A psychoanalytic exploration into the memory and aesthetics of everyday life: Photographs, recollections, and encounters with loss by Mellos, Dimitrios
City University of New York (CUNY)
CUNY Academic Works
Dissertations, Theses, and Capstone Projects Graduate Center
2-2014
A psychoanalytic exploration into the memory and
aesthetics of everyday life: Photographs,
recollections, and encounters with loss
Dimitrios Mellos
Graduate Center, City University of New York
How does access to this work benefit you? Let us know!
Follow this and additional works at: https://academicworks.cuny.edu/gc_etds
Part of the Clinical Psychology Commons, Esthetics Commons, and the Modern Literature
Commons
This Dissertation is brought to you by CUNY Academic Works. It has been accepted for inclusion in All Dissertations, Theses, and Capstone Projects
by an authorized administrator of CUNY Academic Works. For more information, please contact deposit@gc.cuny.edu.
Recommended Citation
Mellos, Dimitrios, "A psychoanalytic exploration into the memory and aesthetics of everyday life: Photographs, recollections, and
encounters with loss" (2014). CUNY Academic Works.
https://academicworks.cuny.edu/gc_etds/73
  
 
 
 
A psychoanalytic exploration into the memory and 
aesthetics of everyday life: Photographs, recollections, and 
encounters with loss 
 
 
By 
 
Dimitrios Mellos 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
A dissertation submitted to the Graduate Faculty in Psychology in partial fulfillment of 
the requirements for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy, The City University of New 
York 
 
2014 
 ii 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
© 2014 
Dimitrios Mellos 
All Rights Reserved 
 iii 
 
The manuscript has been read and accepted for the  
Graduate Faculty in Psychology in satisfaction of the  
Dissertation requirements for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy  
 
 
 
 
 
   
________________________   ___________________________ 
Date        Jeffrey Rosen, Ph.D.  
       Chair of Examining Committee 
 
 
 
________________________   ____________________________ 
Date       Maureen O’Connor, Ph.D. 
       Executive Officer 
 
 
 
       Lissa Weinstein, Ph.D.                      
        
       Diana Diamond, Ph.D.                                                                          
 
       Steve Tuber, Ph.D??                            
 
       Evelyne Ender, Ph.D.                        
 
       Supervisory Committee 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
THE CITY UNIVERSITY OF NEW YORK 
 
 
 iv 
ABSTRACT 
 
A Psychoanalytic Exploration into the Memory and Aesthetics of Everyday Life: 
Photographs, Recollections, and Encounters with Loss 
 
By  
Dimitrios Mellos 
 
Advisor: Professor Jeffrey Rosen   
 
 The project at hand explores some of the psychological functions of photography 
as both an everyday and an artistic cultural practice from a psychoanalytic perspective. It 
is proposed that, contrary to commonsensical opinion, photographs are not accurate 
depositories of memory, but rather function as a functional equivalent of screen 
memories, thus channeling the subject's memory in ways that are objectively distorted 
and distorting, but psychologically meaningful and important; moreover, they are a 
special kind of screen memory in that they are often created pre-emptively and are 
physically instantiated.  
 Additionally, it is suggested that, by dint of their materiality, photographs achieve 
a degree of autonomy from the purposes of their creators and viewers, with the result that 
they can also trigger unwanted and potentially traumatic recollections, along the lines of 
the Freudian notion of ‘deferred action’. Specifically, different ways in which 
photographs can enter into the experiencing and processing of loss are explored. It is 
 v 
proposed that photographs can either facilitate normal mourning or impede it. They can 
be used to either disavow loss, to repetitively fixate on it in a sadomasochistic manner, or 
to facilitate the transition to an acceptance of loss and moving on. Parallels are drawn 
between these various uses of photographs and three types of physical/emotionally 
charged objects: fetishes, transitional objects, and what I term ‘masochistic objects’.   
 The paradox of the accrual of aesthetic value on certain photographs and not 
others is explored next. The attainment of aesthetic value is separated from the conscious 
intentions of the photographer, and is instead linked to certain underlying psychological 
parameters, primarily, the acceptance of the depressive position and of the separateness 
of the libidinal object, as well as the capacity to achieve a controlled surrender to 
primary-process functioning. These conceptualizations are illustrated by reference to 
specific photographs (taken by the author, who is also a recognized photographer), as 
well as through an analysis of several poems of the Greek poet Kiki Dimoula, in whose 
oeuvre photography is a prominent and recurrent theme.  
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INTRODUCTION 
 
 
 A few years ago I had a sudden recollection. I cannot remember what exactly 
triggered it, but there it was: a long-forgotten memory of myself, aged around ten, 
wandering around the house, and taking pictures of various objects with an old Kodak 
Instamatic camera. All of a sudden I was transposed: I could literally feel what it was like 
tiptoeing around the rooms, looking at the light, lifting the camera, pressing the button. I 
could again feel the excitement and the wonder. This recollected image led me to 
remember how fond I was of that camera, and how one day, when my father came home 
from work with some gifts for me and my brother and asked us who wanted what, I 
immediately and without any hesitation had asked for the Instamatic, even though I had 
had no exposure to photography prior to that. I also remembered taking more pictures 
with that camera, on other occasions, in different parts of the house or the garden. Yet, 
these were more ‘cognitive’ memories: their content was more like information; it lacked 
the quality of lived experience. The one instance of using the camera that I could really 
revisit, as if I were reliving it, was that quiet afternoon.  
 And then it struck me; not so much as something I had forgotten, but as 
something I had not paid much attention to, as if it were not particularly unusual or 
puzzling: there was no film in the camera that day when I had been wandering around 
and taking pictures. I could distinctly remember how, far from dampening my 
enthusiasm, that fact had on the contrary fuelled it, as I could just photograph away with 
abandon, with no worries that I would run out of film, no need to ration my pictures. This 
absence of film was not always the case when I was using that Instamatic: indeed, there 
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are still the old faded rectangular pictures in albums at my parents’ house to prove it. And 
yet, it was this instance that had stuck with the intensity and vibrance of lived experience 
in my memory. It then occurred to me that perhaps this was not accidental; that perhaps 
the fact that on that particular occasion the photographic process had been pared down to 
even less than the bare essentials, had indeed become pure process, without a product, 
might have been the reason that experience (or the memory of it) had attained such 
intensity for me, and might be able to reveal something about the motivations and 
psychological rewards that enter into the process of taking pictures. In other words, 
thinking about this vivid memory helped me realize that, even though the two are usually 
closely intertwined, there is an important distinction to be made between photography as 
process and as product, and that these two aspects of photography may be serving distinct 
psychic functions, addressing distinct psychological needs of those in one or another way 
invested in the appreciation and enjoyment of this cultural activity.  
 Even though, following this early obsession with my Instamatic, and perhaps in 
the absence of much encouragement or support of this activity on the part of my family, 
my interest in photography gradually fell by the wayside during my childhood, it re-
emerged many years later, and has now become a dominant preoccupation and passion in 
my life. Given all this, it should be readily apparent why I would have a strong personal 
investment in exploring the uses of photography from a psychoanalytic perspective, thus 
integrating two disciplines that deeply fascinate me. Nevertheless, it seems to me that an 
interest in this topic transcends the personal and idiosyncratic. We as a species have come 
to occupy a world immersed in photographic images – this is not just the case in western, 
developed societies, but, at times counterintuitively, is also a dominant cultural feature of 
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most developing nations, even in places, and among groups of people, one would assume 
hostile to photographic representations. 1  Especially nowadays, still-image-making 
devices seem to be proliferating at an unprecedented pace; it is telling that it would be 
next to impossible to purchase a cell phone without a built-in camera. It seems clear that 
these technological developments speak to a general intense demand for the ability to 
privately create and consume photographs, over and above the institutionalized 
privileging of photographic images in various domains of our culture (e.g. advertising, 
news media, etc.). What intrigues me, then, is not only, or primarily, the psychological 
investment in photography of people for whom photography is a main interest or 
professional activity, but rather the more diffuse investment in photography of our culture 
as a whole, the conscious and unconscious psychological uses photographic images are 
being put to by the average person, and the pleasures afforded to them by photography. In 
some respects, this distinction seems to me to correspond to the one alluded to earlier, 
between photography as process and as product. What I aim to do in this dissertation, 
then, is to explore the psychoanalytic dimensions of both of these aspects of photography, 
even though also recognizing that there may be significant overlap between these two 
ways of relating to photographs – namely, the creation of photographic images, and their 
subsequent revisiting and appreciation. 
 An additional and equally important impetus for my undertaking was provided by 
another personal experience. After a painful breakup, I found myself troubled by all the 
                                                
1 Dworzak (2003) has edited a collection of photos he came across and acquired from 
village photographers in rural Afghanistan, whose studios Taliban fighters habitually 
visited in order to pose and have their portraits taken, notwithstanding the Taliban’s ban 
on representational imagery as un-Islamic – a notorious example of the enforcement of 
which was their destruction of the giant Buddha statues in Bamiyan.  
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photos of my ex girlfriend that I had in my possession. I had cherished those photos, 
many of which were not just pictures of her, but, often, double self-portraits of us side by 
side. The photographs emanated from my past, my history with that person. They were, 
as a rule, photographs that evoked happy memories, from happy times together, as such 
photographs tend to be. And yet, now that that person was no longer in my life (and in 
fact in the wake of an unpleasant and not particularly amicable breakup), these same 
photographs had become much more problematic for me. Looking at them triggered a 
whole spectrum of emotions often at odds with each other, from fleeting pleasure and 
nostalgia, to sadness and regret, to anger and intense pain. The photographs were still the 
same, and yet they had also become something else than before; they had added on layers 
of meaning, had reversed polarity in their psychological valence, or kept oscillating, 
confusingly and frustratingly, between a positive and a negative one. I also oscillated 
between a rather masochistic urge to look at these photographs, and an avoidant stance, a 
temptation to never look at them again, in the interest of my peace of mind. However, 
there was never the slightest question of actually getting rid of them – throwing away 
what prints I had, or deleting the files from my computer. This would have been 
inconceivable for me, even though I am aware that that is precisely the reaction of some 
people finding themselves in a similar situation. Regardless of the particulars of one’s 
handling of this conundrum, though, what my predicament helped me realize was the 
deep entanglement of photographs in processes of grief and mourning, as well as the 
complicated temporality and emotional multi-dimensionality characterizing them.   
 In this dissertation, then, I set out to explore in some depth the relations people 
enter into, both with photographs as such, as well as with the activity of taking 
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photographs, utilizing a broad psychoanalytic theoretical framework. It was with nothing 
short of astonishment that I discovered, during the initial stages of my research, the 
almost absolute dearth of articles – let alone books – on photography in the 
psychoanalytic literature.2 This lacuna is all the more striking given the vast amount of 
psychoanalytic writing on other arts. My suspicion is that this lack may have something 
to do with the dual aspect of photography, as both an artistic practice but also an 
extremely widespread everyday activity; in other words, the fact that it is so omnipresent 
may in a way have rendered photography invisible as a cultural practice, much in the 
same manner that, under normal circumstances, we are not aware of the oxygen we 
breathe. In some sense, its very ubiquitousness may have inclined psychoanalytic 
theoreticians to take photography for granted. Thus, a point of departure for thinking 
about photography critically would entail problematizing this activity, taking a second 
look at it, as if we were naïve outsiders to a strange foreign culture, instead of taking it 
for granted and assuming that it is self-evident why we take photographs.  
 In undertaking this dissertation, then, part of my agenda was to lay the 
groundwork for a more comprehensive and systematic psychoanalytic approach to 
photography than has hitherto been available; ultimately, apart from whatever intellectual 
value it might have as such, this kind of theoretical framework could also generate 
                                                
2 This having been said, psychoanalytic ideas and concepts have clearly informed the 
thinking of scholars such as Roland Barthes (1980) and Susan Sontag (1977), whose 
writings on photography have attained iconic status. Nevertheless, it is still remarkable 
that psychoanalysts themselves, as well as critics and scholars working within a mainly 
psychoanalytic theoretical framework, seem to have all but ignored photography. The 
handful of articles in the literature (Mühl, 1927; Fox, 1957; Colson, 1979) mostly 
approach photography from a narrow viewpoint of instinctual conflict, compromise 
formation, and the need for mastery, even though Colson also links photography to 
mourning processes.  
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empirical research on some of the hypotheses that will be proffered here, but also inform 
clinical practice, to the extent that people’s engagement with photography, in one way or 
another, is almost universal. Thus, not only does it seem to be the case, on the basis of 
anecdotal evidence, that some patients spontaneously bring photographs into the therapy 
space, but, possibly, therapists could also assume a more active role in encouraging 
patients to engage with personal photographs in the context of therapy, if the facts of the 
case indicate that such an engagement might facilitate the progress of treatment and the 
patient’s production of material and processing and resolution of conflicts. A solid and 
nuanced conceptual framework would allow such a therapeutic engagement with 
photography to be more informed, fine-tuned, and sophisticated than what seems to 
currently be the case in the fledgling field of photo therapy.  
 As already implied in my previous comments, there are three main axes or pivots 
to this dissertation: a discussion of photography as it relates to memory, of photography 
in connection with loss, and of artistic creativity and aesthetic value in regard to 
photography.  
 Chapter 1 is devoted to the interface of photography and memory. I begin my 
discussion with an overview of the academic literature on memory, in order to set the 
stage for a novel conceptualization of photographs as memorial devices. I present the 
case for a constructivist understanding of memory, as a process of putting memories 
together at the time of recall, in contrast to the obsolete conception of recollection as 
analogous to the retrieval of discrete, immutable files from a mental archive. The 
respective roles of memory traces and cues in this constructivist process of recollection 
are explored, as well as the puzzling tenaciousness of the belief in the permanence and 
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accuracy of memory traces, despite overwhelming evidence to the contrary. I then move 
on to the psychoanalytic understanding of memory, and specifically to a detailed 
exposition of the concept of screen memories. I focus not just on an explication of this 
concept per se, but also on an unresolved dialectic discernible in Freud’s thinking on this 
topic, which can be read as indicative of his own very ambivalent stance toward the 
notion of memory as constructed vs. a notion of memory as more straightforwardly 
linear, accurate, and truthful; subsequently in the chapter, I suggest that this ambivalence 
and uncertainty in regard to the accuracy of memory is something that most of us are 
troubled by, and enters into the unconscious motivations and specific ways in which we 
use photographs defensively. In the third section of Chapter 1, I propose a novel 
conceptualization of photographs in connection with memory: I endorse the 
commonsensical conception of photographs as memorial devices, but turn it on its head, 
so to speak, claiming that photographs can be construed as reified screen memory 
analogues, serving a functionally equivalent purpose in our psychic economy. 
Essentially, my claim is that, far from being safe depositories of accurate and permanent 
memories, photographs in fact distort and channel our memories in the service of psychic 
defense. Moreover, unlike screen memories themselves, photographs are often pre-
emptively created with just such a defensive purpose in mind. I present several 
hypotheses as to what photographs may be screening against, including the full range and 
complexity of emotional experience, the fallibility of our memory, and the awareness of 
the embeddedness of our existence in time. In the context of this discussion, I present a 
case for conceptualizing photographs as providing an attenuated form of hallucinatory 
wish-fulfillment. 
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 In Chapter 2, I discuss the implication of photographs in the negotiating of loss, 
that is, in processes of grief and mourning. I begin with an analysis of the Freudian notion 
of Nachträglichkeit (also known as deferred action, or, preferably, afterwardness), and 
the temporal dynamics of trauma; specifically, the way in which some piece of 
knowledge acquired at a later point in time can retroactively affect and alter the meaning 
and psychological valence of an earlier experience, thus rendering it traumatic after the 
fact. I proceed to suggest that photographs, insofar as they are objects with some kind of 
physical instantiation, attain a degree of autonomy from the human agents creating them 
and their conscious or unconscious intentions; one corollary of this is that they lend 
themselves to subsequent revisions of their meaning and significance according to the 
mechanism of deferred action. Such subsequent accruals of meaning can take a traumatic 
form, instigating a trauma after the fact, but, alternatively, can also lead to a reappraisal 
and belated assimilation of a reality that had been ignored, misperceived or disavowed in 
the past but can be revisited and integrated through photographs. In the next section of 
this chapter I discuss mourning, distinguishing between normal and pathological forms of 
mourning; the former are characterized by an ability to gradually accept loss and move 
on, while the latter are associated with psychic stasis, taking the form of either manic 
denial or unresolved melancholic grief. I then proceed to suggest that photographs can be 
used to either facilitate or to evade mourning: in processes of melancholic fixation, they 
function as sadomasochistic objects; when utilized as props for manic denial or disavowal 
of loss, they function as analogs to fetishes; while, in more favorable outcomes, they can 
function as transitional objects, fostering the acceptance and overcoming of loss, and, 
under certain circumstances, even sublimating grief into creativity. Thus, it becomes 
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apparent as a corollary to this discussion that it is not some essential, inherent nature of 
an object that determines the psychological uses that the object is being put to in one’s 
psychic economy.  
 In the next chapter, I proceed to shift the relative emphasis on the process of 
photographic creation, rather than on the subsequent uses of its products. The main 
question I attempt to address is that of aesthetic value; insofar as photography is both an 
artistic but also a widespread everyday cultural practice, and, moreover, to the extent that 
the operation of the apparatus of photography does not necessitate a high level of 
technical expertise, I suggest that it is fruitful to explore the possibility that what 
differentiates a photograph with aesthetic value from one lacking in such value may be 
the presence of certain psychological parameters in the photographer or, indeed, in both 
photographer and subject. I begin with an overview of Freud’s aesthetic theories, and 
conclude that, ultimately, Freud failed to pursue his most pertinent and promising insights 
about aesthetics and creativity; thus, a classical Freudian framework is deemed 
inadequate to tackle the issue of aesthetic value. I then proceed with a broad overview of 
post-Freudian theories of psychoanalytic aesthetics, focusing on the British school, and 
primarily on the work of Melanie Klein, Hanna Segal, Marion Milner and Adrian Stokes. 
In the final section of this chapter, I attempt to apply the insights of those theoreticians 
specifically to photography, something that, to my knowledge, has not been done before. 
I draw a link between the attainment of aesthetic value and a true reparative urge in the 
Kleinian sense, that is, an eschewing of omnipotent manic control in conjunction with a 
non-defensive acceptance of loss and emotional ambivalence, both on the part of the 
photographer, and, in the case of posed portraits, also on the part of the photographed 
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subjects. Thus, the issue of aesthetic value in photography is, in fact, shown to be closely 
connected to the themes addressed in the previous chapters, namely, the defensive 
utilization of photographs as screen memories, as well as the use of photographs to 
facilitate or evade mourning. I conclude this chapter with a brief discussion of some of 
my own photographs, for purposes of illustrating these points, but with no presumption of 
being able to either prove these hypotheses conclusively, or, indeed, of being able to 
attain anything approaching complete lucidity when it comes to the analysis of my own 
work.  
 Finally, in chapter 4, which forms a sort of coda to this dissertation, I again 
attempt to ground the conceptual analysis presented hitherto and give it some more 
concrete content, by applying some of the ideas put forth to an analysis of the work of 
Kiki Dimoula, a very major figure in contemporary Greek poetry. Dimoula’s work is 
very pertinent to my purposes, insofar as time, memory, loss, and our relation to 
photographs are all preeminent themes throughout her oeuvre. For the purposes of this 
final chapter, I carried out a translation of all relevant poems from scratch, as, after 
careful examination, I couldn’t avoid the conclusion that existing English translations are, 
to a lesser or greater extent, unsatisfactory and often unsound. Again, such an analysis of 
Dimoula’s poetry as I could offer is not put forth as in any way exhaustive, definitive, or 
demonstrable; rather, a reading of the poems just helps to bring into relief and make less 
abstract some of the theoretical ideas advanced in this dissertation.  
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CHAPTER 1: ON PHOTOGRAPHY AND MEMORY 
 
I. Memory: some basics 
  
 Even though the pivot of my investigation of the connections between 
photography and memory will be the psychoanalytic theory of screen memories, a brief 
foray into the concept of memory in general will provide an orienting framework for my 
subsequent conceptualizations. And while memory is a faculty apparently possessed by 
many diverse species, the following discussion specifically pertains to human memory.  
 ‘Memory’ is an umbrella concept, encompassing a wide set of diverse cognitive 
abilities (Schacter, 1996; Sutton, 2012); their common denominator could be said to be 
the influence of the past on the present and future, via the mediation of the human brain. 
Memory is the capacity to assemble information from past experience (including 
information that the individual acquired intentionally as well as a vast amount acquired 
without specifically intending to do so) and to use that information for present purposes, 
or, more generally, be influenced or affected (either consciously or non-consciously) by it 
in the present. The past can manifest itself in the present (in terms of one’s behavior and 
mental life in general) in various ways. Thus, I can say that I remember the face of my 
dead grandmother; the vacation I took when I was 18; I remember how to drive a car or 
add a sum; I remember the name of the President or the sequence of the letters in the 
alphabet; I remember to water my plants every week, and I remember what I had for 
lunch earlier today. It can even be said that I remember how to button my shirt or identify 
danger, even though I may not remember having ever initially learned to do so. The 
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above mundane examples should make evident both the diversity and the similarities 
between the various mental acts and capacities that we categorize under the concept of 
memory.  
 Let’s make this typology a little more explicit. One fundamental distinction that 
psychologists draw is that between declarative and non-declarative memory (Squire, 
1994; Schacter, 1996; Sutton, 2012). Declarative memories can be accessed and 
articulated verbally, whereas non-declarative memories are preverbal or non-verbal. 
Another way of putting this is that declarative memories have the potential for being 
consciously recalled, whereas non-declarative memories may affect current behavior 
without the necessity of conscious awareness; this will become clearer in what follows.  
 Non-declarative memory is usually taken to be coextensive with procedural 
memory, the ability to learn certain motor or cognitive skills, and, more generally, to 
“know how to do things” (Schacter, 1996, p. 135); it covers a spectrum “from simpler 
forms of associative learning through to kinesthetic, skill, and sequence memory” 
(Sutton, 2012). It has to do with remembering how; for instance, how to ski or to play the 
piano or how to read. Typically, the skills in which procedural memory is implicated 
automatically give rise to the performance of actions, without conscious awareness; 
moreover, these skills are not mediated verbally and are in fact often very difficult to put 
into words. Even though, as mentioned, most psychologists equate non-declarative 
memory with procedural memory, Mancia (2007) intriguingly suggests that another 
aspect of non-declarative memory is “emotional and affective memory, where the brain 
stores its recollections of emotions arousing from affective experiences of the child’s 
earliest relations with the environment” (p. 32); these recollections are “formed in the 
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earliest, preverbal and presymbolic stages of life” (2007, p. 48), and are therefore forever 
beyond the reach of conscious awareness. In terms of the links between affective and 
procedural memory, it can also be pointed out that ‘knowing how to’ do something is 
closely coupled with ‘knowing whether’ it is pertinent or advisable to do or not do it, so 
by association the former type of knowledge is linked to affective memory.  
The category of declarative memory encompasses two major subcategories: 
semantic and episodic memory (Tulving, 1972; Schacter, 1996). Semantic memory 
comprises remembering facts and conceptual information about the world (in the present 
or the past). In other words, it has to do with remembering that such-and-such is the case, 
for instance that Obama is the current President, that there are 24 hours in the day, or that 
Bach was a great 18th century German composer. Episodic memory, on the other hand, 
has to do with information specifically pertaining to the rememberer; it is uniquely 
personal in that it refers to experienced events and episodes from the rememberer’s life. It 
is important to note that episodic memory is always contextualized, in the sense that 
episodic memories are always embedded into a particular context, a particular moment 
(in the extended sense) of the rememberer’s history, that is, a particular time and place, 
whereas semantic memory is largely de-contextualized. Episodic memories are memories 
of incidents that the rememberer has experienced from a first-person perspective. Thus, 
remembering the date of my birth is a semantic, not an episodic, memory, even though it 
refers to my personal history – it is a piece of factual information, and it is independent of 
a personal context. But remembering where I was and what I was doing when I heard that 
Obama was elected as President is an episodic memory, despite also referring to a factual 
piece of information about the world, because it essentially entails a reference to myself 
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as a participant in the recollected scene. The “subjective experience” (Schacter, 1996, p. 
17) of the rememberer is the hallmark of episodic memory; crucially, the conviction that I 
(the rememberer) directly experienced the occurrence of the remembered episode that 
forms the content of the memory. As Tulving writes,  
The particular state of consciousness that characterizes the experience of 
remembering includes the rememberer’s belief that the memory is a more or less 
true replica of the original event, even if only a fragmented and hazy one, as well 
as the belief that the event is part of his own past. Remembering, for the 
rememberer, is mental time travel, a sort of reliving of something that happened 
in the past. (1983, p. 127)   
Indeed, the way in which we seem to be invested in their accuracy is a very significant 
feature of our episodic memories; in both semantic and episodic memories “we seek to 
track the truth” (Sutton, 2012; see also Poole, 2008), but we tend to be particularly 
distraught when the veracity or accuracy of our episodic memories is challenged; this is 
especially true of such episodes as are fraught with autobiographical/identity-forming 
significance.  
 An important dimension of episodic memories, especially for purposes of my 
subsequent discussion, is the point of view or vantage point from which the rememberer 
experiences the recollected scene. Specifically, one can either ‘see’ the recollected scene 
through one’s imaginary eyes, so to speak – that is, as if one was re-experiencing the 
scene as a participant in it, from one’s own unique perceptual perspective; or, 
alternatively, one can visualize the recollected scene as a detached observer, 
incorporating one’s own person as a physical object in the scene, as if one had become 
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disembodied and was seeing oneself in the context of one’s surroundings (Nigro & 
Neisser, 1983; Schacter, 1996). These two different modes of remembering episodes 
from one’s life are designated as ‘field’ and ‘observer’ memories, respectively. 
Significantly, Freud (1899a) anticipated this discovery by many decades; but more of this 
later.  
 What is immediately apparent from the existence of these two distinct modes of 
episodic remembering in people’s phenomenological awareness is the fact that, even in 
the case of recollections that carry a strong conviction of directly stemming from lived 
experience, some significant mental processing and reorganization is taking place, as it is 
obviously absurd that a person could have experienced the original episode giving rise to 
the memory from a disembodied perspective. It is thus clearly not the case that a memory 
is an exact replica of the original experience that it ostensibly points to. 
 Even more intriguingly, however, there are additional dimensions to the ‘field’ 
and ‘observer’ distinction. Thus, Nigro and Neisser (1983) found a correlation between 
the two types of episodic memory and the time distance separating the recollection from 
the original event; people tended to assume an observer perspective in memories referring 
to more distant past events, while they were more likely to assume the field perspective 
when the recollected events were more recent. Additionally, when research subjects were 
instructed to focus more on the feelings associated with each past episode, they were 
more likely to experience field memories; while when they were asked to focus on the 
objective circumstances of the past episode, they tended to produce observer memories. 
However, situations that objectively entailed a high degree of emotionality were “most 
likely to be recalled with an observer perspective” (Nigro & Neisser, 1983, p. 467); 
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presumably, as if too much emotion is hard to bear, and gives rise to a more detached 
mode of recollection. Another important point to note from this research is that many 
subjects claimed they could switch perspectives at will. In a related, more recent study, 
Robinson and Swanson (1993) set out to test whether the affective experience associated 
with episodic memories was impacted by such a switch in perspectives. They found that 
the affect reportedly experienced by rememberers decreased when there was a shift from 
a field to an observer perspective, but, interestingly, not vice-versa. Importantly, the 
decrease in affective experience reported following a shift from the field to the observer 
perspective did not just involve the affect rememberers experienced in the present, at the 
time of recollection, but also had to do with the intensity of affect they attributed to the 
original experience. In sum, these findings suggest that “a qualitative characteristic of 
personal memories – the perspective from which they are experienced – is apparently 
related to characteristics of the original event, to the individual's purpose in recalling that 
event, and to the reported recall interval” (Nigro & Neisser, 1983, p. 467). In other 
words, “The way you remember and event depends on your purposes and goals at the 
time that you attempt to recall it … the emotions that you attribute to the past may 
sometimes arise from the way in which you set out to retrieve a memory in the present” 
(Schacter, 1996, p. 22). The importance of this finding for my subsequent discussion will 
eventually become apparent; even though it has to be noted that the way Schacter 
expresses this point tends to imply an overvaluation of conscious intention, which, in my 
opinion, can be misleading.   
Two other important distinctions are drawn in the memory literature: between 
implicit and explicit memory, and between ‘remembering’ and ‘knowing’ (Schacter, 
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1996). Often the contrast between explicit and implicit memory is taken to be 
synonymous to that between declarative and non-declarative memory; however, it is 
more cogent to conceptualize certain (although not all) implicit memories as potentially 
accessible to conscious awareness and verbalization. Implicit memory designates 
situations where “people are influenced by a past experience without any awareness that 
they are remembering” (Schacter, 1996, p. 161). Clearly, procedural memory falls under 
this rubric, as well as Mancia’s (2007) conception of the non-repressed unconscious and 
emotional memory, not to mention episodic memories that may be repressed (and thus 
recoverable in principle, i.e. able to become explicit). Moreover, Schacter and his 
colleagues (McAndrews, Glisky, & Schacter, 1987; Schacter, 1996) demonstrated that 
semantic, conceptual knowledge can also be implicitly operative.  
The contrast between ‘knowing’ and ‘remembering’ has to do with a qualitative 
difference in the conscious, subjective phenomenological experience of the rememberer 
(Tulving, 1985; Schacter, 1996). Thus, sometimes we have a clear and unequivocal sense 
of remembering something, an inner conviction that we are recalling something from our 
past; at other times, we experience a vague sense of familiarity regarding someone or 
something, without quite being able to put our finger on the past event(s) from which this 
sense of familiarity ostensibly stems. To take an example that probably everyone has 
experienced at some point, sometimes we see someone on the street or at some social 
gathering and we ‘know’ that we have met this person before, but cannot recall either 
who they are or the circumstances of our prior meeting. Very importantly, Schacter 
(1996), summarizing the relevant research, suggests that the “recall of visual information 
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about the physical setting or context of an event is crucial to having a ‘remember’ 
experience” (p. 23).  
Let us now turn from these typological considerations to an examination of the 
actual process of memory. Schematically, we can describe three main components or 
stages comprising the overall cognitive process that we call memory: these are the 
encoding, storage, and retrieval of past experiences and information. Even though for 
purposes of exposition I will now attempt to briefly discuss each of these separately, their 
interconnections will also become apparent; indeed, the functioning of memory turns on 
the fluid articulation of all these sub-processes.  
An important preliminary consideration is to note that, for memories to be 
genuine recollections of past events, it logically and conceptually follows that there must 
be a causal thread running from encoding to storage to retrieval (Martin & Deutscher, 
1966); that is, the recollected memories causally depend on, and derive from, the 
remembered experiences. This, in turn, implies that there must be some kind of residue of 
the original experience that is left and stored in the rememberer’s brain, which provides 
the causal intermediary that bridges the temporal gap between the recollected experience 
and its recollection in the present. This is the idea of a memory trace: “Once we accept 
the causal model for memory we must also accept the existence of some sort of trace, or 
structural analogue of what was experienced” (Martin & Deutscher, 1966, p. 189).  
This much seems straightforward. However, the question then becomes what 
exactly is the nature of these memory traces. The naïve, commonsensical conception that 
most people seem to endorse is that memory traces are “passive or literal recordings of 
reality” (Schacter, 1996, p. 5), that is, exact replicas of the original experiences that are 
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somehow stored in the brain intact, only to be pulled out one by one as needed. As the 
great pioneer of memory studies Frederic Bartlett wrote (only to immediately afterwards 
proceed to undermine and qualify this commonsensical conception),  
From a general point of view it looks as if the simplest explanation available is to 
suppose that when any specific event occurs some trace, or some group of traces, 
is made and stored up in the organism or in the mind. Later, an immediate 
stimulus re-excites the trace, or group of traces, and, provided a further 
assumption is made to the effect that the trace somehow carries with it a temporal 
sign, the re-excitement appears to be equivalent to recall. There is, of course, no 
direct evidence for such traces, but the assumption at first sight seems to be a very 
simple one, and so it has commonly been made. (1932, Chapter X, §1)  
This conception has adopted different guises throughout history, in reference to the 
technologies prevalent at each time. Thus, in the Theatetus, Plato (1997) suggests that 
memory is like a wax tablet, onto which our perceptions and thoughts stamp impressions 
of themselves, to remain there forever after. More recently, the mind has been commonly 
compared to a warehouse or archive, where again memories are filed or stored away, 
object-like. Computers have furnished yet another reiteration of this metaphor, with the 
brain seen as analogous to a hard disc or some similar data-recording device. Last but 
certainly not least, another intuitive, commonsensical conception sees memory as 
analogous to a sound or video recording, storing away mental films and snapshots of the 
rememberer’s experiences. Note that there are two important dimensions to all of these 
conceptions: the idea that memory traces are accurate, exact replicas of experience, and 
in a relationship of one-to-one correspondence to the experiences they derive from, as 
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well as the idea that memory traces, once imprinted on the mind, are permanent and 
unalterable, even if not always readily accessible at will.  
Intuitively appealing and widespread as such a conception of memory traces may 
be, more recent advances in memory research indicate that it is flatly inaccurate. 
Psychologists, cognitive scientists, and researchers in other related disciplines have been 
converging toward a constructivist theory of memory, the idea that our memory stores 
our knowledge and experiences not wholesale but in bits and pieces, which are then 
recombined and altered in the course of recollection (Neisser, 1967; Tulving, 1983; 
Damasio, 1994; Schacter, 1996). That is, memory traces are now recognized to be much 
more dynamic and fluid entities than previously thought. Yet, false as the 
commonsensical conception of memory as a literal, accurate recording of reality stored in 
the brain may be, it is clear that some kind of change or transformation occurs in the brain 
when memory ensues from perception and experience. Memory traces, also known as 
engrams, are “the transient or enduring changes in our brains that result from encoding an 
experience” (Schacter 1996, p. 58); they are the neurological vehicle “that conserves the 
effects of experience across time” (Schacter, 1996, p. 57).  
Before going into some of the neuroscience of memory, let’s see how findings 
from the psychological investigation of the processes of encoding and recall both point, 
from opposite directions, toward the dynamic and fluid character of engrams and a 
constructivist conception of memory.  
By ‘encoding’ we designate “a procedure for transforming something a person 
sees, hears, thinks, or feels into a memory” (Schacter, 1996, p. 42), ‘memory’ here 
referring to the memory trace or traces stored in the brain, not a subsequently recollected 
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memory. Research has shown that not all encoding processes are created equal – it is not 
enough for something to just be perceived in order to be encoded in memory in the shape 
of a permanent engram. Note the word “transforming” in the above quotation: the way in 
which events are attended to and processed cognitively influences the way they are 
encoded and stored. Thus, when incoming information is attended to in a way that 
endows it with meaningful semantic associations, it tends to be recalled more accurately 
and for longer than if it was only attended to in a superficial and semantically shallow 
way (Craik & Lockhart, 1972; Lockhart & Craik, 1990); this effect is known as ‘depth of 
processing’. Another term for deep encoding is ‘elaborative encoding’: the gist of this 
concept is that by cognitively elaborating on incoming information by drawing semantic 
connections between it and other information that one already knows and remembers, the 
likelihood that the new information will also be consolidated in memory increases (Craik 
& Tulving, 1975; Schacter 1996). It is also interesting to note that the level of conscious, 
intentional effort one makes in storing something in memory does not by itself 
necessarily have any effect on the success of the encoding task, unless the intention to 
remember gives rise to elaborative encoding strategies (Hyde & Jenkins, 1973). 
Inversely, most memorable experiences that seem to be indelibly imprinted in memory 
and are effortlessly recalled were not initially attended to “with any particular intention to 
remember them” (Schacter, 1996, p. 45). Schacter suggests that “a kind of natural 
selection drives us. What we already know shapes what we select and encode; things that 
are meaningful to us spontaneously elicit the kind of elaborations that promote later 
recall” (1996, p. 45-6). And again: “We remember only what we have encoded, and what 
we encode depends on who we are – our past experiences, knowledge, and needs all have 
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a powerful influence on what we retain. This is one reason why two different people can 
sometimes have radically divergent recollections of the same event” (Schacter, 1996, p. 
52).  
At the other end of the memory process, what is it that enables encoded memory 
traces to be reactivated and re-emerge so as to give rise to experiences of recollection? 
After all, it would seem that at any given time there are innumerable memory traces lying 
dormant in our brains, which, under the right circumstances, are somehow retrieved and 
causally give rise to explicit memories; conversely, at any given moment we are 
consciously aware of just a small subset of the plethora of information and episodes that 
are presumably stored in our memory. Dormant memory traces are reawakened in 
response to some cue or other. Such retrieval cues can take many forms, but they are in 
one way or another associatively related to the original experience that is to be recalled. 
A cue can be part of the external world, part of one’s own mind, or even one’s overall 
current state of mind in general (more of this later). For instance, finding myself again in 
a city or house I had not visited in years may bring forth a host of memories about my 
last visit there, memories that I may even never have recalled before in all the intervening 
time. Or if, browsing through my books, I happen to come across a book that was given 
to me as a gift years ago, such an encounter might ensue in various memories about the 
person who gave me the book all that time ago, and even a vivid recollection of the 
circumstances and the exact moment when this gift was presented to me. The most 
famous example of all, of course, is the episode where, after a chance event when he 
tastes a madeleine dipped in tea, a torrent of memories of his childhood is released upon 
Proust’s narrator (Proust, 1913/2003). Alternatively, a cue can be provided by the 
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operations of one’s own mind. For instance, if, for whatever reason (this is irrelevant for 
purposes of exposition) I happen to think of the name of one of my classmates from 
elementary school, that single name can serve as a cue for me to recall the names of 
several others from my old class. And even one’s general state of mind can affect recall: 
for instance, if one was intoxicated during the encoding of an event, they may later on 
have trouble remembering what they encoded, but, counterintuitively, their recollection 
improves if they become inebriated again so as to approximate the state under which the 
original experience occurred – this is the concept of state-dependent retrieval (Eich, 
1989; Eich, 1995; Schacter, 1996).   
Thus, a subtle and complicated interplay takes place between the conditions of 
encoding and the conditions of recall, which may ensue in either successful recollection 
or a failure of explicit recall, depending on the presence of a good fit between memory 
traces and cues. In other words, even if an event was deeply, elaboratively encoded, it 
may still fail to rise to conscious recollection in the absence of the right cue(s); 
additionally, even if there is no shortage of cues connected to that event, accurate 
recollection may again fail if those cues are not closely related to the rememberer’s initial 
encoding. This is known as the encoding specificity principle: “Specific encoding 
operations performed on what is perceived determine what is stored, and what is stored 
determines what retrieval cues are effective in providing access to what is stored” 
(Tulving & Thomson, 1973, p. 369). This implies, as Schacter observes, that 
“superficially encoded events can be remembered more accurately than deeply encoded 
events when people are given retrieval cues that match exactly a shallow encoding” 
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(1996, p. 62). The importance of this point for my specific conceptualization of 
photographs as mnemonic devices will become apparent in the course of the discussion.  
Yet retrieval cues are not mere triggers whose function is exhausted in simply 
reactivating a memory trace that was until that time lying dormant in the brain. The 
reactivated memory, the subjective phenomenological experience of recollection, is not 
identical to whatever engram(s) relating to a past event are stored in memory (Schacter, 
1996). On the contrary, research findings indicate that what everyday language calls a 
memory is a composite product, “like a giant jigsaw puzzle” (Schacter, 1996, p. 87), put 
together out of memory traces, the properties of retrieval cues themselves, as well as 
other factors such as the rememberer’s current attitude, emotions, and goals (Loftus & 
Palmer, 1974; Schacter, 1996; Bartlett, 1932; Tulving, 1983). As Schacter writes, “the 
cue combines with the engram to yield a new, emergent entity – the recollective 
experience of the rememberer – that differs from either of its constituents” (1996, p. 70).  
In other words, memory is an essentially constructive and combinatorial process. 
How is this process implemented in the neural machinery of the brain? Without getting 
into any detail, the basic mechanism postulated is that “memory involves biochemical-
molecular and structural events at the junctions where neurons meet” (Mancia, 2007, p. 
36), that is, a strengthening of the synaptic connections between neurons or even the 
creation of new synapses and thus new neural circuits in the brain (Kandel, Schwartz, & 
Jessell, 1994; Kandel 1999; Kandel 2001). However, any single event, especially when 
we’re talking about episodic memories, is comprised of myriad perceptual elements, 
across all the various sensory modalities (not to mention all the other mental elements 
present at the time of the initial experience, such as one’s emotions and thoughts). Thus, 
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there is no one engram corresponding to the encoding of a memory, but rather multiple 
bits and pieces of information stored around innumerable neural circuits in the brain 
(Schacter, 1996). How are these myriad scattered memory traces recombined at the time 
of recall, to reconstitute the remembered experience in the mind’s eye? Damasio (1989, 
1994) has proposed that there are certain ‘convergence zones’ in the brain, which 
function as control centers for other neural circuits. These convergence zones contain 
what he calls ‘dispositional representations’: these are neural patterns that literally 
dispose other neural networks to be activated in such a way as to approximately 
reconstitute an encoded experience by recombining its constituent elements. Many 
researchers believe that the medial temporal region of the brain is the primary, most 
critical convergence zone, containing a kind of index pointing to the locations of memory 
traces across different cortical regions (Damasio, 1989, 1994; Schacter, 1996; Squire, 
1987, 1992). Damasio writes: “What dispositional representations hold in store in their 
little commune of synapses is not a picture per se, but a means to reconstitute ‘a picture’” 
(1994, p. 102). Note the quotation marks around the word “picture” in this quote; 
Damasio explains that “[t]he brain does not file Polaroid pictures of people, objects, 
landscapes … these mental images are momentary constructions, attempts at replication 
of patterns that were once experienced, in which the probability of exact replication is 
low but the probability of substantial replication can be higher or lower, depending on the 
circumstances in which the images were learned and are being recalled” (1994, p. 100-1). 
What do these findings on the neurobiological underpinnings of memory imply 
regarding the permanence of memory traces in the brain? Does the fact that the encoding 
of experience literally alters the physical structure of the brain’s neural circuits prove that 
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memories remain forever imprinted somewhere in that neural architecture? Undoubtedly, 
phenomenological experience as well as experimental data indicate that the ability to 
recall events as a rule decreases as a function of the passage of time (Loftus & Loftus, 
1980; Schacter, 1996). However, that fact by itself does not necessarily prove that the 
engrams fade away or even dissipate altogether with time. It may be the case that 
engrams become harder and harder to retrieve as time passes because of interference with 
later events, a kind of cluttering of subsequently encoded engrams, so to speak; for 
example, it may be easy to remember what I had for lunch today, but it will be much 
harder to remember what I had for lunch a month ago, simply because so many other 
lunches have taken place in the meantime. Alternatively, proponents of the permanence 
of engrams also suggest that the increasing difficulty of retrieval as time passes may be 
simply due to a lack of appropriate retrieval cues, the operation of which is often 
serendipitous and subject to chance. After all, we saw earlier how the right, even if 
unlikely, cue, can often trigger vivid, detailed memories of events that seemed, up to that 
point, completely forgotten (recall the incident with Proust’s narrator and the madeleine 
dipped in tea). Such experiences, known to all of us, would indeed seem to suggest that 
our memories always remain stored in there somewhere, intact, even if not just the 
memories themselves, but the memory of these memories is outside our conscious 
awareness (by the term ‘memory of these memories’ I mean the sense that something 
ought to be remembered, even if currently it is not: for instance, if I try to recall who 
attended my birthday party last year, I have a sense that this is a piece of information that 
I did possess at some time – I have a memory of having had this memory in the past. It’s 
a different thing to, all of a sudden, remember an event from my distant past whose very 
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existence I had forgotten: for instance, to become aware of scenes from a birthday party 
when I was 10, the very occurrence of which I had forgotten during the intervening 
decades).  
On the other hand, neurobiological research (Bailey & Chen, 1989; Kandel, 2006) 
with simple invertebrate organisms has demonstrated that the changes in neurons and 
synaptic connections that underlie simple forms of memory may in fact be reversible, and 
may become weakened or even “literally fade away over time” (Schacter, 1996, p. 78). 
Although it is not clear how these findings would translate to mammals, let alone 
humans, they do suggest the possibility that our memory traces, too, may fade away to 
the point of nonexistence with the passage of time. Schacter (1996) reasonably proposes a 
more nuanced, dialectical approach to this debate: it does not have to be either one or the 
other explanation, either that engrams disappear or that they always remain “fully intact” 
(1996, p. 78) albeit, for whatever reason, inaccessible. Rather, “we need to refine our 
ideas about why forgetting occurs. It seems likely that as time passes, interference from 
new experiences makes it progressively more difficult to find a retrieval cue that elicits 
an increasingly blurred engram” (1996, p. 79).   
What is most interesting about this debate for my present purposes, however, is 
how skewed the distribution of opinions regarding the permanence of memory traces is, 
despite the fact that the available data are, at the present state of our knowledge, open to 
both of the possibilities described above, let alone to a more moderate, middle-ground 
position, like the one proposed by Schacter. Thus, Loftus and Loftus (1980) surveyed 
both psychologists and non-psychologists as to which of two theories of forgetting they 
espoused: whether, that is, they believed that every experience is permanently stored in 
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the mind and is potentially recoverable, or whether they thought that some of the contents 
of our memory may fade away and be eventually permanently lost. A stunning 84% of 
the respondents who had graduate training in psychology espoused the first hypothesis; 
14% chose the second position, and only 2% gave some other answer. Out of the non-
psychologists, a slightly smaller percentage (69%) chose the first option, 23% chose the 
other position, and 8% indicated some other choice (Loftus & Loftus, 1980, p. 410). 
Given the fact that this hypothesis is in no way corroborated by the available 
neurobiological evidence, although “it can never be disproved on purely psychological 
grounds” (Schacter, 1996, p. 78), I would like to claim that this overwhelming preference 
for the idea that memories are forever preserved in the brain intact would seem to suggest 
that emotional factors are at work here, in other words, wishful thinking. There seems to 
be something comforting to the idea that our memories are forever stored safely in our 
brains, and this idea seems to be comforting even despite the demonstrable fact that, all 
too often, recollection fails. The belief in this hypothesized indestructibility and 
permanence of memory is reminiscent of a belief in an invincible deity, a permanent 
albeit invisible and intangible presence; a permanent presence, moreover, from whose 
vantage point our own lives are minutely and wholly visible. I will return to the 
implications of this point later.  
Going back to the more measured idea that there is an interaction of variables, 
namely, that with the passage of time, not only may engrams fade and become “blurred” 
(Schacter, 1996, p. 79), but interference from accumulated new experience may 
simultaneously make it progressively harder to come up with the right retrieval cues, 
another important implication of such a state of affairs arises. As we saw earlier, a 
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recollected memory is in any case a composite construction, like a “giant jigsaw puzzle” 
put together from multiple elements; memory traces and cues play a prominent role 
among these elements. However, the relative contribution of the traces and the cues 
toward the end product varies. In fact, they would seem to vary in inverse ratio: the 
greater the contribution of the engrams, the smaller that of the cues, and vice-versa. This 
is similar to the Freudian concept of a ‘complemental series’ (Freud, 1916-17), which 
refers to an aetiological/causal continuum; any point along such a continuum corresponds 
to a particular mixture of contributing factors, and any such combination of causal factors 
can bring about a similar outcome. As far as memories are concerned, the inverse ratio 
between the relative contribution of engrams and cues toward an experience of 
recollection appears to be, among other things, a function of time (Schacter, 1996). 
Specifically, other things being equal, “when memory is probed soon after an event, the 
engram is a rich source of information and may even be the dominant contributor to 
recollective experience. Relatively little retrieval information is needed to elicit the 
appropriate engram, and the retrieval cue will play a more or less minor role in shaping 
the subjective experience of remembering” (Schacter, 1996, p. 79). On the other hand, 
other things being equal, this situation is gradually reversed as the event to be 
remembered becomes more and more distant in time. As the engram gradually becomes 
less salient, readily available, or accurately preserved, the properties of the retrieval 
cue(s) come to play a greater role in channeling the recollective experience and in the 
formation of the ‘memory’ that presents itself to conscious phenomenological awareness. 
“Because the engram is so impoverished, recollective experience may be determined 
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more heavily by salient properties of the cue, which itself has stored associations and 
meanings in memory” (Schacter, 1996, p. 80).  
Keeping in mind these findings and concepts derived from psychological and 
neurobiological research on memory, it is now time to move on to the more specifically 
psychoanalytic theorizing about memory. The concept of screen memories will provide 
the cornerstone of the psychoanalytically-informed hypothesis that I propose in this 
chapter regarding the interface between photography and memory and the use of 
photographs as memorial devices. 
 
II. Screen memories  
 
It could cogently be claimed that the concept of memory is in many ways the 
central thread running through psychoanalytic theory as a whole, from the Studies on 
Hysteria and the famous dictum that “hysterics suffer mainly from reminiscences” (Freud 
& Breuer, 1895, p. 58) onwards; arguably, the operation and vicissitudes of memory is 
the common denominator not only across a spectrum of clinical as well as more everyday 
psychological phenomena, but also between Freud’s most abstract theoretical 
conceptualizations and such concrete phenomena. However, for my present purposes, I 
will focus specifically on the more narrow Freudian concept of screen memories. It will 
be seen that, in his development of this concept, Freud (1899a) presciently anticipated 
many of the findings and conceptualizations presented in the previous section. Despite its 
brevity, this seminal paper is manifestly dense and complicated; more than that, however, 
a close reading of this paper reveals a latent text, so to speak, over and above the ideas 
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explicitly put forth. This latent content of the paper, which can be reconstructed by a 
careful parsing of its rhetorical structure, is not only crucial to a fuller understanding of 
Freud’s ideas on memory, but will be seen to be particularly pertinent to a hypothesis I 
will present later regarding one of the functions of photographs as they relate to memory; 
it will be worth our while, therefore, to now engage in a detailed rather than a cursory 
reading of this one work.    
 Freud (1899a) begins his investigation of this concept by noting the apparent 
paradoxical discrepancy between the psychological importance of early childhood events 
and their long-term determining influence over a person’s life, character, and 
psychopathology (a thesis derived from his clinical work with neurotic patients), and, on 
the other hand, the well-known fact, familiar to anyone from personal experience, of the 
great paucity of consciously recalled memories dating from childhood. Not only are there 
very few, if any, accessible memories from the early years of one’s life, but they very 
often tend to be memories of apparently insignificant or trivial events. This, claims Freud, 
is counterintuitive, because later on in life, there tends to be “a direct relation between the 
psychic significance of an experience and its retention in the memory” (1899a, p. 303). 
There are two sides to this: not only do important events usually make a deep impression 
on us and are unlikely to be forgotten, but, conversely, insignificant events are, as a rule, 
forgotten very quickly. Current research indeed corroborates this idea, and in fact views 
this as an adaptive feature of our memory, in terms of the allocation of limited cognitive 
resources (Anderson & Schooler, 1991).  
 There is an additional paradox: not only are childhood memories usually 
concerned with apparently insignificant and trivial scenes and events, but, moreover, 
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these scattered islands of recollection in the ocean of childhood amnesia that have 
remained accessible to conscious recall tend to be characterized by extreme precision, 
clarity, detail and vividness; they are remembered “too clearly, one is inclined to say” 
(Freud, 1899a, p. 305; Freud’s italics). Especially given the fact that even the memories 
of significant events usually tend to become blurrier and less accurate with time, as we 
saw in the previous section, their unusual phenomenological qualities make these 
childhood memories all the more puzzling. Freud’s ingenious solution to this puzzle is to 
hypothesize that the paradox is only apparent. He suggests that what may be happening is 
that, despite its deceptive clarity and ostensible wholeness, such a memory is in fact 
incomplete; moreover, it is precisely the parts of the scene that are consciously forgotten 
that account for the remembered event’s emotional significance. In fact, in this 
conception it is inaccurate to speak of the ‘forgotten’ parts of the memory scene; Freud 
says that the elements of the experience that fall outside conscious recollection are 
“omitted rather than forgotten” (1899a, p. 306; italics in the original). This is not a matter 
of linguistic nitpicking, but goes to the aetiological heart of the matter, according to 
Freud. Why should it be that “precisely what is important is suppressed and what is 
indifferent retained” (1899a, p. 306)?   
 A psychoanalytic answer lies in the concepts of psychic conflict and compromise 
formation. Freud postulates that something in the original experience or its memory is, 
for reasons that can only be revealed through psychoanalysis and on a case-by-case basis, 
“objectionable”, that is, in some way disturbing, traumatic, or incongruous with the self-
image the rememberer may want to maintain of themselves; nevertheless, objectionable 
as it may be, the importance of such an experience is “a motive for seeking to remember 
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it” (1899a, p. 307). As a result, an intrapsychic conflict ensues, as this tendency to 
remember is countered and opposed by another tendency in the mind, a ‘resistance’. 
Neither of the two opposing forces is able to completely overwhelm and annihilate the 
other, and, consequently, a compromise is brought about: instead of the original mnemic 
image remaining accessible to conscious recollection, it becomes repressed and another 
mnemic image is produced, which evades the objectionable aspects of the original 
experience but is, in one way or another, associatively connected with it. There is a 
displacement of the recollective experience from one memory image or scene to another, 
more innocuous one. In the simplest case, a selection is made among the constituent 
elements of the original experience (or rather, among the various memory traces 
stemming from that experience): some of them are retained, and some of them repressed. 
“It is a case of displacement on to something associated by continuity; or, looking at the 
process as a whole, a case of repression accompanied by the substitution of something in 
the neighborhood (whether in space or time)” (Freud, 1899a, p. 307-8). In other 
instances, a more complex constructive process is at work, where a recalled memory is 
put together out of memory traces not necessarily originating from the same experience 
or time/space frame as the original event that is being repressed; in fact, some of the 
constituent parts of these recollected memories may not be other memory traces at all, but 
instead originate in phantasy, in the rememberer’s present needs and unconscious wishes.  
 This process of displacement accounts for the paradoxical character of such 
memories, which Freud called ‘screen memories’ since they serve the function of 
covering up and hiding something from conscious awareness. Thus, the affective 
intensity associated with the repressed (aspects of the) memory is retained, but seems 
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incomprehensible and out of place as it is not justified by the manifest content of the 
memory that appears in recollection. Likewise with the sheer fact of the screen memory’s 
survival amidst the generalized amnesia of childhood: it seems puzzling just because we 
are consciously aware only of the manifest content, the screen, and not the underlying, 
repressed object of mnemonic intensity and fascination.   
 Another crucial feature of screen memories that Freud adduces is the reversal of 
perspectives that as a rule characterizes them. Thus, in the majority of these memories the 
rememberer sees himself from the vantage point of an outside observer, “as an object 
among other objects in the memory scene … with the knowledge that this child is 
himself” (1899a, p. 321). In other words, the remembering subject swaps the ‘field’ 
perspective, that would logically correspond to an accurate, unmediated recording of 
lived experience, for an ‘observer’ point of view. This feature also points to the 
constructivist character of these memories, the amount of cognitive processing and 
manipulation that has gone into their production. “[T]his contrast between the acting and 
the recollecting ego may be taken as evidence that the original impression has been 
worked over. It looks as though a memory-trace from childhood had here been translated 
back into a plastic and visual form at a later date – the date of the memory's arousal” 
(1899a, p. 321).   
 To illustrate these ideas Freud (1899a) then proceeds to analyze in depth one 
specific screen memory. I won’t go into the details of this screen memory and its 
analysis, but what is important to point out is the rhetorical device Freud employs to this 
purpose: even though it is now known (Bernfeld, 1946; Strachey, 1962; de Mijolla, 2005) 
that Freud used one of his own childhood memories, he ascribed it to an imaginary 
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interlocutor, a supposedly unofficial analysand, “a man of university education, aged 
thirty-eight” (1899a, p. 309). He then proceeds to describe the process of analyzing this 
memory in the form of a dialogue between himself and this supposed interlocutor. Ender 
(2005) ingeniously suggests that the reasons for the adoption of this device were not 
primarily stylistic or censorial, but profoundly methodological. She writes:  
Given Freud’s characteristic frankness, it would be surprising if the recourse to a 
split personality had coyness as its cause. It is much more likely that the reason 
for the dialogic structure is methodological: a clean epistemological break 
between the scientist and the rememberer can only promote objectivity. In other 
words, Freud puts himself on the side so as not to hide from us an embarrassing 
personal fantasy (there are plenty of those in The Interpretation of Dreams), but to 
better see himself. He leaves the field in order to be, truly, the observer. … 
Indeed, like any other rememberer, Freud must have felt the split between the ‘I 
now’ and the ‘I then’, and in splitting his personality, he offers a vivid reminder 
that we all ultimately view the ‘film’ of our memories through the eyes of a self 
very different from the subject in the picture. (2005, p. 95) 
But there is another, even more significant reason that may have motivated Freud, 
consciously or not, to adopt this dialogic device, and the relevance of this to my 
discussion will soon become evident. Specifically, Ender (2005; see also LaGuardia, 
1982) insightfully remarks that in his investigation of screen memories Freud reveals 
himself as deeply torn between the logical implications of his own deconstructive 
approach to memory, and his wish to hold on to the idea that memories are not fictions, 
constructed after the fact in order to address the subject’s current psychological needs, 
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but that they retain some kernel of objective (as opposed to merely psychological) truth – 
that they retain a direct connection to, and derivation from, lived experience, despite their 
significantly worked-over character. In other words, in the construction of the argument 
of his seminal 1899 paper, Freud is mirroring and repeating the very process he is 
describing: he tries to dialectically meld two opposing tendencies into a compromise 
formation and thus resolve his conflict. In the same breath that he uncovers the 
“tendentious” (Freud, 1899a, p. 322) and essentially constructivist nature of memory, he 
also strives to hold on to a belief in the permanence of memory traces and the existence 
of a direct, unmediated (albeit limited and perhaps verifiable only through 
psychoanalysis) channel to the past through recollection. The compromise he arrives at 
could be described as the position of “a nostalgic realist” (Guillaumin, 1968; quoted in 
Ender, 2005, p. 92). “The ‘nostalgist’ wants to believe that there is some reality to the 
childhood scene that is being recounted; the realist knows that memories are just 
constructions” (Ender, 2005, p. 95).  
There is no neat one-to-one correspondence between each interlocutor and each 
epistemological stance – instead, some interesting and revealing reversals take place. 
This would seem to further point to Freud’s own ambivalence vis-à-vis a more ‘realist’ 
versus a more ‘nostalgic’ conception of memory. Thus, Freud’s initially naïve imaginary 
interlocutor, who, to begin with, did not doubt the veracity of his own memory as a direct 
trace and representation of the past, becomes increasingly skeptical after his screen 
memory has been duly analyzed. As he says, “I have lost all faith in the genuineness of 
the dandelion scene [some yellow dandelions play a prominent part in the screen memory 
in question] … I cannot help concluding that what I am dealing with is something that 
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never happened at all but has been unjustifiably smuggled in among 
my childhood memories” (Freud, 1899a, p. 317-8). At this juncture a very interesting 
reversal takes place, and Freud, in his guise as the psychoanalyst in the dialogic pair, 
seems to feel he may have gone too far and gotten more than he bargained for; thus, he 
pulls back, almost alarmed:  
I see that I must take up the defence of [the memory’s] genuineness. You are 
going too far. You have accepted my assertion that every suppressed phantasy of 
this kind tends to slip away into a childhood scene. But suppose now that this 
cannot occur unless there is a memory-trace the content of which offers 
the phantasy a point of contact – comes, as it were, halfway to meet it. … It is 
very possible that in the course of this process the childhood scene itself also 
undergoes changes; I regard it as certain that falsifications of memory may be 
brought about in this way too. … But the raw material was utilizable. If that had 
not been so, it would not have been possible for this particular memory, rather 
than any others, to make its way forward into consciousness. No such scene 
would have occurred to you as a childhood memory, or perhaps some other one 
would have – for you know how easily our ingenuity can build connecting bridges 
from any one point to any other. (1899a, p. 318)  
 As Ender (2005) notes, one of the arguments Freud adduces in favor of the idea 
that, at least some of the “raw materials” of the memory are genuine, directly derived 
from a past event, is the sheer phenomenological quality of certain elements in the 
memory as recollected in the present. These elements are sensorial, having to do with the 
color of the flowers and the taste of the bread that form part of the memory. These 
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sensorial qualities of these memory objects are not just present, but are quite acute, 
overwhelming even: as Freud’s imaginary interlocutor first narrates his childhood 
memory, he states that “[t]he yellow of the flowers is a disproportionately prominent 
element in the situation as a whole, and the nice taste of the bread seems to me 
exaggerated in an almost hallucinatory fashion” (1899a, p. 312). Here, then, Freud in his 
guise as the analyst in the dialogic pair, is latching precisely onto these intense sensorial 
qualities of these elements in the memory as proof of their being genuine memory traces, 
imprinted on the mind by a real past experience, by the external world. In his reversal and 
attempt to temper his newly-skeptical friend’s losing “all faith in the genuineness” of 
memory, he says: “In your case the childhood scene seems only to have had some of its 
lines engraved more deeply: think of the over-emphasis on the yellow and the 
exaggerated niceness of the bread” (1899a, p. 318). Thus, he is suggesting that the vivid, 
intense phenomenological quality of these elements is all-too-real to have been simply a 
product of the rememberer’s imagination. A real link to the past is retained. And yet 
(Ender, 2005), just a few pages earlier, Freud the analyst seemed to have been deriving 
precisely the opposite conclusion from the exact same phenomenological features of the 
memory: “The element on which you put most stress in your childhood scene was the 
fact of the country-made bread tasting so delicious. It seems clear that this idea, which 
amounted almost to a hallucination, corresponded to your phantasy of the comfortable 
life you would have led if you had stayed at home and married this girl” (1899a, p. 315).  
 Of course, strictly speaking, there is not necessarily a contradiction here. It may 
well be that the vivid sensorial quality of the memory points both toward its erstwhile 
derivation from an actual past sense impression, and its subsequent amplification as a 
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vehicle of phantasy. The significant point is that, in this aspect of his analysis as well, 
Freud reveals himself to be unable to resolve his conflict between embracing a ‘realistic’ 
or a ‘nostalgic’ position. Further, it may be that this ambiguity and ambivalence, this 
hovering between positions, does not say so much about Freud as an individual as it does 
about all of us as rememberers, and indeed about an essential doubt lying at the heart of 
the experience of remembering. Even today, with all the accumulated scientific advances 
that took place in over a century since Freud wrote on screen memories, it seems very 
hard to adopt a strictly ‘realistic’ position about the veracity and accuracy of memory, 
even when we ought to know better. Thus, of all people, the renowned neurologist 
Antonio Damasio writes: “[T]he denial that permanent pictures of anything can exist in 
the brain [as demonstrated by hard scientific research] must be reconciled with the 
sensation, which we all share, that we can conjure up, in our mind’s eye or ear, 
approximations of images we previously experienced. That these approximations are not 
accurate, or are less vivid than the images they are meant to reproduce, does not 
contradict this fact” (1994, p. 100; italics in the original). In other words, when it comes 
to adopting a ‘realist’ position on memory, we are like scientifically sophisticated 
travelers lost in the desert: we know that the shimmering oasis in the distance is almost 
certainly a mirage, but we cannot help being drawn towards it. I will return to this point 
when I come to the discussion of photographs in the next section. 
 This dialectical back-and-forth and the ambivalence it signifies continues up to 
the very end of Freud’s seminal paper, which ends on this ambiguous note, without 
coming to a resolution of the paradox of memory as both constructed and derived from 
external reality: 
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[T]he falsified memory is the first that we become aware of: the raw material 
of memory-traces out of which it was forged remains unknown to us in its original 
form. 
The recognition of this fact must diminish the distinction we have drawn 
between screen memories and other memories derived from our childhood. It may 
indeed be questioned whether we have any memories at all from our childhood: 
memories relating to our childhood may be all that we possess. Our childhood 
memories show us our earliest years not as they were but as they appeared at the 
later periods when the memories were aroused. In these periods of arousal, the 
childhood memories did not, as people are accustomed to say, emerge; they 
were formed at that time. And a number of motives, with no concern for historical 
accuracy, had a part in forming them, as well as in the selection of the memories 
themselves. (Freud, 1899a, p. 322; italics in the original)  
Two more points are worth emphasizing before I bring this section to a close. 
There are various possible chronological combinations between a screen memory and the 
mental content that it is screening against. Thus, in his 1899 paper Freud dealt with an 
ostensible childhood memory whose manifest content was revealed, upon analysis, to be 
covering up certain repressed thoughts and wishes that first emerged later in the 
rememberer’s life, that is, after the time in which the manifest scene of the memory is set. 
Assuming that some of the building blocks of the screen memory were derived from real 
perceptual experiences, these raw materials were therefore used after the fact to defend 
against, and keep out of consciousness, some mental elements that postdated the 
recording of the memory traces. In other words, such a screen memory is, in a way, a 
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decoy defending against the future (taking the time of the production of the memory 
traces as the chronological baseline). Freud called such screen memories “retrogressive” 
(1899a, p. 320). Some time later, Freud (1901b) shifted his attention to the reverse 
situation, which he now assumed was “found perhaps still more frequently” (p. 44). In 
this case, the production of the raw materials (the memory traces) that go into 
constructing a screen memory in fact occurs later in time than the psychic content(s) that 
the screen memory, once constructed, is defending against. In other words, a more recent 
experience, in itself “indifferent” (1901b, p. 44), attains greater significance and intensity 
than would otherwise be warranted and becomes lodged in memory because it 
fortuitously happens to furnish the mind with a suitable decoy that diverts attention from 
some other, much more distressing, mental content of earlier origin: “it owes that 
privilege merely to its connection with an earlier experience which resistances prevent 
from being reproduced directly” (Freud, 1901b, p. 44). These are screen memories “that 
have pushed ahead or been displaced forward” (1901b, p. 44; Freud’s italics). Finally, 
there is the possibility that a screen memory “is connected with the impression that it 
screens not only by its content but also by contiguity in time: these are contemporary or 
contiguous screen memories” (1901b, p. 44; Freud’s italics). Nevertheless, it might be 
useful to keep in mind that, even though for purposes of exposition such a schematization 
may be useful, reality is usually more complicated and these categories may be 
intermingled. Often, “screen memories are found to draw their strength from … events 
which have happened both before and after their occurrence” (Greenacre, 1949, p. 73).  
Last but definitely not least, Freud (1901b) postulates that childhood episodic 
memories (the prototype par excellence for screen memories in general) are marked by 
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their predominantly visual character. He compares such memories to “representations on 
the stage” (Freud, 1901b, p. 47), again inviting us to understand that they are not 
randomly put together, but that their construction is “defined by a narrative impulse that 
drives us toward an underlying story … A mnemonic scene, just like a good story, has a 
point” (Ender, 2005, p. 93). Freud (1901b) claims that memory can assume different 
modalities in later life, for instance that in certain rememberers the auditory modality 
may be privileged over the visual one; however, he insists that our earliest episodic 
memories are as a rule visual. Further, he draws an analogy between such memories and 
dreams: “we all dream predominantly in visual images” (1901b, p. 47). It would seem, 
then, that the visual modality is closely connected to the operations of the primary 
process (Freud, 1950a, 1900a, 1915e). In The Ego and the Id Freud returns to this point: 
“Thinking in pictures … stands nearer to unconscious processes than thinking in words” 
(1923b, p. 21). In the next section, I will, among other things, explore a possible 
implication of this idea in connection with the use of photographs as mnemonic devices.  
 
III. Photographs and memory, photographs as screen memories 
 
 In the previous section we saw how screen memories, even if constructed out of 
components derived from actual lived experience, are essentially deceptive: their raison 
d’être is to facilitate selective forgetting in the guise of vivid and seemingly genuine 
remembering. In fact, the more genuine the fabric of the memory (in terms of its 
historical derivation), the better the deception: as Greenacre writes, with screen memories 
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we use “reality to cover reality. … This reminds one that a frank confession often deflects 
suspicion” (1949, p. 83).  
 It would not be too far-fetched to claim that we could paraphrase the above 
statement by saying that screen memories are “figments from the real world” 
(Szarkowski, 1984, title page). It might come as a surprise, then, to be told that this 
intriguing turn of phrase, by the art critic John Szarkowski, was not intended with 
memory (or even screen memories) in mind, but as a characterization of the work of the 
great American photographer Garry Winogrand – and, I would suggest, can be 
generalized from the case of Winogrand to serve as an apt and astute description of 
photography as such. In this section I will pursue this analogy between photographs and 
screen memories. My claim is that photographs can be seen to be the objectively reified 
functional equivalents of screen memories, and that their perusal serves similar purposes 
in our psychic economy.  
 Of course, commonsensical understanding already treats photographs as closely 
related to memory, as mementos and memorial objects (I am here primarily focusing on 
snapshots or portraits of family and friends, the genres of photography most people have 
a connection to on an everyday basis). Photographs continue to have a life long after the 
moment in which they are created. They are stored and cherished, and revisited again and 
again. People take pleasure not only in looking at them in solitude, but also, and perhaps 
primarily, in showing them to others, revisiting and sharing moments of their lives. The 
commonsensical presumption is that photographs are windows onto the past, accurate and 
truthful representations of some past moment in time. Thus, my aim here will be to 
deconstruct and undermine this naïve commonsensical conception, and to argue in favor 
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of the hypothesis that photographs are indeed memorial objects par excellence, but in a 
much less straightforward and innocuous way than commonly assumed.  
 A photograph is a special type of pictorial representation. Photographs are, as a 
rule, characterized by their realistic quality, that is, they seem to be accurate 
representations of the external world of vision: they depict people, objects, and situations 
in a way that seems true to life. However, verisimilitude is not the essential feature of 
photographic representation. There are paintings that are also extremely realistic in the 
way they depict the world – indeed, there is a type of painting that goes even beyond 
what is called ‘photorealism’, to achieve what is called a ‘hyperrealistic’ effect: such 
paintings appear to be more detailed, accurate, and faithful reproductions of external 
reality than even the most sharp and realistic photograph (Meisel, 1993, 2002; Taylor, 
2009). Rather, what sets photographs apart from any other type of pictorial representation 
of the world and of the past is the mechanics of their production: a photograph is causally 
connected in a direct and almost immediate sense to something existing out there in the 
world. This is “the fundamental trait of the photographic medium: the physical objects 
themselves imprint their image by means of the optical and chemical action of light” 
(Arnheim, 1986, p. 108). This direct causal derivation of a photograph from the objects it 
depicts holds, in every essential, throughout the various specific mechanical instantiations 
of this process: it holds equally true when the light rays are hitting the sensor of a digital 
camera, as it did when they hit a 19th century emulsified glass photographic plate. Indeed, 
the word photography is derived from the Greek for ‘writing with light’. According to 
Bazin (1967), 
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Photography affects us like a phenomenon in nature, like a flower or a snowflake 
whose vegetable or earthly origins are an inseparable part of their beauty. This 
production by automatic means has radically affected our psychology of the 
image. The objective nature of photography confers on it a quality of credibility 
absent from all other picture-making. … The photographic image is the object 
itself … it shares, by virtue of the very process of its becoming, the being of the 
model of which it is the reproduction. (p. 241) 
Barthes (1980) expresses the same idea when he writes, “in Photography I can never 
deny that the thing has been there. There is a superimposition here: of reality and of the 
past” (p. 76; italics in the original). And elsewhere, even more evocatively: “The 
photograph is literally an emanation of the referent … A sort of umbilical cord links the 
body of the photographed thing to my gaze: light, though impalpable, is here a carnal 
medium, a skin I share with anyone who has been photographed” (1980, p. 80-1).   
 This is a very different process than what goes into the production of any other 
representational artifact. A painting or a novel, no matter how realistic in their 
representations or how extensively based on the real world in their origin, are mediated in 
an altogether different way in terms of their production. There are two sides to this: not 
only can a photograph be taken without the mediation of a human agent, just by the 
mechanical action of the camera, but, additionally, no photograph is possible unless the 
camera is directly receiving light waves from the external world. A painting can be 
painted directly from nature, or from the imagination. Not so with photographs – there is 
no such thing as a photograph derived purely from the imagination. And this is not a 
function of an image’s being representational or non-representational, such as abstract 
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painting. Even the most formally abstract, non-representational photograph depends, for 
its production, on the action of light waves on some photosensitive surface. Certainly, 
nowadays some artists are using computer software to create images that look like 
photographs but are not derived from the external world; but then my claim regarding 
such images would be that calling them photographs is a misnomer. Ontologically, they 
are something completely different: even if they look indistinguishable from 
photographs, they are a form of painting, as they are not derived from the action of light 
waves emanating from the external world.   
The appearance of verisimilitude furnished by photographic representations, that 
is, the pictorial realism of photographs, and, even more importantly, our awareness of the 
mechanism of the derivation of photographic images from the light waves emanating 
from objects in the real world, in conjunction turn photographs into a very special kind of 
recall cue. A photograph is a cue that is also immediately, as opposed to indirectly, 
connected to the past experience that is the object of (the attempted) recollection. It is a 
very different process when the cue that triggers my recollection, or on which my 
recollection importantly depends, is for instance a friend’s comment, or something I 
happen to read, or some other thing indirectly connected to my past experience, and, on 
the other hand, when the recall cue itself immediately, causally originates from, and is 
part and parcel of, that very same past experience. Of course, this distinction could, in 
theory, be said to hold across all the sensory modalities. Still, I believe that the status of 
photographs as special recall cues remains unique, for at least two reasons. First, because 
of the interesting (albeit accidental) fact that we do not yet have the technology for taking 
‘snapshots’ of smells or tastes, for example. Proust’s narrator came to once more taste the 
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madeleine dipped in tea by pure happenstance; this is very different from the process of 
intentionally deciding to take a photograph, and then revisiting that artifact at will at a 
later date. Indeed, there is another aspect of sensory experience and of the past that we 
are in a position to intentionally and accurately preserve through technological means, 
namely, sound. Nevertheless, and here I come to the second reason I alluded to, the visual 
modality seems to be the most privileged one for most people, the one that is a sine qua 
non of autobiographical memory (I can have odorless memories, but it would be much 
more rare to have ones without a visual component, even if the latter were triggered by a 
scent) – as it is also of conscious experience (at least most of the time). Recall Schacter’s 
statement to the effect that the “recall of visual information about the physical setting or 
context of an event is crucial to having a ‘remember’ experience” (1996, p. 23).  
 By dint of these qualities of the photographic medium, in commonsensical 
understanding photographs are treated as safe, permanent, reliable repositories of truthful 
memory. There is a strong temptation, when we are looking at a photograph, to feel that 
the cue and the past experience, the thing that memory is grasping after, are actually one 
and the same. It is as if the complemental series formed by engram and cue collapses into 
a single point; as if by looking at a photograph the rememberer immediately arrives at the 
memory, without having to expend any more effort, without a need for any more mental 
detours; as if there is no longer a need for retrieve (or construct) a visual image of the 
past in one’s mind, since it is already out there right in front of one’s eyes. Indeed, it 
might be more accurate to say that photographs don’t even really function as recall cues 
(insofar as a cue sets in motion a mediated process of memorial reconstruction), but 
rather activate recognition memory in a much more immediate manner. By looking at 
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photographs, therefore, recollection (as a strenuous process of reconstructing the past) is 
not only aided, but is perhaps transcended, short-circuited, bypassed altogether. In the 
commonsensical conception, the problem of recollecting the past no longer needs to be 
solved – it simply dissolves, thanks to technology.  
 What’s more, not only are photographs commonly treated as externalized 
memories, but they have in fact furnished our imagination with an intuitively appealing 
and tenacious metaphor for the actual process of remembering as it occurs in the mind: 
actual recollection is often compared to an internal slideshow in the mind’s eye. In the 
popular imagination, the notion of the permanence, veridicality, and objectivity of 
photographs and the permanence, veridicality, and objectivity of memory traces buttress 
and feed into each other. We already saw that this notion of the objectivity and 
permanence of memory is an illusion. My claim, then, is that commonsense 
understanding has got it backwards: we could indeed fruitfully compare memories with 
photographs, but only to the extent that photographs themselves are not the non-
tendentious traces and straightforward representations of reality a naively realistic 
conception would have us believe; in other words, photographs are indeed props to 
memory, but in ways that significantly influence, direct, and distort it, far from simply 
providing it with a little nudge to just ‘refresh’ or reactivate it from its supposedly 
dormant state. Looking at photographs short-circuits the process of recollection; in the 
guise of providing a convenient shortcut to the accurate remembrance of the past, 
photographs in fact do just the opposite, distorting memory while at the same time giving 
rise to a strong but illusory phenomenological sense of safeguarding it.  
 The claim, then, is that photographs are the functional equivalent of screen 
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memories. It may be true that, under a certain description, the camera never lies; but, 
equally, it does not tell the whole truth: photographs are figments from the real world. I 
will now try to unpack this claim in a little more detail. On a first, superficial level, 
photographs share many phenomenological characteristics with screen memories, 
including their essentially visual character, their ability to vividly retain and call attention 
to small details of a larger scene, and their fixity.  
 More importantly, like screen memories, photographs both reveal and conceal 
something – and they conceal by revealing. In a sense, it is true that a photograph, as far 
as it goes, provides an almost unmediated, authentic, accurate record of the past (for the 
sake of simplification, this discussion is premised on the type of photograph that has not 
been digitally manipulated or altered by special effects, filters, distorting lenses, etc.). But 
a photograph is a piece of paper – it has four sides (the argument holds equally for a 
rectangle on a computer screen). A section of objective visual reality is certainly 
contained within the frame of that rectangle – and a much greater piece of reality is 
excluded. Additionally, not only is there a lot of space left out of the frame, but a lot of 
time as well. On average, a photograph captures a few thousandths to a few hundredths of 
a second – it depicts an extremely thin time slice of lived reality. Thus, even the most 
accurate, authentic photographs are extremely selective in what they show.   
 Still, such a descriptive analysis says nothing about the specific dynamics of the 
postulated tendentiousness of photographs. My hypothesis, then, is that photographs are 
not randomly or haphazardly selective in terms of what they show and what they don’t 
show, but that, in functioning as reified screen memories, they selectively preserve 
moments of life in a calculated and motivated way, in the service of defense. The 
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counterargument might be raised that, in dissecting screen memories, Freud (1899a) 
spoke of “objectionable … psychical element[s]” (p. 307) that the screen memory diverts 
attention from; their objectionable character arises from their connection to primitive, 
repudiated instinctual urges and phantasies, and their consequent incompatibility with the 
rememberer’s consciously espoused values or the self-conception he wants to maintain 
for himself. So the question obviously arises, what could possibly be so objectionable as 
regards the past experiences that I am claiming may be glossed over and replaced by their 
photographic residues? After all, here we are just talking about snapshots – and, 
presumably, the occasions that usually give rise to them do not as a rule have much to do 
with the instinctual and the forbidden.  
 Is that really so, however? I will briefly touch on two points: first, according to 
the psychoanalytic conception of mental functioning (Freud 1915c, 1915d; Laplanche & 
Pontalis, 1988), any conscious psychical element or experience can be a derivative of the 
primitive drives, and be associatively connected to unconscious phantasy. Second, even if 
we opt for a somewhat looser, more commonsensical reading of what may be 
objectionable, it becomes readily apparent that there’s quite a lot about the past (in fact, 
about life, which is always becoming the past all the time) that may be objectionable, at 
least in the sense that we’d rather it were somewhat different.  
 Thus, one hypothesis would be that we have a vested, albeit often 
unacknowledged, interest in glossing over the fact that life experiences are never one-
dimensional, almost never unfold on a single emotional register: we usually have mixed 
feelings about things, and events and experiences very rarely don’t evoke some degree of 
ambivalence in us. In other words, one of the ways photographs can function as screen 
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memories is by defending against the conscious awareness of the full emotional spectrum 
associated with, and triggered by, the unfolding of our lives. To take a very trivial 
example, even the most ideal and idyllic holiday is unlikely to have been totally 
unalloyed, without a single moment of frustration, sadness, impatience, disagreement, 
fatigue, what have you. But, in the pictures, all these tend to disappear. People pose and 
say ‘cheese’. In the photographs, it’s all wide smiles and seemingly perfect happiness.  
 Or, to take a different aspect: research suggests that people tend to distort their 
recollections of past events so as to exaggerate their own significance in them, relegate a 
more important place or role to themselves than was actually the case (Schacter, 1996; 
Schacter, Coyle, Fischbach, Mesulam & Sullivan, 1995; Tulving & Craik, 2000). 
Likewise, photographs often put people on a pedestal, even if only by excluding others 
from within the virtual space of the frame. In this connection it is interesting to note how 
one of the most widespread genres of snapshot photography revolves around people 
standing in front of famous monuments or landscapes in order to be photographed. Here 
it becomes clear that what motivates the person being photographed is not even the 
preservation of their own past perceptual experiences in memory, in so far as this kind of 
snapshot is actually predicated on the abandonment and reversal of one’s point-of-view 
experience. The natural, ‘field’ point of view, is replaced by an ‘observer’ perspective. 
Recall that Freud (1899a) stressed this particular kind of reversal as one of the telltale 
features of screen memories. In the snapshots in question, then, it seems that this type of 
doctored recollection finds perfect expression, is even taken to an altogether different 
level. It’s not so much my surroundings that matter, but the fact that I was there. What I 
may have actually, even if unconsciously, felt – to hazard a guess, my insignificance and 
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transience vis-à-vis the Grand Canyon or the pyramids (or even vis-à-vis the myriad other 
tourists who were there having their picture taken), is disavowed and reversed. 
Narcissism triumphs.    
  It will be noted that the examples I have been adducing are quite simplistic. This 
is a deliberate choice – I am attempting to present a hypothesis in schematic form. A 
more in-depth exploration of this hypothesis would not be possible without a detailed 
analysis of specific photographs, and that, in turn, would also not easily get off the 
ground in a vacuum, i.e. without simultaneously analyzing in depth the people for whom 
those photographs carried some emotional and memorial significance. But, over and 
above those considerations, using simplistic examples is not altogether unrelated to my 
point in a more substantive way also: the point is precisely that photographs qua screen 
memories, as indeed actual screen memories themselves, are, more often than not, made 
of humble fabric: that constitutes part of their deceptiveness, but is also an immediate 
consequence of their derivation from the flow of everyday life. This is the point I want to 
emphasize: processes of tendentious memory distortion are not necessarily or primarily 
mobilized by momentous, extraordinary events – they constitute the everyday workings 
of memory.   
 On a first level, then, photographs can be viewed as screen memory-equivalents 
defending against the past: they selectively channel our attention and recollection, and 
replace a more multi-dimensional, ambivalent version of past reality with a more 
unequivocal, palatable one. But photographs as screen memories can also be seen as 
screening against psychical elements following their creation, not just ones coincidental 
with it or preceding it. They deflect our conscious awareness from the future as well, not 
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just from the past. There are at least two major aspects to this latter dimension of their 
utilization as screen memories, and it will be seen that this second dimension can operate 
independently of the first one, of photographs’ possible role in distorting the true 
emotional significance and complexity of experience.   
 First, recall Freud’s (1899a) own ambivalence and indecisiveness as to the logical 
implications of his own insights about the functioning of memory: as soon as he realized 
that his analysis of screen memories pointed to the tendentious and constructivist 
character of memory in general, he seemed uneasy with this conclusion and tried to 
retreat to a position that reaffirmed the veridicality and permanence of at least some 
memory traces. Likewise with the majority of psychologists questioned in the study by 
Loftus and Loftus (1980) already referenced earlier, or, indeed, with Damasio’s assertion 
that our knowledge that our memories are, at best, approximations, does not undermine 
our strong subjective conviction that “we can conjure up, in our mind’s eye or ear … 
images we previously experienced” (1994, p. 100). It seems that we find it emotionally 
very hard to accept the possibility that the past may be gone without leaving some 
permanent, accurate, accessible traces in our minds. Schacter writes: “The idea that there 
is a one-to-one correspondence between a bit of information stored away somewhere in 
our brain and the conscious experience of a memory that results from activating this bit 
of information is so intuitively compelling that it seems almost nonsensical to question it” 
(1996, p. 71). We know that this notion is false – indeed, one does not even have to be a 
neuroscientist to entertain doubts about it, as everyday experience furnishes us with 
ample instances where memory, simply, does not serve. Yet, such instances, instead of 
undermining the commonsensical engram theory of memory, on the contrary often seem 
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to lend it further conviction, the rationale being that these are instances where things don't 
work as they should, or as they optimally do. Instead of leading to a revision of the 
assumption that everything experienced is put in storage in the brain for good, instances 
of memory failure are as a rule attributed – to pursue the computer-storage metaphor of 
memory – to a software malfunction, not to deficits in the hardware: we tell ourselves 
that the memories are ‘in there’ somewhere, safely stored – it is just that our retrieval 
algorithms fail. In this conception, the fading of memory is a failure of recollection, not 
storage. It seems that there is something very containing and soothing to the idea that the 
past is not irrevocably lost, even if it appears to be so.  
 Photographs provide a perfect foil for this notion. Not only are they themselves 
permanent imagistic representations directly derived from past events (thus nurturing the 
reification of the metaphor of memory as consisting of permanent and accurate images 
stored in the brain), but they also seem to be all it takes for our own memories of the 
depicted events to be rekindled and emerge from the depths of the mind. Thus, looking at 
photographs fosters the assumption that, given the right cue, our memory traces are 
always there, to be retrieved wholesale. But even more so: that by means of this 
repetition, this revisiting of photographs, this ‘refreshing’ of our memory, our memories, 
or our ability to retrieve them, become stronger and are inoculated against the onslaught 
of the wearing-down effects of the passage of time. As I suggested earlier, this is an 
illusion. Looking at photographs short-circuits the process of recollection, the re-
construction of memories. What may conceivably really be going on is a process of 
covert substitution: whatever memory-traces may have been there to begin with, far from 
being strengthened, are gradually, inexorably, and imperceptibly being replaced by the 
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supposed recall cues ostensibly serving them – the photographic images themselves. 
After repeated viewings, we no longer remember the original moment depicted as much 
as we remember the photographs – and we even lose track of this substitution: the 
photographs and the moment of their derivation become conflated beyond recognition. 
My suggestion, then, is that one of the fundamental screening functions of photographs is 
to deflect our awareness and recognition of the impermanence and fallibility of our 
memory, and of the corrosive effects of time on its, even to begin with, fragile hold on 
the past.  
 There is a second major way in which photographs provide a screen for what 
follows the moment of their creation. When we look at photographs, by definition we are 
always looking at a moment in the past, forever frozen in time. It is always later when we 
are looking at a picture. A lot has intervened. The people in the photograph may have 
died, or be as lost to us as the dead. Or, less dramatically, our feelings may have changed; 
we may have grown colder towards each other. Or, simply, we, and they, may have aged 
– we are children no longer, or have grown old. (And even if none of the above has 
transpired, what is certain is that what’s in the picture is no longer here, or we’re no 
longer there: the party or the holiday is over, replaced once again by our usual everyday 
routine. Notice that this conception does not presuppose the defensive distortion of 
emotional experience: even if a photograph emanated from, and depicts, a true moment 
of unequivocal bliss, the hard fact remains that the moment is gone). But the picture 
doesn’t know that. In the picture the people we have known, and the relationships we 
have had, and the places we have been to, and our own face, will never change; they have 
achieved a kind of timeless limbo. Thus, by returning to old photographs we can 
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momentarily screen the present; or, under a different description (i.e. from the point of 
view of the moment when the pictures were taken), we screen the future.  
 All this may seem quite straightforward – once more, a case of replacing a more 
objectionable, unpleasant psychical element with a more palatable one. But it may be a 
little more complicated than that. When asked by his imaginary interlocutor why it is that 
phantasy usually picks a scene from childhood (as opposed to a later time) to disguise 
itself with, Freud (1899a), after suggesting that the supposed innocence of childhood 
offers a particularly good decoy for covering up repudiated instinctual impulses, also 
makes this additional, rather cryptic remark: “It seems, moreover, as though the 
recollection of the remote past is in itself facilitated by some pleasurable motive: forsan 
et haec olim meminisse juvabit” (p. 317). The Latin quotation is from Virgil’s Aeneid 
(book I, 203): ‘maybe someday you will rejoice to recall even this’. Even this: the 
passage is from a speech Aeneas delivers to his shipwrecked, “bloodied, battered, bruised 
and hungry” crew, after they wash up on the shores of Carthage following a terrible storm 
(Jenkins, 2001, commentary on Aeneid Book 1, Lines 195 to 207). And yet, he tells them 
that someday they may rejoice to recall even this disaster. The passage is often taken to 
be somewhat equivalent to a modern-day expression such as ‘someday we’ll look back 
on this and laugh’. But the implication of this latter phrase is that laughing with hindsight 
is connected to a feeling of triumph attendant upon overcoming adversity. Freud, 
however, seems to be emphasizing a different connotation of the passage, by using it as 
an illustration or epitome of the thought that “the recollection of the remote past is in 
itself facilitated by some pleasurable motive” (1899a, p. 317). The emphasis here seems 
to be on the idea that recollection in and of itself is a source of pleasure; indeed, that it is 
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in itself so satisfying that it can afford pleasure even if the content of the recollection is, 
as such, unpleasant.  
 Let’s see how we could begin to make some sense of this notion. One thing that 
seems clear is that Freud is talking of a situation where a mental image of the past is a 
source of pleasure. In the passage quoted above, Freud is discussing conscious 
recollection. There is another situation, however, where a very similar derivation of 
pleasure from a visual mental image of the past takes place. In Chapter VII of The 
Interpretation of Dreams, Freud (1900a) discusses the concepts of perceptual identity and 
thought identity. Perceptual identity is the goal and mode of operation of the primary 
process: once a satisfaction has been experienced in the past, the primary process 
endeavors to bring about the re-experiencing of the perception of the object associated 
with that experience of satisfaction. It achieves this aim by directly re-activating the 
memory of the experience of satisfaction. Here is how Freud describes this process:  
[T]he reappearance of the perception is the fulfilment of the wish; and the shortest 
path to the fulfilment of the wish is a path leading direct from the excitation 
produced by the need to a complete cathexis of the perception.  … Thus the aim 
of this first psychical activity was to produce a ‘perceptual identity’ – a repetition 
of the perception which was linked with the satisfaction of the need. (1900a, p. 
566) 
And elsewhere: “A current of this kind in the apparatus, starting from unpleasure and 
aiming at pleasure, we have termed a ‘wish’ … The first wishing seems to have been a 
hallucinatory cathecting of the memory of satisfaction” (Freud, 1900a, p. 598). Freud 
postulates that such a state of affairs could not realistically sustain itself, as a 
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hallucinatory, illusory satisfaction of a need, however pleasurable, could not possibly 
keep any organism alive for long. Therefore, another mental activity arises, better 
adapted to help the organism survive in the real world: the secondary process – in other 
words, thinking. The secondary process replaces perceptual identity with what Freud 
terms ‘thought identity’: it attempts to alter the actual external world, “by means of 
voluntary movement” (1900a, p. 599) so as to arrive “at a real perception of the object of 
satisfaction” (p. 599) instead of a hallucinatory one. In other words, thought (the 
secondary process) aims to enable the organism to once more come into contact with a 
real object that can truly satisfy its need, as it has done in past experience. Memory is its 
guide and touchstone in this quest, but this is a very different usage of memory than its 
hallucinatory re-activation. And yet, unrealistic and self-defeating as the primary process 
may be, “all the complicated thought-activity which is spun out from the mnemic image 
to the moment at which the perceptual identity is established by the external world – all 
this activity of thought merely constitutes a roundabout path to wish-fulfilment which has 
been made necessary by experience. Thought is after all nothing but a substitute for a 
hallucinatory wish” (1900a, p. 566-7). The opposition between the primary and the 
secondary process corresponds exactly to that between the pleasure principle and the 
reality principle, in other words, the mode of functioning of the unconscious, on the one 
hand, and that of preconscious and conscious cognition on the other (Freud, 1900a; 
1950a; 1915e; 1911b). In normal development, the secondary process replaces the 
primary process; thinking and action replace hallucinatory perceptual identity. 
Nevertheless, there is one sphere of mental activity where hallucinatory wish-
fulfilment is never given up. When we sleep, our unsatisfied and repressed wishes are the 
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instigators of dreaming: “a dream is the fulfilment of a wish” (Freud, 1900a, p. 121). It is 
important to note the exact phrasing of this famous statement. Freud does not just claim 
that dreams represent or express the fulfillment of unconscious wishes: he claims that 
they are wish-fulfilments. I take this to mean that the activation of the primary process as 
such, the regression to a mode of mental functioning based on the principle of perceptual 
identity, is in and of itself deeply satisfying (over and above the other reasons Freud 
adduces for the process – regardless of the content – of dreaming, such as the 
safeguarding of sleep).  
Further, Freud (1900a) suggests that only “a wishful impulse of the strength 
proper to children” (p. 552) has the capacity to instigate dreaming; in adults, such wishful 
impulses carried over from childhood have become unconscious, and are the real engines 
of dream formation, albeit masked behind unsatisfied wishes of contemporary origin. 
What is most interesting for my present purposes, however, is the thought that follows 
this statement: Freud evokes an analogy between the diminution of the strength of wishes 
is later life, and a diminution in the production and intensity of visual imagery. He writes:  
It seems to me … that, with the progressive control exercised upon our instinctual 
life by our thought-activity, we are more and more inclined to renounce as 
unprofitable the formation or retention of such intense wishes as children know. It 
is possible that there are individual differences in this respect, and that some 
people retain an infantile type of mental process longer than others, just as there 
are similar differences in regard to the diminution of visual imagery, which is so 
vivid in early years. (Freud, 1900a, p. 552)  
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  Apart from the rule of the primary process (the principle of perceptual identity), 
another feature of unconscious mental processes is their timelessness: “The processes of 
the system Ucs. are timeless; i.e. they are not ordered temporally, are not altered by the 
passage of time; they have no reference to time at all. Reference to time is bound up, 
once again, with the work of the system Cs.” (Freud, 1915e, p. 187; Freud’s italics). 
Indeed, hallucinatory wish-fulfilment already points to this feature: perceptual identity is 
premised on the inability to distinguish between an initial perceptual impression and the 
reactivation of its mnemonic image. The image is equivalent to the actual object. My 
hypothesis, then, is that there is a deep and essential connection between the sense of 
timelessness and visual hallucinatory wish-fulfilment, and that it is this link that underlies 
the profound pleasurableness of remembering, even if the content of recollection is in 
itself indifferent or unpleasant. In other words: memory, at least vivid, imagistic memory, 
provides us with a species of hallucinatory wish-fulfilment, albeit a more attenuated one 
than in dreams. In this connection, recall the almost hallucinatory intensity of some of the 
perceptual elements (e.g., the yellow of the flowers) in the paradigmatic screen memory 
Freud analyzed in this 1899 paper. Vivid episodic memories, by presenting us with visual 
scenes, with “the mise-en-scène of desire” (Laplanche & Pontalis, 1988, p. 318) afford us 
not just “a pleasure connected to missing objects” (Ender, 2005, p. 100), but also, I would 
claim, the illusory satisfaction of transcending time. If that is so, another implication of 
this idea is that photographs, insofar as they function as screen memories, are inter alia 
obviating our awareness of the passage of time, of the embeddedness of our existence in 
time. This is the other aspect of their screening the future that I referred to earlier: by 
offering us “a perfect likeness of the past” (Freud, 1900a, p. 621) photographs enable us 
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to not only mentally travel through time and momentarily forget the time that elapsed 
since they were taken, but to forget the dimension of time altogether – they provide us 
with a temporary reprieve from the secondary process.   
 All in all, then, I have been making the case that, by virtue of their 
phenomenological characteristics in conjunction with their unique ontological status as 
direct traces of the real world, photographs are the functional equivalent of screen 
memories in our psychic economy. They offer us “precisely a way of experiencing both – 
the fascination for the memory content (for, say, yellow flowers, a smell of lilac, or a 
watery surface) and the fascination for the act of remembering” (Ender, 2005, p. 101). 
They function as screen memories on multiple levels: they can mask the time that 
preceded their creation and the time that followed; divert our attention from the full 
emotional complexity of relationships and events; deflect our awareness of the inexorable 
passage of time; and even put up a screen against the full recognition of the deficiencies 
and essential fragility of our own memory. In fact, they offer a perfect example of how 
the secondary process, by following “a roundabout path … altered the external world in 
such a way that it became possible to arrive at a real perception of the object of 
satisfaction” (Freud, 1900a, p. 599) – or at least a perception more objectively real than a 
full-fledged hallucination, even if the object of that perception is not the original object 
but its photographic likeness. For, unlike actual screen memories, photographs are 
created pre-emptively, before the fact. I want to claim that this unconscious defensive 
function enters into the process of staging and taking photographs in the first place, and 
that it goes a long way toward explaining the ever-expanding appeal of photography as a 
practice in everyday life. Photographs are screen memories made to order. 
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CHAPTER 2: ON PHOTOGRAPHY AND LOSS 
 
I. What remains: Nachträglichkeit 
 
 In the previous chapter I made the case for considering photographs as reified 
screen-memory equivalents: objects created at least partially with the aim of 
manipulating and channeling autobiographical memory in the service of defense. 
However, in being memorial objects with some kind of physical instantiation in external 
reality, photographs also attain to a degree of autonomy from the human beings creating 
them and their conscious or unconscious intentions and purposes. Thus, over and above 
what I’ve been suggesting, photographs may also come to play a role in the unintentional 
and often unwanted remembrance of the past and rewriting of one’s personal history.   
 I specifically have in mind the fate of photographs depicting loved ones who are 
no longer with us – people lost to us through separation or death. Our beloved may be 
gone, but their photographic images remain. My claim is that these photographic 
representations, in the aftermath of loss and bereavement, acquire new meaning and 
intensity as visual stimuli, a whole new and conflictual psychological valence: in a 
retroactive way, looking at such pictures can trigger, in certain cases, potentially 
traumatic associative chain reactions, unexpected tectonic shifts in our carefully 
constructed personal narratives. Such photographs become problematic, impossible 
objects. No matter how you approach them, they cut; and yet, they may also exert a 
strange, morbid fascination. In any case, they pose a conundrum that almost everyone is 
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familiar with from personal experience: what is to be done with them? Keeping them or 
looking at them is hard; getting rid of them, even harder.  
 The problem posed by photographs in the wake of loss is essentially the problem 
of dealing with new knowledge that casts the past in a new light; it is the problem of 
revising our understanding and memory of the past, and the emotions hitherto associated 
with it, through the prism of what we know now but had no way of knowing earlier. 
(Subsequently, I will attempt to show how this is a problem essentially posed by all 
photographs, not just the ones depicting erstwhile loved ones that are, for whatever 
reason, gone, insofar as all photographs are monuments to the passage of time; however, 
approaching this from the angle of such pictures offers the advantage of making the 
exposition of the dynamics involved more straightforwardly apparent).  
 In a letter to Wilhelm Fliess dated December 6, 1896, Freud writes:  
I am working on the assumption that our psychical mechanism has come about by 
a process of stratification: the material present in the shape of memory-traces is 
from time to time subjected to a rearrangement in accordance with fresh 
circumstances – is, as it were, transcribed. Thus what is essentially new in my 
theory is the thesis that memory is present not once but several times over… 
(Freud, 1954, p. 173)  
This passage introduces the pivotal, albeit never clearly defined in the Freudian corpus, 
notion of Nachträglichkeit. This concept has traditionally been translated as deferred 
action in English, but as several commentators have pointed out (Laplanche & Pontalis, 
1988; Thomä & Cheshire, 1991; Laplanche, 1976, 1999; Faimberg, 2005; Eickhoff, 
2006), such a rendering is both distorting and limiting, selectively narrowing the concept 
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down to just one of its facets discernible in Freudian usage. Indeed, the passage in the 
letter to Fliess quoted above seems to point in a different direction: whereas the term 
‘deferred action’ suggests a temporal deferral, and hence a forward movement, a kind of 
delayed effect of an actual past event, Freud’s letter of December 6 apparently focuses on 
a movement in the opposite direction, from the present toward the past, in the sense of the 
retroactive re-transcription of past memories in the light of present circumstances. In fact, 
both of these senses are discernible in Freud’s usage of the term Nachträglichkeit across 
various texts, from the letters to Fliess of the late 1890s to the Wolf-man case (Freud 
1918b). As Thomä and Cheshire write, by collapsing all these various usages in the term 
‘deferred action’ we are “running the risk of constructing a pseudo-concept in English 
where there was either no common one, or indeed more than one, in the original” (1991, 
p. 410). In order to retain this conceptual polysemy of the original German term, 
Laplanche (1999) suggests ‘afterwardness’ as a more adequate English translation. 
 Nachträglichkeit or afterwardness, then, refers to the revision or 
reconceptualization of the past (as preserved in memory) so as “to fit in with fresh 
experiences or with the attainment of a new stage of development” (Laplanche & 
Pontalis, 1988, p. 111). Moreover, “[i]t implies a complex and reciprocal relationship 
between a significant event and its later reinvestment with meaning, a reinvestment that 
lends it a new psychic efficacy” (Laplanche, 2005, p. 377-8). It is because of this 
“complex and reciprocal relationship” between past and present, what came before and 
what comes afterwards, that the Freudian usage of Nachträglichkeit oscillates between 
emphasizing a more deterministic, forward-moving understanding of the re-signification 
of the past, and a more hermeneutical, retroactive conception of this process of re-
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transcription. There is a dual emphasis: on the process of re-transcription itself, as well as 
on the openness and pliability of certain past experiences to being thus re-transcribed. As 
Laplanche and Pontalis explain, “[i]t is not lived experience in general that undergoes a 
deferred revision, but, specifically, whatever it has been impossible in the first instance to 
incorporate fully into a meaningful context. The traumatic event is the epitome of such 
unassimilated experience” (1988, p. 112). What makes an event traumatic, though? 
Through various writings spanning more than two decades, from the Project for a 
Scientific Psychology to the analysis of the Wolf-man, Freud (Freud 1950a [1895]; Freud 
& Breuer 1895; Freud 1896c, 1900a, 1909b, 1918b) pursued a conception of trauma as 
biphasic, unfolding in two stages. The prototypical example of this conception is 
provided by Freud’s patient Emma, in the Project (Freud, 1950a). This young woman had 
developed agoraphobia and could not go into a store alone. This symptom emerged after 
an experience during which, around the age of twelve, she walked into a store and saw 
the two shop clerks laughing, at which point she “rushed out in some kind of fright” 
(Freud, 1954, p. 410; italics in the original). Analysis eventually revealed that this 
experience unconsciously aroused an earlier memory of having been sexually molested 
by a shopkeeper at the age of eight (that shopkeeper’s grin provided the associative link 
to the two laughing clerks, and thus reactivated the unconscious memory). Freud 
postulates that the initial experience had not been traumatic in itself, because at the time 
the little girl had lacked an adequate understanding of sexuality to comprehend what had 
happened to her; four years later, however, and with the advent of puberty, a retroactive 
understanding of that earlier event had rendered it traumatic and pathogenic. It may be 
doubted whether an experience of being fondled on the genitals was, as such, not 
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traumatic before the advent of puberty and greater sexual awareness; in fact, Freud’s own 
discovery of infantile sexuality a few years later (Freud, 1905d) would seem to invalidate 
the above reconstruction of events, which importantly turns on the assumption of sexual 
naiveté on the part of the 8-yr-old Emma. However, the essential point for my purposes 
here is the notion of “a memory exciting an affect which it had not excited as an 
experience” (1895b, p. 413). In this particular instance, this chain of events and the 
relative potency of memory over experience is attributed to the assumption that “in the 
meantime the changes produced by puberty had made possible a new understanding of 
what was remembered” (1895b, p. 413); by substituting ‘time’ or ‘loss’ for “puberty” in 
the above statement, we will begin to approach the conception of photographs as objects 
of afterwardness that I am driving at here. In short, conceptualizing photographs as loci 
of retroactive trauma is not dependent on the specifics of Freud’s seduction theory, but 
rather on the idea that “in a sense, the trauma is situated entirely in the play of ‘deceit’ 
producing a kind of seesaw effect between the two events. Neither of the two events in 
itself is traumatic” (Laplanche, 1976, p. 41; my emphasis). In other words, the locus of 
trauma is the incommensurability between the two events, the temporal disconnect 
between them, the “interplay … of ‘too early’ and ‘too late’” (Laplanche, 1976, p. 43). 
Elsewhere, Laplanche compares this process to the operation of “a time-bomb which is 
triggered off by something outside it” (1999, p. 265). This “critical later event” (Thomä 
& Cheshire, 1991, p. 415) that acts as a catalyst to trigger off the up-to-then dormant and 
only potentially explosive time-bomb is none other than the belated “access to a new 
level of meaning” (Laplanche & Pontalis, 1988, p. 112). But isn’t a time-bomb, by 
definition, a mechanism that is set in motion and then takes its course, with no need for 
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another subsequent trigger? Wouldn’t this conception suggest a purely linear, 
deterministic understanding of the state of affairs, an understanding, in fact, encapsulated 
by the forward-looking term ‘deferred action’, which, as you will recall, we dismissed as 
too one-dimensional? Note, however, that the idea of a time-bomb can easily be 
reconciled with the need for an additional, subsequent catalyst: describing the time-bomb 
as potentially explosive may be construed as meaning that, even though it will most 
likely detonate sooner or later, the particular moment this will happen is crucially 
dependent on when the subsequent outside catalyst arrives on the scene (and, in fact, it is 
also possible that the bomb may fizzle out and not detonate at all if such a catalyst never 
presents itself). In that sense, the second phase of the process, what comes afterward, is 
as crucial as the initial phase.  
 What do the two phases entail in the case of looking at photographs, what is the 
‘before’ and what the ‘afterward’, that, in conjunction, give rise to a traumatic time-
bomb? The making (or ‘taking’) of a photograph, by the very nature of the medium, 
presupposes presence: the presence of the loved ones whose image is captured and fixed. 
And, on another level, the presence of certain feelings, of an emotional bond, and a trust 
in the reciprocity and continuity of such feelings. But when we are looking at a 
photograph of a lost loved one, we cannot escape the “new level of meaning” (Laplanche 
& Pontalis, 1988, p. 112) provided by intervening events: a new level of meaning that 
functions as a kind of postscript to the photograph and the moment of its creation. We 
now know what we had no way of knowing then, when the photograph was taken: that 
this loved person would be gone, would not be part of our life forever; or, more 
accurately (assuming that we learn to expect loss from an early age, disavowal 
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notwithstanding), what we have no way of knowing in advance is not so much the fact of 
eventual loss, but rather the when and the how: that perhaps the loved person would stop 
loving us, or we them; that perhaps they would die before us. As Baer writes, “every 
photograph is radically exposed to a future unknown to its subjects” (2005, p. 7). 
Photographs are not just reminders of loss per se; even more significantly, they are 
reminders of our erstwhile (either willful or naïve) ignorance, our mistake in disavowing 
and trying to arrest the passage of time, trying to cling to the illusion that things last 
forever. This is the real sting of afterwardness when it comes to photographs.    
 Interestingly enough, Freud himself used precisely the metaphor of photography 
to describe trauma and the persistent effects of the past on the present; in Moses and 
Monotheism, he writes:  
It has long since become common knowledge that the experiences of a person’s 
first five years exercise a determining effect on his life, which nothing later can 
withstand. Much that deserves knowing might be said about the way in which 
these early impressions maintain themselves against any influences in more 
mature periods of life – but it would not be relevant here. It may, however, be less 
well known that the strongest compulsive influence arises from impressions 
which impinge upon a child at a time when we would have to regard his psychical 
apparatus as not yet completely receptive. The fact itself cannot be doubted; but it 
is so puzzling that we may make it more comprehensible by comparing it with a 
photographic exposure which can be developed after any interval of time and 
transformed into a picture. (1939, p. 125-6) 
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I want to focus on two salient points that can be discerned in the above passage. First, 
Freud is not speaking here of extraordinary, catastrophic events – and yet, the mechanism 
he describes is virtually identical to that according to which trauma operates, as we saw 
earlier. And, secondly, that he describes the young child’s psychic apparatus as “not 
completely receptive”. Indeed, it is precisely this characteristic of the young psyche that 
allows events to “impinge” on it, and to subsequently have the most far-reaching 
“compulsive influence”. In a way, what this means is that the young child’s psyche is all 
too receptive: but receptive in the wrong way, in the sense of being wide open, 
defenseless, unprepared and unable to adequately process and thus assimilate experience. 
The implication, again, is that it is not the nature of an experience per se that renders it 
traumatic, but the way it is received and apprehended. And, crucially, that is a matter of 
timing. As the important scholar of trauma Cathy Caruth writes, trauma is not defined 
“by the event itself – which may or may not be catastrophic, and may not traumatize 
everyone equally – nor can it be defined in terms of a distortion … but consists … in the 
structure of its experience of reception: the event is not assimilated or experienced fully 
at the time, but only belatedly, in its repeated possession of the one who experiences it” 
(1995, p. 4; italics in the original).  
 In the passage from Moses and Monotheism quoted above, the suggestion is that 
an experience may remain unassimilated or not fully experienced because of the 
immaturity of the psychic apparatus at the time. My suggestion, when it comes to 
photographs, is that, as a rule, at the time of taking photographs people are also not 
“completely receptive” (Freud, 1939, p. 126) to what is occurring in the moment, 
although this lack of receptivity is not due to developmental immaturity. Rather, in the 
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case of photography this lack of receptivity unfolds on a double register: not just in the 
sense of not being attentive enough to the flow of experience (insofar as attention is 
diverted from spontaneous lived experience to the staging of a photograph), but also, and 
much more importantly, in the sense that, by consciously attending to one connotation of 
the memorializing function of photography, people tend to disavow the other implication 
of this term. When people take pictures, in most instances (I will qualify this statement in 
Chapter 3) their conscious agenda and conceptualization of what is transpiring has to do 
with the preservation of memories, the fantasied arresting of time, as described in 
Chapter 1. They thus tend to disavow the fact that memorialization is intimately 
connected with loss and death – therefore, that photography is Janus-faced: apart from 
being “an aide-mémoire, a form for preserving memory, it is [also] a memento mori” 
(Prosser, 2005, p. 1-2).  
 In a work of impressive scholarship, Baer (2005) analyzes “photography’s ability 
to confront the viewer with a moment that had the potential to be experienced but perhaps 
was not. In viewing such photographs we are witnessing a mechanically recorded instant 
that was not necessarily registered by the subject’s own consciousness” (p. 8); in that 
sense, “photography can provide special access to experiences that have remained 
unremembered yet cannot be forgotten” (Baer, 2005, p. 7). However, by focusing on 
photographs of the Holocaust and its traces, or the extensive photographic record of the 
cataleptic and other hysterical seizures of Charcot’s patients at the Salpêtrière, Baer’s 
analysis tends to over-emphasize the sheer overwhelming nature of the photographed 
event or moment that makes it psychically unassimilable at the time of its occurrence. I 
think it is more fruitful and ultimately far-reaching to re-direct the emphasis to the 
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traumatic potential of photographs in afterwardness that is not owing to the fact that the 
photographed moment was overwhelming or unthinkable as such, but to the fact that it 
becomes traumatic to contemplate in hindsight, in juxtaposition to the present – a present 
enwrapped in loss. Photographs enable the “appearance of a meaning that … although it 
concerns the past, did not exist there” (Baer, 2005, p. 12).  
 In his famous paper ‘Fear of breakdown’, Winnicott (1974) speaks of situations 
where the patient has no understanding or conscious recollection of a traumatic 
experience of “primitive agony” (1974, p. 105) that he underwent in the past, but instead 
projects it into the future in the form of a fear of a possible future breakdown. The tragic 
irony, then, is that the dreaded breakdown has already occurred. Winnicott suggests that 
even though this catastrophic breakdown was, from an objective point of view, 
experienced, on another level it does not constitute part of the subject’s experience 
because “it is not possible to remember something that has not yet happened, and this 
thing of the past has not happened yet because the patient was not there for it to happen 
to. The only way to ‘remember’ in this case is for the patient to experience this past thing 
for the first time in the present” (1974, p. 105). What Winnicott means when he says that 
the patient “was not there” for the experience to happen to is that, at the early stage of life 
that he is referring to, the ego is still too inchoate, too disconnected from a stable sense of 
self, to be able to fully own every experience that befalls it. By analogy, when looking at 
a photograph of a lost loved one, the viewer is also someone who, in a sense, was not 
there (even if he took the photograph, or is also depicted in it). He is both the same 
person who was related to the photograph’s subject back then, but also, in a crucial sense, 
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a very different person: a person bereaved, left behind; someone who used to see through 
a glass, darkly, but no longer.  
 And this brings me to the other main point of Winnicott’s 1974 paper: the reverse 
side of the situation of a non-experienced event that he is describing is, in fact, the 
possibility of belatedly experiencing it (experiencing it for what it was, instead of in the 
form of a fantasied fear of the future) and thus owning it in the present. This is another, 
very different aspect of afterwardness. Künstlicher (1994) describes a clinical situation 
where a patient is haunted (possessed, to paraphrase Caruth) by a “frozen picture” (1994, 
p. 102), similar to a screen memory – “a perceptual impression from a past course of 
events which, precisely because of its immutability, indicates something overwhelming” 
(Künstlicher, 1994, p. 102). However, he goes on to describe how in analysis (thus, in 
afterwardness) such “unassimilated impressions from the past [can be] transformed into 
something psychically manageable or into an experience” (1994, p. 102. Italics in the 
original). Likewise, Baer suggests that “bypassed memory and cognition … remain 
visible, phenomenologically, in the photographs” (2005, p. 15), and describes 
“photography’s ability to confront the viewer with a moment that had the potential to be 
experienced but perhaps was not. In viewing such photographs we are witnessing a 
mechanically recorded instant that was not necessarily registered by the subject’s own 
consciousness” (2005, p. 8). The essential afterwardness of photographs, then, is a 
double-edged sword: by the same token that photographs can instigate trauma after the 
fact, they can also be “a medium of a salvaging, preservation, and rescue of reality” 
(Baer, 2005, p. 24). In fact, photographs can rescue a previously disavowed reality 
precisely through confronting the subject with it: this confrontation can be, in one fell 
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swoop, both traumatic and redemptive. Thus, Prosser (2005), referencing Lacan (1981), 
describes how photography is uniquely positioned to effect a ‘return of the real’, and how 
the photographic “gaze returns the real overlooked by the more credulous and conscious 
vision of reality” (Prosser, 2005, p. 5). Poignantly, Prosser likens photography to the 
poetic form of the palinode, whose essence is the retraction or recantation of an earlier 
view now acknowledged to have been misguided; this is a painful process: “In palinodes 
the enlightenment is often coincident with trauma, our greatest insight ensuing from our 
greatest loss” (2005, p. 13-4). Likewise, “Photography makes real the loss. But then it 
makes possible the apprehension of this loss. This is my recovery. As offering insight 
into the inexorable loss that is life, photography captures a reality that we would 
otherwise not see, that we would choose not to see. It holds out the promise of a kind of 
enlightenment” (Prosser, 2005, p. 2).    
 Laplanche adds yet another parameter to the conceptualization of afterwardness 
by noting that what is missing from the Freudian conception of a past event that is later 
re-transcribed with new meaning is a greater emphasis on the fact that the past events in 
question always entail an interaction with another; therefore, 
afterwardness is inconceivable without a model of translation: that is, it 
presupposes that something is proffered by the other, and this is then afterwards 
retranslated and reinterpreted. … [the] past cannot be a purely factual one, an 
unprocessed or raw ‘given’. It contains rather in an immanent fashion something 
that comes before – a message from the other. It is impossible therefore to put 
forward a purely hermeneutic position on this – that is to say, that everyone 
interprets their past according to their present – because the past already has 
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something deposited in it that demands to be deciphered, which is the message of 
the other person (1999, p. 269).  
This message is “enigmatic” (Laplanche, 1999, p. 269): it invites a potentially infinite 
chain of projections and conjectures. According to Laplanche, this is part of the work of 
mourning: “Mourning is hardly ever without the question: What would he be saying 
now? What would he have said? hardly ever without regret or remorse for not having 
been able to speak with the other enough, for not having heard what he had to say” (1999, 
p. 258).  Here, too, photographs are uniquely positioned to fan the flames of this process 
of guessing and imagining, of trying to decipher the lost other’s enigmatic message: 
“Photographs compel the imagination because they remain radically open-ended” (Baer, 
2005, p. 24). Indeed, they add a new dimension to the regret posited above by Laplanche, 
of “not having heard” what the loved person had to say: looking at old photographs, of 
happier times, it is hard to avoid wondering whether there was something we missed, 
something we did not see or understand at the time in the other person’s attitude, their 
posture, their body language, or especially their gaze, still looking at us through all this 
time and distance. This is especially true in the case of loss not due to death but, in 
Akhtar’s felicitous turn of phrase, “other devastating forms of separation” (Akhtar, 2003, 
p. 29). Is there a hint of what was to come in how our loved one was looking at us in that 
photograph, a hint discernible only from the vantage point of hindsight? Is that a wistful, 
knowing smile in the picture, an indication of their knowing something we did not know, 
that we were too late to understand? Or does their smile only appear wistful in 
afterwardness? Looking at photographs can open a Pandora’s box of second-guessing and 
regret.   
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II. What is lost: Mourning  
 
 Mourning is the set of conscious and unconscious psychological processes set in 
motion by the loss of a loved one. Mourning processes may be instigated by either a loss 
due to the actual death of the loved person in question, or another irreversible separation, 
such as the termination of an important relationship, of someone having been “lost as an 
object of love” (Freud, 1917e, p. 245). Optimally, the end result of the process of 
mourning is the acceptance of the irrevocability of the loss and the concomitant 
achievement of detachment from the hitherto emotionally invested love object, so that the 
bereaved can go on with their lives and become once more capable of new emotional 
attachments. Experience demonstrates that the work of mourning is both painful and 
prolonged in the best of cases, and also that it can go awry in various ways, and turn into 
some pathological form of mourning. Subsequently, I will try to show how different 
outcomes of mourning result in different configurations in the mourning subject’s usage 
of, and relationship to, the photographs of their lost love object – indeed, how, perhaps, 
this may be a bi-directional process, that is, different uses of photographs may feed into 
and foster one or another of the possible ways of dealing with loss and resolving the 
process of mourning.   
 In the psychoanalytic canon, the fundamental text on mourning continues to be 
Freud’s pivotal paper Mourning and Melancholia (Freud, 1917e). However, antecedents 
of some of the ideas expressed in that work can also be glimpsed in the case history of 
Elizabeth von R. (Freud & Breuer, 1895), and, more extensively, in Totem and Taboo 
(Freud, 1913). It is of significance that Freud begins his 1917 paper by drawing a 
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methodological analogy between his attempt to analyze mourning and the analysis of 
dreams: he suggests that, just as dreams are ubiquitous, normal mental processes which, 
however, can offer fundamental insights into the workings of the human mind if they are 
not just taken for granted but are problematized and meticulously analyzed, so can 
mourning, another ubiquitous and normal aspect of the human condition, throw light on 
the unconscious workings of the mind and on pathological processes such as melancholia 
(which we would nowadays designate as severe depression). However, the analogy with 
dreams seems to go much deeper than the methodological level, even though Freud 
himself does not explicitly point this out. This will become clearer as we describe the 
work performed by mourning. 
According to Freud (1917e), mourning entails very significant psychical work 
indeed, in so far as it consists in the arduous and gradual readjustment of the ego to a new 
reality, the reality of an external world in which the loved object has become permanently 
absent. This readjustment takes the form of the gradual withdrawal of libidinal 
investment from the lost loved object. The process of mourning is a strenuous, prolonged 
and piecemeal one, because this libidinal withdrawal is effected through an equally 
gradual and repetitive process of painful reality testing: each expectation of the object’s 
presence in the outside world, an erstwhile realistic, repeatedly corroborated expectation, 
is now met with a reality that disconfirms it; the ego must then gradually readjust its 
expectations, so that they again correspond to objective reality, the reality of a world 
“which has become poor and empty” (Freud 1917e, p. 246), as it no longer contains the 
longed-for loved object.  
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In an essential way, then, mourning is “the work of memory” (Laplanche, 1999, p. 
245), “a work of recollection” (Freud & Breuer, 1895, p. 162). It pits memory against 
reality, the past against the present:  
Each single one of the memories and situations of expectancy which demonstrate 
the libido’s attachment to the lost object is met by the verdict of reality that the 
object no longer exists; and the ego, confronted as it were with the question 
whether it shall share this fate, is persuaded by the sum of the narcissistic 
satisfactions it derives from being alive to sever its attachment to the object that 
has been abolished. (Freud, 1917e, p. 255)  
However, this is easier said than done. Emotional attachments tend to be very tenacious: 
“people never willingly abandon a libidinal position, not even, indeed, when a substitute 
is already beckoning to them” (Freud, 1917e, p. 244). Thus, the initial reaction to a 
catastrophic bereavement or separation typically may very well be a denial of the reality 
of loss, paired with “a clinging to the object through the medium of a hallucinatory 
wishful psychosis” (Freud, 1917e, p. 244). This, then, is the other way in which mourning 
(at least in its initial stage) seems to be similar to dreaming. And, as will be recalled from 
Chapter 1, photographs can be seen as concretely providing an experience of ‘perceptual 
identity’ (Freud, 1900a), which is the hallmark of dreaming and of the primary process of 
hallucinatory wish fulfillment. Thus, as we will soon see in more detail, photographs are 
potentially ideally situated to buttress the denial of the reality of loss, in the service of 
obviating the pain and toil of mourning.  
In fact, even in the case of a more successful outcome of the mourning process, it 
would seem that a profound withdrawal from reality (albeit not a persistent denial of it) is 
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necessary to pave the way for eventual reality-acceptance and moving on. Freud (1917e) 
describes the triad of “cessation of interest in the outside world, loss of the capacity to 
love, inhibition of all activity” (p. 244), which forms a normal accompaniment to 
mourning. Again, the similarity to sleep and dreaming is pertinent:  
Could it be that, as in dreams, withdrawal into mourning makes it possible to 
organize the world not on the basis of external perceptions, but on the basis of a 
subjectivity turned completely inward? Inasmuch as sleep is a prerequisite of 
mental recuperation, a chance to start again relying on one’s inner resources, it 
would seem reasonable to conclude that a kind of psychic restoration likewise 
occurs through mourning, with its deferment of all outside stimuli; that the loss of 
a cathected object requires a psychic reorganization so absorbing that it means 
confining all cathexis to the internal world. There are in fact few tasks more 
engrossing than taking stock of what will never again exist. (Jacobi, 2005, p. 
1081)  
Again, we will soon see how photographs can play a facilitating role in this process of 
temporarily, provisionally withdrawing from the exigencies of objective reality in order 
to eventually accept and address them more successfully.  
Nevertheless, as already alluded, this delicate and demanding process of 
mourning often goes awry, or becomes even more complicated due to the presence of 
various additional emotional factors. This derailment of successful mourning can take 
several different forms. As mentioned, one possible outcome is that loss may give rise to 
an entrenched denial of the actuality of this loss (or, minimally, a denial of the real 
emotional impact of that loss). Another species of pathological mourning centers on 
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“obsessive self-reproaches” (Freud, 1913, p. 60), to the effect that the mourner “is 
overwhelmed by tormenting doubts … as to whether she may not herself have been 
responsible for the death of this cherished being through some act of carelessness or 
neglect” (1913, p. 60). Freud attributes this pathological process of mourning to 
emotional ambivalence; more specifically, to an unconscious sense of guilt derived from 
hostile feelings that the bereaved unconsciously harbored toward the deceased, feelings 
which, given the sway of the primary process and the omnipotence of thought in the 
unconscious, on some level are perceived as in fact having caused the loved person’s 
death. “In the view of unconscious thinking, a man who has died a natural death is a 
murdered man: evil wishes have killed him” (Freud, 1913, p. 62).  
Significantly, Freud then goes on to discuss how the same emotional ambivalence 
and unconscious hostile feelings toward loved ones who happened to die give rise, in the 
case of a multitude of tribal cultures, to various taboos against the dead, the common 
denominator of which is a conception of the dead as transformed into vindictive, resentful 
demons that may come back to torment and destroy the living, especially those who were 
closest to them in life (Freud, 1913). Freud analyzes these fears as deriving from a 
mechanism of projection of the survivors’ unconscious hostility onto the dead 
themselves, in combination with the unconscious guilt and need for punishment felt by 
the bereaved precisely as a result of their unconscious emotional ambivalence. “The 
taboo upon the dead arises … from the contrast between conscious pain and unconscious 
satisfaction over the death that has occurred. Since such is the origin of the ghost’s 
resentment, it follows naturally that the survivors who have the most to fear will be those 
who were formally its nearest and dearest” (Freud, 1913, p. 61). For my purposes here, 
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what is of interest is how such an interaction of projection and guilt may play into the 
deciphering of the presumed “enigmatic message” (Laplanche, 1999, p. 269) detected in 
photographs of lost loved ones, whether the loss was due to death or another form of 
separation.  
A few years after Totem and Taboo, Freud further elaborated on processes of 
pathological mourning stemming from emotional ambivalence in his seminal 1917 paper. 
There, he sets out to establish the essential differences between normal mourning and the 
condition then termed melancholia, which nowadays would most likely be diagnosed as 
severe (reactive) depression. Outwardly, melancholia seems to be identical to mourning 
in all its particulars, with one significant exception: the effect it has on the sufferer’s self-
regard. Thus, its defining characteristic is a process of self-reproach, of the self 
apparently attacking itself. “The melancholic displays … an extraordinary diminution in 
his self-regard, an impoverishment of his ego on a grand scale. In mourning it is the 
world which has become poor and empty; in melancholia, it is the ego itself” (Freud, 
1917, p. 246). In this, then, melancholia appears to be similar to the states of pathological 
mourning described by Freud in Totem and Taboo. The added dimension here is that the 
self-reproaches are not simply stemming from an unconscious sense of guilt because of 
emotional ambivalence, but are then genuinely directed against the mourner’s own self – 
rather, the melancholic’s self-reproaches entail a further reversal, in that they are masked 
reproaches against the lost love object, which the subject has incorporated in a process of 
identification. “The shadow of the object fell upon the ego, and the latter could 
henceforth be judged … as if it were an object, the forsaken object” (Freud, 1917, p. 
249). In other words, melancholia derives from a pathological internalized object 
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relationship, a situation in which what seemed to be a self-reflexive accusation is in fact a 
covert reproach against the loved object, which has so disappointed and hurt the bereaved 
by disappearing from his external world. Melancholia derives from “a mental 
constellation of revolt” (Freud, 1917, p. 248).  
Finally, another important feature of melancholia is “its tendency to change round 
into mania” (Freud, 1917, p. 253). Non-psychogenic cases of bipolar disorder 
notwithstanding, Freud (1917) suggests that mania may be a manifestation of the 
regression of libidinal investment away from external objects and onto the self. Thus, he 
postulates an essential connection between mania and narcissism. According to this 
conception, the elation and self-aggrandizement that constitute the phenomenology of 
mania are predicated on the devaluation of the love object, and of emotional attachment 
in general. Indeed, melancholia is seen as gradually effecting precisely such a devaluation 
of the object, in terms of the psychical work underlying its surface appearance of 
devaluing the self: “each single struggle of ambivalence loosen[s] the fixation of the 
libido to the object by disparaging it, denigrating it and even as it were killing it” (1917, 
p. 257); this results to a situation where “the manic subject plainly demonstrates his 
liberation from the object which was the cause of his suffering” (1917, p. 255). Again, in 
the next section we will see in a little more detail how photographs may be utilized for 
this defensive purpose of divesting oneself from the pain associated with emotional 
attachment to a love object.  
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III.  Using photographs to mourn, using photographs to not mourn  
 
  A conspicuous absence in the psychoanalytic theorizing about mourning that I 
have been summarizing in the previous section would concern the part played by material 
objects in the psychical negotiation and processing of loss. Most patently, physical 
objects play a significant role in the burial customs and rituals of virtually every culture; 
their functions in the context of mourning processes, however, are not restricted to that, 
but are arguably much more extensive and multi-faceted. Yet this lacuna in 
psychoanalytic theorizing is not limited just to the issue at hand. As Akhtar suggests, 
“from birth till death a human being is constantly involved with inanimate objects, many 
of which come to acquire profound psychological meanings for him” (2003, p. 1); 
nevertheless, and surprisingly, “psychoanalysis has paid inadequate attention to the 
constructive, sustaining, and symbolic significance of the inanimate surround in which 
the human mind evolves and functions” (2003, p. 1). In this section, then, I propose to 
explore in more detail the various roles that photographs can play in a person’s psychic 
economy when it comes to dealing with loss. My hypothesis is that photographs often 
become part of mourning, and indeed in a dialectical manner: they may facilitate the 
expression of different currents or possible channels that mourning processes can follow, 
but, additionally, their presence and availability may in itself add an important, 
psychically potent parameter to the overall dynamic, and thus foster, inhibit, or re-direct 
the particular course that mourning pursues, thereby also potentially influencing its 
eventual outcome. I will concern myself with three main paths that mourning may follow, 
in other words, three fundamental reactions to loss: pathological mourning that takes the 
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form of entrenched melancholia, manic denial of loss, and normal mourning that 
eventuates in the acceptance of loss and thus ultimately moving on.3 A by-product of my 
discussion will be the observation that one and the same object can be used in 
diametrically opposed ways, that is, can facilitate diametrically opposed psychological 
processes. This functional pliability of photographs provides a telling demonstration of 
the fact that it is not so much the inherent characteristics of any given material object as 
such, but rather the way that the object is employed that has a decisive influence on the 
role it may come to play in one’s psychic economy.  
 As we saw, mourning can be derailed from a healthier course and turn into 
melancholia when intense emotional ambivalence toward the lost loved person is present. 
Such ambivalence can be due to a combination of factors. These include the mourner’s 
own psychological constitution and characterological traits, the particulars of the history 
of the relationship with the love object, and, not least, the circumstances of the 
bereavement itself: was it due to death or separation? If the former, was the death sudden 
or long expected? Was it peaceful or violent? If the latter, was this separation inevitable, 
due to external circumstances, or did it have the character of an intentional abandonment? 
Did it register as a betrayal by the other person, or was it perhaps the subject himself or 
herself the one who initiated the separation?  The possibilities are endless. But in any 
                                                
3 We can also conceive of a variant of the third possibility, a special sub-species of 
normal mourning, so to speak, the importance of which will become more apparent in the 
next chapter: this would be a kind of sublimation of mourning that goes on, that is not 
shed once a particular loss has been worked through. In other words, this is a stance that 
entails an affirmation of ‘the blues’, as it were, as a creative stance and expression, an 
attitude that not only acknowledges, but, in a manner of speaking, celebrates loss and 
transience as a measure of the meaningfulness of human encounters and libidinal 
investments, as suggested in Freud (1916). As in the case of the blues as a fountain of 
creation in music (not just limited to the homonymous genre), such a stance can also 
become a wellspring of photography as an art.  
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event, we saw that pathological mourning is characterized by a pathogenic internalization 
of the lost love object which, due to the presence of intense ambivalence and aggressive, 
hostile feelings, does not resolve itself into an ego-syntonic identification and integration 
of the good qualities of the lost object into the ego. Rather, the mental representation of 
the lost object functions as a semi-alien introject, and the mourner is caught up in the 
vicious circle of an internalized object relationship that consists of interminable attacks 
upon this disappointing, hated object, which are phenomenologically experienced as 
attacks against one’s own self (one’s self-regard, sense of well-being, etc.). It is also of 
the essence of pathological mourning that it relegates the mourner to a kind of limbo, a 
sort of psychic stasis, as opposed to normal mourning, whose course may be slow and 
painful but is eventually spent and overcome.  
 Photographs can become potent triggers or facilitators of the internal drama of 
melancholia. Volkan (1981, 1984) introduced the concept of ‘linking objects’ in relation 
to pathological forms of mourning. Even though Volkan only concerns himself with 
mourning due to actual death, I believe that this concept is equally, if not more so, 
applicable to other forms of loss as well. (Thus, even in the absence of the real death or 
loss of the object depicted, a photograph is always an emanation from, and a monument 
to, a moment forever lost). Volkan writes: “A linking object is something actually present 
in the environment that is psychologically contaminated with various aspects of the dead 
and the self … the significance of this object does not fade as it does in uncomplicated 
mourning. Rather, it increasingly commands attention with its aura of mystery, 
fascination, and terror” (1981, p. 101). Note how the linking object is not just 
associatively linked to the lost loved one, but is psychologically invested with aspects of 
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the self as well. Thus, it “functions as an external meeting ground for those 
representations that offer the illusion of reunion between the mourner and the deceased” 
(Volkan, 1984, p. 334). In other words, the linking object is an external reification of the 
internalized object relationship between mourner and mourned, and thus becomes an 
arena for the expression of the ambivalence characterizing that relationship. A material 
object can acquire this role if it was something the deceased was attached to and 
habitually used, if it was a gift from the deceased to the mourner, or an object that the 
bereaved happened to be handling at the exact moment when he learned the news of the 
loss (Volkan, 1981). Two additional categories of linking objects, however, are much 
more pertinent to our present purposes. Thus, another main sub-species of linking objects 
is comprised of “things through which the deceased had extended his senses – for 
example, a camera” (1984, p. 334). I would suggest that, much more than the mechanical 
apparatus   (the camera itself), it is the tangible results of the operation of such an 
apparatus by the lost loved one, i.e. the photographs that he took (which, after all, are 
replicas of what he saw at the moment of taking the pictures) that can function as linking 
objects. Additionally, and predictably, “[s]ymbolic or realistic representations of the dead 
person’s appearance, such as a photograph” (Volkan, 1984, p. 334) form yet another type 
of linking object.  
 Both the photographs that the lost loved one took themselves, and photographs of 
them, can thus become fertile ground for the proliferation of phantasy and projections, 
purveyors of an infinitude of enigmatic messages from beyond. Indeed, by including an 
element of “terror” in the “aura” (Volkan, 1981, p. 101) surrounding linking objects, 
Volkan is hinting precisely at the fact that such objects become depositories of 
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unconscious hostile projective identifications, thus turning into a non-psychotic 
equivalent of Bion’s (1956, 1957) ‘bizarre objects’. In any case, my main point is that 
looking at photographs associated with the lost loved object can fuel the mourner’s 
ambivalent, tenacious attachment, and perpetuate the process of pathological mourning. 
By returning to the lost one’s photographs in a frame of mind where ambivalence is 
dominant, the mourner keeps revisiting the trauma of loss, and, more likely than not, even 
intensifying that trauma through his projections (projections steeped in feelings of 
betrayal, disappointment, and resentment). This way, looking at photographs can result in 
a perpetually open wound, a wound that won’t heal – indeed, a wound that is scratched 
open again every time it threatens to heal, in the manner of a pathological repetition 
compulsion (Freud, 1920), a trauma intentionally renewed again and again in 
afterwardness. Hence, I am tempted to suggest that, when recruited in the service of 
processes of pathological interminable mourning, photographs could be pertinently 
described as sadomasochistic objects.  
 On the other end of the spectrum from melancholia we encounter denial as 
another less than optimally healthy possible way of attempting to deal with loss. We saw 
how denial as a rule forms the initial reaction to bereavement and normal processes of 
mourning; however, in pathological outcomes denial can become prolonged and 
entrenched. Moreover, denial as a way of dealing with loss can assume the more 
straightforward aspect of denying the reality of the loss itself, or the subtler form of 
denying the real magnitude of the lost loved one’s emotional significance for the 
bereaved. With this in mind, and despite appearances, there may in fact be significant 
underlying connecting threads between melancholia and the entrenched denial of loss. In 
 87 
the previous section we saw how Freud (1917) proposed that the oft-observed reversal of 
melancholia into mania may be the more or less sudden outward manifestation of a much 
more prolonged underlying process, namely, the gradual chipping away of the value of 
the lost love object by the constant attacks and denigrations the ambivalent ego engages 
in against it.  
Melanie Klein (1935, 1940) significantly expanded upon these ideas. In fact, she 
postulated that manic defenses against dependence can operate at any time, not just in the 
wake of actual loss – that is, a manic denial of the importance of the depended-upon 
loved object can also operate pre-emptively: “Its torturous and perilous dependence on its 
loved objects drives the ego to find freedom” (1935, p. 161). A primary means of 
achieving this illusory sense of freedom from dependence takes the form of the 
disparagement of the goodness and value of the loved object, and consequently of its 
importance for the subject. This disparagement is not just directed against the actual 
loved object, but toward its internal representation as well. The ego “attempt[s] to detach 
itself from an object without at the same time renouncing it” (Klein, 1935, p. 162; italics 
mine); “[i]t succeeds in this compromise by denying the importance of its good objects” 
(1935, p. 162; italics in the original). We will presently examine in more detail the 
implications of the fact that the compromise consists, in effect, in simultaneously, and 
paradoxically, both renouncing and not renouncing the good loved object. Another 
important aspect of the manic defense against dependence, in the Kleinian conception, is 
the endeavor to control the love object in phantasy, through the employment of the “sense 
of omnipotence” (Klein, 1935, p. 162) that holds sway there. The purpose of this 
phantasied omnipotent control of the object is twofold: to reverse the situation of 
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dependence upon the object, but also to be able to undo the aggressive attacks that have 
been directed against the object in phantasy, that is, to make ‘reparation’. Klein writes: 
“[T]he objects were killed but, since the subject was omnipotent, he supposed he could 
also immediately call them to life again. One of my patients spoke of this process as 
‘keeping them in suspended animation’” (1935, p. 162. Italics mine). 
The above turn of phrase would also serve as an apposite description of 
photographic representations. Photographs are literally devices for freezing the flow of 
motion that we normally perceive in our lived experience. But the connection of 
photographs to the kind of psychic suspended animation that Klein’s patient was 
describing runs much deeper than that. I want to suggest that photographs can be utilized 
in the service of manic defense, for purposes of evading the full recognition of loss and 
the concomitant pain of mourning. Their being put to such use makes them closely 
related to fetishes, as I will now attempt to show.  
Strictly speaking, the concept of a fetish relates to the sphere of sexuality. In this 
sense, a fetish is “an inherently non-sexual object” (Lussier, 2005, p. 582) which, 
paradoxically, in the case of certain men becomes an essential precondition for achieving 
and maintaining potency and/or for obtaining pleasure from sexual relations with women. 
An example would be a man’s need for the woman to be wearing high heels during the 
sexual act, in the absence of which it is impossible for him to achieve or maintain an 
erection. According to Freud (1927e), the compulsive reliance of the fetishist on the 
fetish as a precondition for sexual satisfaction is to be explained on the basis of psychic 
defense, the alleviation of intolerable anxiety that the fetish affords; specifically, the 
alleviation of castration anxiety. Freud claims that the fixation on the fetish develops in 
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that instance in childhood when a male child becomes aware of the anatomical 
differences between the sexes, namely, the fact that women do not possess a penis (as 
young boys initially naively assume on the basis of overgeneralizing from their own 
anatomy). This new perception of the absence of a penis in women is extremely alarming, 
because it opens up the possibility that the little boy's own penis might be taken away and 
become lost. Freud claims that the possibility of such a threat to bodily integrity can be so 
unbearably terrifying that the only way some individuals can deal with it is to disavow 
the perception that led to it in the first place. “The creation of the fetish was due to an 
intention to destroy the evidence for the possibility of castration, so that fear of castration 
could be avoided” (Freud, 1938, p. 203).  The fetish, then, is a material object which is in 
some manner associatively connected to the terrifying perception of the real female 
genitalia, but at the same time comes to stand for the otherwise absent, fantasized female 
penis, and thus alleviates the terror triggered by the absence of a penis in females in 
objective reality. It is important to note that this defensive manoeuver does not consist in 
an absolute denial of a piece of reality; this differentiates it from psychosis. Rather, what 
happens is that the fixation on the fetish facilitates a paradoxical parallel 
acknowledgment and denial of a piece of objective reality – this “divided attitude” 
(Freud, 1927, p. 156) is the essence of both fetishism and disavowal. The fetishist “has 
retained [a] belief, but he has also given it up” (Freud, 1927, p. 154).  
It can be seen that in his theory of fetishism Freud is revealing a more widely 
applicable template about one possible way of psychologically negotiating the real and 
imagined terrors of the world, over and above the specific content he gives to this 
template in this instance. That is, the sexual fetish may be a talisman against the 
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recognition of the absence of a penis in females, but the fetishistic defense may also come 
to the rescue of other cherished possessions, other libidinally invested objects. In fact, 
Freud himself was quick to point this out. In An Outline of Psychoanalysis, he writes: 
“disavowals of this kind occur very often and not only with fetishists; and whenever we 
are in a position to study them they turn out to be half-measures, incomplete attempts at 
detachment from reality. The disavowal is always supplemented by an acknowledgment” 
(1938, p. 204). Even in the 1927 paper on fetishism itself, Freud clearly indicated the 
applicability of the concept to the non-sexual sphere. Thus, referring to emotional 
investments in abstract ideas and specifically the political sphere, he writes: “In later life 
a man may perhaps experience a similar panic when the cry goes up that Throne and 
Altar are in danger, and similar illogical consequences will ensue” (1927, p. 153). And, 
more pertinently for our present focus, he also refers to the case of two young men both 
of whom had lost their father at a young age, and yet “had failed to take cognizance of 
the death” (1927, p. 155), without, however, developing a psychosis. Rather, “a piece of 
reality which was undoubtedly important had been disavowed by the ego, just as the 
unwelcome fact of women’s castration is disavowed in fetishists. … It was only one 
current in their mental life that had not recognized their father’s death; there was another 
current which took full account of that fact. The attitude which fitted in with the wish and 
the attitude which fitted in with reality existed side by side” (1927, p. 156).  
Freud (1927) concludes his paper on fetishism by referring to certain fetishes that 
are particularly subtle and ingenious compromise-formations, in that they are “doubly 
derived from contrary ideas” (1927, p. 157), condensing both the acknowledgment and 
the disavowal of reality in their very construction and their specific characteristics; this 
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makes them “especially durable” (1927, p. 157). Photographs are interesting objects in 
this regard. In their very essence, they instantiate presence and absence at one and the 
same time, regardless of the additional consideration of whether the person(s) depicted in 
a photograph are still alive (or still part of our lives) or not.  By dint of the mechanics of 
the photographic process and the ontology of photographic images, photographic 
representations are always both in the past tense but also very much present. The people 
and scenes preserved in photographs are both here (as images) and not here. In a sense, 
photographs are always populated by ghosts. This paradoxical character of photographic 
representation acquires an additional layer of signification and poignancy when the loved 
ones populating our photographs are not simply absent for the moment, while we are 
contemplating their photographic traces, but are, for one reason or another, forever gone.  
What I want to suggest is that, by dint of their paradoxical nature, photographs are 
particularly well-suited for being employed as fetishistic objects, in order to disavow the 
fact and/or the pain of loss and bereavement and evade the cost of emotional attachment. 
In more extreme cases, looking at photographs in this way may facilitate the disavowal of 
actual bereavement or other traumatic loss. Much more commonly, however, I want to 
claim that our culture’s constantly intensifying dependence on interminably proliferating 
photographic images can also be seen as a manic defense against dependence and loss, 
albeit of a milder form. Recall how, according to Klein (1935), omnipotent control of the 
love object is one important aspect of the manic defense. Photographs of our loved ones, 
especially in this age of portable electronic devices (which replaced the photographs 
tucked in wallets) are always readily available, and always at our behest – literally at our 
fingertips. Thanks to the availability of photographs, we can summon hallucinatory wish-
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fulfillment through perceptual identity (Freud, 1900a) at will. Photographs can thus 
furnish us with an illusory sense of control over our love objects, thus reversing our sense 
of dependence on them, and affording us an unconscious feeling of narcissistic triumph 
over them (Freud, 1917; Klein, 1940). Moreover, photographs as fetishes can also foster 
the disavowal of another kind of loss (as I already hinted in Chapter 1, while discussing 
the function of photographs as screen memories): namely, the loss of past moments, the 
reality of the constant, inexorable passage of time, the trickling away of our lives. Thus, 
fetishes and screen memories can, in an important regard, be viewed as functionally 
equivalent, in that they both can be seen as facilitating disavowal by using an aspect of 
external reality to conceal another, more disturbing and painful aspect. 
There is another class of material object that is closely related to the fetish, and 
yet also ultimately very different in its psychic functions. I am referring to the concept of 
the ‘transitional object’, which we owe to Winnicott (1953, 1971). The transitional object 
is the infant’s “first possession” (Winnicott, 1953, p. 89), the first halfway station in the 
developmental journey from primary symbiosis and undifferentiation between self and 
other, to the achievement of a true object relationship. Prototypically, the transitional 
object can be something like a soft blanket or soft toy, but all sorts of things can serve as 
transitional objects. However, this is not to say that the materiality of the object is not 
important – on the contrary: “the point of it is not its symbolic value so much as its 
actuality” (Winnicott, 1953, p. 91-2. Italics mine). And yet, its very materiality is what 
enables it to occupy the no-man’s-land between reality and imagination: “It comes from 
without from our point of view, but not so from the point of view of the baby. Neither 
does it come from within; it is not an hallucination” (1953, p. 91. Italics mine). Initially, 
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the transitional object is employed by infants (beginning anywhere between the ages of 4 
and 12 months) in order to negotiate and bridge the gap between a world where all that 
exists is part of the self, and one in which there is the growing realization that there are 
objects external to the self and not subject to its wishes; most crucially, the realization 
that the mother is a separate and independent entity, and not a creation of the infant’s 
omnipotent imagination. Thus, the transitional object assists the infant in making the 
transition from psychic reality to becoming aware of, and accepting, objective, external 
reality as well; it “gives room for the process of becoming able to accept difference and 
similarity” (Winnicott, 1953, p. 92).  
What is crucial in this conception is that the transitional object somehow spans 
various supposedly incompatible and mutually exclusive existential and logical 
categories, such as ‘subjective’ and ‘objective’, ‘reality’ and ‘illusion’, ‘internal’ and 
‘external’. In relating to the transitional object, dichotomies such as the above do not 
even come into question; adult, Aristotelian logic is suspended, and paradox is tolerated 
instead of resolved. Indeed, paradox is of the essence of the transitional object.  
 Winnicott theorizes that, even though the original transitional object of childhood 
is eventually given up (once it serves its purpose, the need for it just evaporates), the 
value of the suspension of strict dichotomies that it affords is never superseded; indeed, 
the capacity to temporarily indulge in illusion, the ability to suspend disbelief (to 
paraphrase Coleridge) is essential for a full human life. The specific transitional object of 
infancy may be given up, but its legacy remains, in the form of other ‘transitional 
phenomena’, in the form of “the intense experiencing that belongs to the arts and to 
religion and to imaginative living” (1953, p. 97). Such transitional phenomena provide 
 94 
some of our most satisfying and meaningful experiences throughout life because “[i]t is 
assumed here that the task of reality-acceptance is never completed, that no human being 
is free from the strain of relating inner and outer reality, and that relief from this strain is 
provided by an intermediate area of experience which is not challenged” (1953, p. 96). 
Transitional objects and phenomena exist in, and make possible, “an intermediate area of 
experiencing, to which inner reality and external life both contribute. It is an area which 
is not challenged, because no claim is made on its behalf except that it shall exist as a 
resting-place for the individual engaged in the perpetual human task of keeping inner and 
outer reality separate yet inter-related” (1953, p. 90; italics in the original).  
 The transitional object, then, is “a bridge between that which is comfortably 
familiar and whatever is disturbingly unfamiliar” (Greenacre, 1969, p. 145); like every 
bridge, its purpose is to facilitate movement and then to be left behind. Winnicott 
postulates that, in order for there to be a place for a transitional object in the developing 
infant’s psychic economy, a very subtle, repeated dialectic between illusion and 
disillusionment is necessary. If the mother is not ‘good enough’, sensitively attuned and 
available to meet the infant’s need at the moment it arises, as if by magic, then the 
capacity for illusion is stymied, and along with it the ability to use an object in a 
transitional way. However, it is equally important for the mother to be able to gradually 
frustrate and disillusion the baby, because “incomplete adaptation to need makes objects 
real … exact adaptation resembles magic, and the object that behaves perfectly becomes 
no better than an hallucination” (Winnicott, 1953, p. 94). If the dialectic between illusion 
and disillusionment unfolds in an adequate manner, separation and weaning becomes 
possible, in the sense that it can be experienced and accepted and not be a catastrophic, 
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unthinkable occurrence. “The mere termination of breast feeding is not a weaning” 
(Winnicott, 1953, p. 96).  
 And this brings us to photographs again. Over and above the difficulty of 
reconciling oneself to separation and individuation in childhood, transience (the loss of 
our love objects as well as the passage of time, the loss of our own past moments) 
remains a challenge throughout life, never ceasing to stretch and test our capacity for 
reality-acceptance. My claim is that, subsequent to the stage of the initial transitional 
object of childhood, photographs become prime candidates for objects able to instigate 
transitional experiences in later life, to assist us in recapturing the ‘potential space’ in 
which we can indulge in paradox and illusion without getting irrevocably lost in it. As 
already discussed, photographs are paradoxical objects in their very essence, 
encapsulating absence and presence, materiality and hallucinatory wish-fulfillment 
simultaneously. Like the transitional object of childhood, a photograph is a very tangible 
part of external reality that also embodies internal, mental states, is a vessel for desire and 
phantasy. In the critic John Szarkowski’s extremely apt phrase quoted earlier, 
photographs are “figments from the real world”. My suggestion, then, is that 
photographs, if used in a transitional manner, can facilitate healthy mourning, the 
acceptance of loss and transience. They can do this, paradoxically, by offering a 
temporary respite from loss, by furnishing us with the experience of recapturing, and 
reconnecting with, our lost objects (as well as with lost time and our lost past selves) in a 
potential space of illusion. While contemplating a photograph, we can momentarily feel 
that our loved one it depicts is still with us, across time and distance or the even more 
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unbridgeable gap of death – or that we ourselves can fleetingly be transported back to the 
objectively irrevocably lost moment portrayed in the photograph.  
But then what differentiates this purported use of photographs from the fetishistic 
usage I was describing earlier? Indeed, various authors, including Winnicott himself, 
have described what seems to be a very great overlap between the conceptualization of 
the fetish and the transitional object (Wulff, 1946; Winnicott, 1953; Greenacre, 1969, 
1970). Winnicott offers a hint toward answering this question when he writes that “some 
abrogation of omnipotence is a feature [of the transitional object] from the start” (1953, 
p. 91; my italics). As we saw, the fetishistic use of an object is predicated on an intense 
narcissistic need for omnipotent control and manipulation of the object; it would seem, 
then, that this is one essential difference from the transitional use of the object. Winnicott 
(1953) aptly expresses this distinction by differentiating between an illusion, facilitated 
by the transitional object, and a delusion, which is sustained by the fetish. Photographs 
are particularly well-suited for illustrating how this distinction really stems from the use 
the object is put to, from the psychic position from which the use of the object emanates, 
and not from the object’s material or perceptual qualities per se. 
Crucially, then, using photographs as transitional objects facilitates mourning as 
well as the eventual overcoming of mourning, instead of either manically evading it or 
masochistically getting stuck in it.4  When looking at photographs in a transitional 
                                                
4 Over and above this transitional usage of photographs in the service of healthy 
mourning and moving beyond loss, photography as a creative activity can also become a 
door toward transitional experience in a more permanent, ongoing manner. Inasmuch as 
loss is an abiding undercurrent of life (minimally, in the sense of the constant passage of 
time), one possible existential stance is to face this fact head-on and indeed embrace it, 
and, far from becoming dispirited by it, rather sublimate mourning into an affirmation of 
life and of our libidinal attachments, despite their transience, as alluded to earlier in 
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manner, on some level we know perfectly well that we have aged, or that so-and-so is 
forever gone; or simply that the past is past – that we will never re-enter the same river. 
We take momentary respite from harsh reality, but we don’t disavow it in the same 
absolute and omnipotent manner as happens in fetishism, nor do we allow ourselves to be 
crushed by it and by our own resentment as happens in melancholia. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                                                                                                            
reference to ‘the blues’; this musical genre is a paradigmatic case in point of how grief 
and sadness can be channeled into creativity and indeed a celebration (of sorts) of loss. 
Freud, in On Transience, one of his most lyrical pieces, which recounts a conversation of 
his with a poet who was claiming that the transitory nature of beauty renders it useless 
and annuls whatever joy it can afford us, writes:  
I could not see my way to dispute the transience of all things, nor could I insist 
upon an exception in favour of what is beautiful and perfect. But I did dispute the 
pessimistic poet’s view that the transience of what is beautiful involves 
any loss in its worth. 
 On the contrary, an increase! Transience value is scarcity value in time. 
Limitation in the possibility of an enjoyment raises the value of the enjoyment. 
(1916, p. 305).  
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CHAPTER 3: ARTISTIC CREATIVITY, AESTHETIC VALUE, AND 
PHOTOGRAPHY 
 
 
I. Freud’s aesthetics and its limitations and potentialities 
 
 In the foregoing discussion I have been focusing on photography as an everyday 
cultural practice, and on photographs as artifacts that are part of the fabric of ordinary life 
of most people in the world we live in. I have been making the case that photographs are 
a special kind of artifact that attracts highly charged emotional investments and comes to 
occupy an all-important place in most people’s psychic economy, becoming a locus and 
catalyst for the construction of personal narratives and the negotiation of transience and 
loss. However, photography is also an artistic practice. Certain photographs are deemed 
by our culture to be part of the institution of art, as distinguished from simple everyday 
‘snapshots’. What makes this juxtaposition even more interesting is the fact that 
photography as a process generally does not entail or presuppose a high level of technical 
expertise, especially given the great leaps in technology in recent years. Not everyone can 
play a musical instrument, at least until one has undergone years of training and practice, 
but everyone can take a picture. Minimally, all that is needed is to be sighted and to push 
a button. In that sense, the medium of photography is similar to the medium of language: 
almost everyone possesses it, but few manage to use it in a way that gives rise to poetry. 
The flip side of this is that, just like with language, as in the case of ‘found poetry’, what 
endows a photograph with aesthetic value and elevates it to the status of art is not 
necessarily a function of the photographer’s intent or conscious assumption of the role of 
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artistic creator. Photographs created with the intention of being works of art may be 
deemed to have failed in this ambition, while some photographs that were created with no 
avowed aesthetic aspirations in mind may, nevertheless, strike us as objects of aesthetic 
value. In this chapter, then, I will attempt to begin addressing the question of those 
parameters the presence or absence of which may elevate a photograph from the status of 
a mere ordinary snapshot to that of an object with aesthetic significance, or, alternatively, 
may render a photograph, albeit created with artistic intent and technical expertise, 
worthless as a genuine work of art.  
 I will begin my exposition with a brief review of the tenor of Freud’s forays into 
aesthetics, in order to set the frame and indicate how the approach he pursued was, 
ultimately, very inadequate to tackle the essential problems of art, but also how he gave 
expression to a fundamental insight that set the stage for subsequent developments in 
psychoanalytic aesthetics, even though it did not significantly inform his own writings on 
art. The pivotal text in psychoanalytic art criticism as practiced by Freud is his essay on 
Leonardo da Vinci (Freud, 1910). In this text, Freud sets out to analyze a number of 
works by Leonardo in terms of their content, and, in conjunction with biographical and 
autobiographical material regarding the artist and especially his childhood, derive certain 
conclusions as to what factors in the artist’s psychological makeup and conflicts found 
indirect expression by means of his art. Freud calls this approach “pathography” (Freud, 
1910, p. 130), by analogy with biography, the significant difference being that, in Freud’s 
view, biographers “devote their energies to a task of idealization” (1910, p. 130), whereas 
the psychoanalytic pathographer aims for truth, the reality of his subject’s personality 
development and emotional struggles. In other words, in this approach art and its 
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products are no more than grist for the psychoanalytic mill, something like “a privileged 
form of neurosis” (Glover, 2009, p. 3). Artworks become material for analysis in the 
same way as dreams or symptoms or fantasies; “Freud’s exclusive concern [is] with what 
a work of art says” (Wollheim, 1965, p. xi; my italics).  
 There are two major shortcomings to such an approach. Even in terms of the more 
modest goal of simply utilizing works of art in order to corroborate or illustrate 
psychoanalytic hypotheses (“Pathography does not in the least aim at making the great 
man’s achievements intelligible”, Freud (1910, p. 130) writes), there is the difficulty that 
“the method would seem to presuppose that we have access to material which in the very 
nature of things we are unlikely to possess, or at any rate to possess to the requisite 
degree” (Wollheim, 1965, p. x). And this does not only concern the objective facts of an 
artist’s life and history; even if a complete and reliable record of these was available, 
psychoanalysis has taught us that what is psychologically significant is not so much the 
facts of a person’s life per se, but “how he felt these facts: the fantasies under which he 
subsumed them and through which they impinged upon him” (Wollheim, 1965, p. x). 
Thus, pathography can, at best, be an interesting intellectual exercise; at worst, not much 
more than wild analysis. As E.H. Gombrich writes, “[s]uch attempts as have been made 
… to tiptoe across the chasm of centuries on a fragile rope made of stray information can 
never be more than a jeu d’esprit, even if the performance is as dazzling as Freud’s 
Leonardo” (1963, p. 31). To his credit, Freud himself did not lose sight of this limitation; 
in a letter to the painter Hermann Struck, he described the Leonardo essay as “half a 
novelistic fiction” (quoted in Gombrich, 1966, p. 33).  
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 A second, and much more serious, objection to the pathographic approach to art is 
that, essentially, it does not concern itself with genuine aesthetic problems at all. 
Specifically, as Richard Wollheim pithily puts it, it “seems to leave the work of art qua  
work of art curiously untouched” (1965, p. x). For, if the emphasis is solely on the work’s 
psychological content, in terms of its giving expression to the artist’s conflicts, fixations, 
etc. in the manner of a compromise-formation, then the question is begged as to why 
these aspects of the artist’s psychology find expression in his creative work instead of 
simply in his symptoms and dreams, as is the case with ordinary people, and, moreover, 
what it is that makes the artwork meaningful and valuable not just to its creator, as a 
vehicle of his drives and fantasies, but to other people as well. Wollheim writes:  
[A]s we have seen, it is an implication of Freud’s own writings that art has a great 
deal in common with other human activities some of whose products may charm 
or gratify the mind, even to a high degree, but none of which goes by the name of 
art. The question therefore arises, Has psycho-analysis anything of interest to say 
about what is not common to works of art and these other objects? What are those 
modifications which content of a kind that might otherwise be found unacceptable 
necessarily undergoes in the course of earning what is society’s highest 
approbation? What is it for something, which might in other circumstances trickle 
out into play or fantasy, to be incorporated into art? (1965, p. xii)  
Herbert Read gave voice to the same quibble (as specifically applied to literature) 
when he stated, in his Ernest Jones Lecture before the British Psycho-analytical Society, 
that “psychology is concerned with the processes of mental activity, literary criticism 
with the product. The psychologist analyses the product only to arrive at the process; art 
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is, from this point of view, as significant as any other expression of mentality. But of no 
more significance: its significance does not correspond to its value as literature” (1951, p. 
73). And indeed, there is no better illustration of this point than Freud’s own paper on 
creative writers (Freud 1908e), an essay notorious for the fact that the literary examples 
that Freud adduces are generally of very low literary quality, of the type of pulp 
romances. Moreover, in this essay Freud presents a picture of the creative writer as a 
neurotic day-dreamer who has trouble adjusting to reality, and of literature as a means of 
vicariously obtaining the imaginary fulfillment of forbidden wishes through partaking of 
the fantasies of the writer. He presented a virtually identical picture of the artist in 
subsequent writings (Freud 1911b, 1916-17): someone essentially maladjusted and 
neurotic, who, however, by means of his art manages to find a circuitous way back to 
reality and the objective fulfillment of his fantasies, upon achieving success as an artist.  
 But how does the artist manage to translate his private fantasies into public 
success and recognition? This is all the more puzzling given that Freud postulates that 
other people’s fantasies normally “repel us or at least leave us cold” (1908e, p. 153). 
Freud’s answer to this question contains, in embryonic form, the kernel of subsequent 
developments in the psychoanalytic theory of art that, as I will try to show, engaged more 
directly with the fundamental questions at the heart of aesthetics. Freud writes:  
How the writer accomplishes this is his innermost secret; the essential ars 
poetica lies in the technique of overcoming the feeling of repulsion in us which is 
undoubtedly connected with the barriers that rise between each single ego and the 
others. We can guess two of the methods used by this technique. The writer 
softens the character of his egoistic daydreams by altering and disguising it, and 
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he bribes us by the purely formal – that is, aesthetic – yield of pleasure which he 
offers us in the presentation of his phantasies. We give the name of an incentive 
bonus, or a fore-pleasure, to a yield of pleasure such as this, which is offered to us 
so as to make possible the release of still greater pleasure arising from deeper 
psychical sources. In my opinion, all the aesthetic pleasure which a creative writer 
affords us has the character of a fore-pleasure of this kind, and our actual 
enjoyment of an imaginative work proceeds from a liberation of tensions in our 
minds. (Freud, 1908e, p. 153; italics in the original)  
Here Freud is finally acknowledging the quintessential, distinguishing mark of art, 
namely, its formal aspects, the formal values it entails. As Wollheim writes, “Form in 
effect embraces all the specifically artistic features that can be predicated of works of art” 
(1965, p. xiii); these are the features of the artwork “that do not have a particular story to 
tell us” (1965, p. xiv). Still, Freud’s acknowledgment of the formal qualities of art seems 
here rather half-hearted. He still seems to be implying that the formal aspect of the 
artwork is “merely a bait to catch the poor fish” (Read, 1951, p. 76), by relegating the 
enjoyment of form to the sphere of mere fore-pleasure. “So we are back … to a 
therapeutic theory of art” (Read, 1951, p. 76), the conception of art as no more than a 
kind of cathartic therapy for the instinctual renunciations and frustrations imposed on us 
by civilization. From the point of view of art historians and philosophers of art such as 
Read and Gombrich, this completely misses the point.  
 Nevertheless, such a reading may be giving Freud too little credit. After all, he 
was repeatedly the first to admit that his approach had a very specific focus, and “can do 
nothing toward elucidating the nature of the artistic gift, nor can it explain the means by 
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which the artist works – artistic technique” (Freud, 1925, p. 65). Moreover, even his 
protestations to this effect may have erred a little on the side of modesty – he may have 
had a slightly greater inkling of the workings of form than he himself readily 
acknowledged. In a paper on ‘Freud’s Aesthetics’, Gombrich (1966) details Freud’s 
conservative taste in art and his aversion, indeed his “uncompromising hostility” (1966, 
p. 33) to modern movements in art, especially in the visual arts. He modified his stance 
somewhat near the end of his life, shortly after his move to London, after his friend 
Stefan Zweig managed to persuade him to be introduced to Salvador Dali. His note to 
Zweig following this meeting, dated July 20th, 1938, is very illuminating:  
I can really thank you for the introduction which yesterday’s visitor brought me. 
For up to then I was inclined to consider the Surrealists who appeared to have 
chosen me as their patron saint, pure lunatics or let us say 95 per cent, as with 
‘pure’ alcohol. The young Spaniard with his patently sincere and fanatic eyes and 
his undeniable technical mastery has suggested to me a different appreciation. … 
Yet, as a critic, one might still be entitled to say that the concept of art resisted an 
extension beyond the point where the quantitative proportion between 
unconscious material and preconscious elaboration is not kept within a certain 
limit. (Freud, quoted in Gombrich, 1966, p. 34-5; my italics)  
The thoughts expressed here by Freud are revealing on multiple counts. For one, 
it becomes apparent that he in fact did not espouse a naïve, crude romantic view of art as 
pure expression, the uninhibited and unprocessed outpouring of the artist’s unconscious 
drives into his artwork. His misguided aversion to Expressionism and Surrealism seems 
to have been based on precisely such a misconception on his part as to what these 
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movements were engaged in. Dali’s “undeniable technical mastery” seems to have made 
him realize his erstwhile error in assuming that modern art was nothing more than pure 
primitive expression, pure content at the expense of form. And not only does Freud 
suggest here that for him “there was no artistic value in the primary process as such” 
(Gombrich, 1966, p. 35), but he gives a clear and specific indication of his conception of 
the dynamic interplay between content and form in the work of art, or rather, in any work 
worthy of the name of art. He states that only in so far as a fine balance between the 
unconscious material (content) and its preconscious elaboration (form) is maintained will 
a work of art ensue. As Gombrich (1966) points out, this formula very closely mirrors 
Freud’s model of the workings of the joke. According to that model, the essence of the 
mental constructions we recognize as jokes is that “a preconscious thought is given over 
for a moment to unconscious revision” (Freud, 1905, p. 166; Freud’s italics). What the 
unconscious revision in question contributes to the end-product is not its content but its 
distinctive form, “the dream-like condensation of meaning characteristic of … the 
primary process” (Gombrich, 1966, p. 35). We should not be confused by Freud’s 
apparent reversal in speaking of “preconscious elaboration” in the one instance, and 
“unconscious revision” in the other. The underlying idea is the same: that some mental 
content, which could theoretically be expressed in propositional form if it became 
conscious as such, instead undergoes a distinctive formal transformation by being filtered 
through the workings of the primary process, namely condensation and displacement. 
Several commentators, beginning with Ernst Kris (Kris, 1952; Gombrich, 1966; 
Wollheim, 1970) have indeed pointed to this model as epitomizing an alternative current 
of thought in Freud’s understanding of art, and indeed one that successfully focuses on 
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the essential problems of aesthetics, as opposed to the pathographic approach that seems 
somewhat irrelevant or parasitical to art as such. Freud himself, despite not pursuing this 
approach further, was apparently aware of its potential; in his essay ‘On the history of the 
psycho-analytic movement’ (1914), he writes: “The first example of an application of the 
analytic mode of thought to the problems of aesthetics was contained in my book on 
jokes. Everything beyond this is still awaiting workers, who may expect a particularly 
rich harvest in this field” (1914, p. 36-7).   
In this conception, then, what is essential to a work of art (as indeed to a joke) are 
the specific formal transformations that some mental content undergoes thanks to the 
workings of the primary process. The content as such, if expressed in propositional form, 
may be not only objectionable or unpalatable, but, more pertinently for our present 
discussion, uninteresting or boring. Thus, for instance, the underlying content of jokes is 
shown to be replete with aggressive or vulgar sexual impulses and ideas (Freud 1905c). If 
expressed as such, these ideas might cause shock and embarrassment, not laughter. 
However, in the guise of a joke, that is, under a particular formal aspect capitalizing on 
the transformations effected by the primary process, the same content enjoys a very 
different reception. This is how Gombrich describes the primary process and its 
application to jokes:  
 It is a process in which the impressions and experiences of our waking life are 
mixed and churned in unpredictable permutations and combinations. In the dream 
no less than in insanity the dynamism of this vortex overwhelms our waking 
thought, the reality principle of the ego. In the joke the ego merely makes use of 
this mechanism in order to invest an idea with a peculiar charm. A thought which 
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it would perhaps be rude or indecorous to utter plain is dipped as it were into the 
magic spring of the primary process, as one can dip a flower or a twig into the 
calcine waters of Karlsbad where they emerge transformed into something rich 
and strange. (1966, p. 35)  
One important implication of Freud’s postulated necessity for keeping “the quantitative 
proportion” between content and its formal elaboration through the filter of the primary 
process “within a certain limit” is that a fine balance between these two factors needs to 
be achieved and maintained for either a joke or a work of art to succeed. For instance, in 
the case of a punning joke, “[i]f the idea were smothered in a welter of punning the result 
would be more like gibberish than like a joke; if the pun were poor the idea would not be 
good enough to compensate for this lack of structure” (Gombrich, 1966, p. 35). I will 
subsequently elaborate further on the application of this principle to works of art.  
 Gombrich calls attention to two additional features of this model that are of 
fundamental importance for any adequate aesthetics, “two supreme virtues which must 
recommend it to the historian and critic of art. It explains the relevance both of the 
medium and its mastery: two vital elements which are sometimes neglected in less 
circumspect applications of psycho-analytic ideas to art” (1966, p. 35). By speaking of 
the relevance of the medium, Gombrich means that the possibilities and limitations of the 
medium of expression to a large extent determine or delimit the content that can find 
expression through the given medium. “It is often the wrapping that determines the 
content” (Gombrich, 1966, p. 36). For instance, in the case of jokes, “[p]uns are not 
made; they are discovered in the language, and what the primary process does … is really 
to facilitate this discovery by its rapid shuttling of associations” (1966, p. 35; my italics). 
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We will subsequently see how this idea of accidental discovery is particularly pertinent to 
photography as a medium. However, this process of discovering the possibilities of the 
medium is far from completely random or a matter of chance. This is where the element 
of mastering the medium comes into the picture. In his book on jokes, Freud discusses 
the child’s pleasure in experimenting with the use of words in a playful way (1905, p. 
125), a playful experimentation that leads to gradual mastery of the language. Gombrich 
suggests that those who have cultivated this playful mastery of the medium of language 
are much more likely to discover “such accidents of sound and meaning as make up the 
perfect pun” (1966, p. 36). The point, then, is that a successful work of art, like a 
successful pun, presupposes a very high degree of adjustment to, and mastery of, an 
aspect of objective reality, the reality of the medium. Gombrich suggests that this current 
of thought in Freud’s aesthetics has been largely overlooked. He writes: “It is the denial 
of such realities which Freud dismissed as ‘lunatic’. Far from looking in the world of art 
only for its unconscious content of biological drives and childhood memories he insisted 
on that degree of adjustment to reality that alone turns a dream into a work of art” (1966, 
p. 36). This, then, might be the beginning of an answer to Wollheim’s challenge as to 
whether psychoanalysis has “anything of interest to say about what is not common to 
works of art” (1965, p. xii; my italics) and other phenomena such as dreams or 
symptoms.  
 In what seems to me a particularly apt metaphor, Gombrich designates the naïve 
conception of art as pure expression as “centrifugal”, in contrast to which he calls the 
conception in which the content of the artwork is shaped and channeled by the medium 
“centripetal” (1966, p. 36). He writes:  
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The artist who thus experiments and plays – who looks for discoveries in 
language if he is a writer or a poet, in visual shapes if he is a painter – will no 
doubt select in that preconscious process of which Freud speaks the structures that 
will greet him as meaningful in terms of his mind and conflicts. But it is his art 
that informs his mind, not his mind that breaks through in his art. Just as the 
temptations of a pun may sometimes bring out an aggressive thought that would 
otherwise have remained unexpressed, so the structural possibilities [of the artist’s 
medium] may sometimes bring out a mood or an experience that would have 
remained dormant in the artist but for this visual suggestion. (1966, p. 38; my 
italics)  
Again, I will soon attempt to show how this model of the creative process is particularly 
apt when it comes to describing photography as an art, especially certain specific genres 
of photography.  
 Even though Gombrich has been arguing for a conception of art in which the 
independent existence of the medium, not only in its inherent features but also in terms of 
its institutional history, is emphasized, this conception still leaves room for the 
contribution of the artist’s individual history and motivation, especially in terms of the 
channeling of personal history into the desire to engage in the artistic creative process as 
such. “What may be connected with [the artist’s] history and disposition is not the 
mastery itself but the will to obtain mastery, the interest in what can be done with 
language [or any other artistic medium], the enjoyment of the game” (1966, p. 40; my 
italics). In the next section, we will see how this idea gained layers of further meaning as 
it was developed by psychoanalytic aestheticians informed by the Kleinian paradigm.  
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II. Kleinian and post-Kleinian psychoanalytic aesthetics  
 
 What constitutes significant artistic form is an important theme in aesthetics, but 
not the only important theme. Indeed, an adequate aesthetics comprises several distinct 
albeit often overlapping themes, minimally, the nature of creativity (both the creative 
process and the creative impulse), the question of aesthetic value and of the nature of 
beauty, and the nature of the aesthetic encounter (in other words, the nature and 
significance of the aesthetic experience from the point of view of the spectator). As we 
saw briefly above, despite his profound insight as to the importance of form and its 
dependence on the utilization of primary-process modes of thinking, in his own writings 
on art Freud tended to focus purely on content, and to pathologize artists and treat art and 
the creative impulse as analogous to a symptom, by “asserting an estrangement of the 
poet from the real world, seeing the artist as never disengaged from the pleasure 
principle, imprisoned in his perpetual immaturity” (Gosso, 2004, p. xviii). As opposed to 
this view, there developed, especially within British psychoanalysis, following the 
tectonic shifts brought about in psychoanalytic theory by Melanie Klein’s contributions, a 
much more “positive vision of the artistic event” (Gosso, 2004, p. xix). In this section I 
will briefly summarize some of these ideas, focusing especially on the work of Hanna 
Segal, Marion Milner, and Adrian Stokes. I will start with a brief overview of some of the 
major themes and tenets of Kleinian theory, as these are intimately and organically 
connected with the developments in psychoanalytic aesthetics I will describe later. I need 
to stress that, of necessity, the following overview will have to be extremely schematic 
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and oversimplified, as doing justice to the nuances and complexity of Kleinian theory is 
completely beyond the scope of the present text.   
 A pivotal concept in Klein’s revision of psychoanalytic theory is that of 
unconscious phantasy. This differs from the Freudian notion of fantasy as something that 
contrasts with a sense of reality. For, in Kleinian theory, unconscious phantasies are, so to 
speak, the basso continuo of mentality; they “underlie every mental process, and 
accompany all mental activity. They are the mental representation of those somatic 
events which comprise the instincts, and are physical sensations interpreted as 
relationships with objects that cause those sensations” (Hinshelwood, 1989, p. 32). 
“There is no impulse, no instinctual urge or response, which is not experienced as 
unconscious phantasy” (Isaacs, 1948, p. 81). A corollary of this notion is that phantasy in 
the Kleinian sense does not occur in opposition to, or alternately than, the objective 
perception of reality, but rather always underlies and colors perception, and is in turn 
modified by it. As Susan Isaacs writes in her seminal paper on phantasy, “[i]t is not 
merely that they ‘blend and interweave’; their relationship is something less adventitious 
than this. On our view, reality-thinking cannot operate without concurrent and 
supporting unconscious phantasies. E.g. we continue to ‘take things in’ with out ears, to 
‘devour’ with our eyes … throughout life. These conscious metaphors represent 
unconscious psychic reality” (1948, p. 94; italics in the original). The examples used in 
the above quote also suggest the very corporeal nature of phantasy. Phantasies have their 
source in, and derive their content from, the concrete realities of the body, its 
characteristics and processes. Moreover, “[t]he earliest phantasies are experienced in 
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sensations; later, they take the form of plastic images and dramatic representations” 
(Isaacs, 1948, p. 96).  
 Closely connected to this concept of phantasy is the notion of an inner world, a 
world of internal objects. Insofar as every instinctual aim has an object, and since, as we 
saw above, unconscious phantasy always accompanies the activity of the drives as their 
psychic representative, if follows that the operation of phantasy gives rise to an inner 
world populated by multiple objects, corresponding to a multitude of instinctual aims and 
phantasied relations to objects according to those instinctual aims. As Klein writes,  
The inner world consists of innumerable objects taken into the ego, corresponding 
partly to the multitude of varying aspects, good and bad, in which the parents (and 
other people) appeared to the child’s unconscious mind throughout various stages 
of his development. Further, they also represent all the real people who are 
continually becoming internalized in a variety of situations provided by the 
multitude of ever-changing external experiences as well as phantasied ones. In 
addition, all these objects are in the inner world in an infinitely complex relation 
both with each other and with the self. (1940, p. 362-3)  
An internal object is not exactly a mental representation; rather, it is experienced as “a 
concrete object physically located internal to the ego (body) which has its own motives 
and intentions towards the ego and to other objects” (Hinshelwood, 1989, p. 68). 
Gradually, there can be development in the experiencing of objects, from this very 
concrete, sensation-based stage to the mental representation of objects and their relations, 
and finally to their symbolic representation in words or other symbols (Money-Kyrle, 
1968).  
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 Melanie Klein’s work extended the concept of symbolization very significantly 
and widely. Insofar as every activity, mental or physical, is accompanied and informed by 
unconscious phantasy, it follows that actions can have symbolic meaning as much as 
words or mental structures such as dreams. Additionally, Klein (1923, 1929a, 1929b, 
1930, 1931) postulates that symbolization works in the manner of an infinite chain, which 
is set and kept in motion by both libidinal and aggressive currents, on the basis of the 
mechanisms of identification and displacement. Very schematically, the chain of 
symbolization is set in motion when the ego displaces its libidinal interest from its initial 
objects to others, in order to evade psychological conflict. But soon the new, originally 
conflict-free relationships with the substitute objects (symbols) also become tainted with 
ambivalence and thus fraught, and yet other symbolic substitutes have to be sought for. 
Thus, in Kleinian theory anxiety and guilt because of aggressive feelings are the “prime 
movers to symbol formation” (Segal, 1991, p. 33). Moreover, symbolism itself is the 
cornerstone and fountainhead of all intellectual development: “symbolism is the 
foundation of all sublimation and of every talent, since it is by way of symbolic equation 
that things, activities and interests become the subject of libidinal phantasies” (Klein, 
1930, p. 220). The profound implication of this idea is that, far from being opposed to the 
sense of reality because of its origins in phantasy, symbolism is in fact “the basis of the 
subject’s relation to the outside world and to reality in general” (Klein, 1930, p. 221).  
 The final major concepts of Kleinian theory that I would like to briefly touch 
upon preliminary to discussing Kleinian aesthetics is that of the two positions, paranoid-
schizoid and depressive, and of part-objects and whole objects (Klein, 1935, 1940, 1946). 
As opposed to a conception of development in terms of stages or phases, Klein used the 
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term ‘position’ to indicate that, even though historically in the subject’s ontogenetic 
development the paranoid-schizoid position precedes the depressive one, thereafter both 
of them remain potentially active throughout life, and in fact it is to be expected that 
every person will continue experiencing oscillations between these two positions at 
varying frequencies, depending on life circumstances, individual psychological makeup, 
etc. The positions refer to overall states of mind, constellations of object-relations, 
desires, defense mechanisms and anxieties, each of which can also be seen as associated 
with different sets of values. The paranoid-schizoid position describes a state of mind in 
which the ego keeps its objects (internal and external) and its own instinctual urges 
separate, on the basis of whether they are experienced as good or bad. In other words, in 
this position the ego actively splits itself and its objects, in order to keep what is 
experienced as good completely separate from what is experienced as bad, and to keep 
positive libidinal urges completely separate from aggressive urges. The corollary of 
splitting is idealization. From an external, objective point of view, the infant’s primary 
object (e.g. the mother) is neither completely good (meaning, able to provide perfect and 
constant gratification of the infant’s needs), nor completely bad. She is both gratifying 
and frustrating, depending on the moment. However, in the paranoid-schizoid position 
the infant keeps these different aspects of the unitary external object completely apart, 
and experiences the object as two distinct part-objects, depending on whether it gratifies 
or frustrates; “from the infant’s point of view, the part is all there is to the object” 
(Hinshelwood, 1989, p. 379). The notion of the part-object also has a perceptual 
dimension: it postulates that, before the perceptual apparatus matures enough to allow 
more integrated and sophisticated perceptions, the external object is not experienced as a 
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whole person, a whole body, but rather in a fragmentary manner; for instance, the focus 
of perception and instinctual investment is not the whole mother, but her breast, which is 
perceived as a self-contained entity (and in fact as two distinct entities, as a bad breast 
and a good breast, depending on whether the infant feels satiated and instinctually 
gratified, or hungry and frustrated).  
 One major reason that the infant splits the good aspects of the object from the bad 
ones, and experiences them as two separate objects, is in order to deflect its own 
aggression and hatred, which is experienced as terrifyingly destructive, and to protect the 
idealized good object from it. The concomitant of this state of affairs, however, is that all 
of its aggression is projected into the bad part-object, which comes to assume a really 
terrifying persecutory aspect. Accordingly, the ego experiences intense persecutory 
anxiety and fear of annihilation.  
 Gradually, due to both perceptual but also emotional maturation, the two split-off 
aspects of the objects are gradually brought together, and finally experienced as one 
whole object, with both good and bad qualities. This is the attainment of the depressive 
position, and it brings new challenges and anxieties in its wake. That is because the ego 
now realizes that the erstwhile demonized bad object was, in fact, none other than the 
idealized good object; ambivalence, the presence of conflicting emotions toward the same 
object, becomes a psychological reality. This realization does not only give rise to regret 
and guilt about the damage that the ego’s hatred and aggression is feared to have inflicted 
on the loved object (when it was not recognized as such), but also to intense concern 
about the whole object’s well-being, “an intense feeling of responsibility as well as an 
exquisite sorrow” (Hinshelwood, 1989, p. 141). These feelings are directed both toward 
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the external object as well as its internal counterpart. Not only the object but also the self 
(which contains the inner world of objects) is felt to have been damaged, perhaps 
irrevocably. Depressive guilt and anxiety can at times be intolerable, and lead to a 
regressive flight back into the paranoid-schizoid position. More favorably, however, they 
give rise to a wish to try and restore the damaged objects as well as the self. This is the 
urge to make reparation (Klein, 1940), and we will presently see how it is a concept that 
plays a major role in Kleinian aesthetics.  
 Melanie Klein herself, in an early paper, linked creativity to the attainment of the 
depressive position and the urge to make reparation, and not only in the case of adult 
artists but also the creative activities of children: “In the analyses of children, when the 
representation of destructive wishes is succeeded by an expression of reactive tendencies, 
we constantly find that drawing and painting are used as means to restore people” 
(1929b, p. 218). Hanna Segal is the primary representative within the Kleinian school of 
this conception of art as reparation. In a seminal paper (Segal, 1952) she set out 
specifically to remedy the situation I described in the previous section, namely the fact 
that, up to that point, psychoanalytic writings on aesthetics “dealt with points of 
psychological interest but not with the central problem of aesthetics, which is: what 
constitutes good art” (1952, p. 385). Segal attempts to connect the answer to that question 
with identifying those specific factors in the psychology of the artist that will enable him 
to produce good, instead of failed, art.  
 Segal suggests that “[t]he task of the artist lies in the creation of a world of his 
own … Even when he believes himself to be a complete realist and sets himself the task 
of faithfully reproducing the external world, he, in fact, only uses elements of the existing 
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external world to create with them a reality of his own” (1952, p. 388). (The relevance of 
this idea to photography hardly needs to be elucidated). Drawing on the many self-
reflective passages on the creative process in Proust’s masterpiece In Search of Lost Time 
(Proust, 2003), she proposes that this compulsion to create stems from the artist’s “need 
to recover his lost past” (Segal, 1952, p. 388). In that sense, the artist’s creation is 
actually a re-creation. It presupposes loss, not only in its objective aspect, but, crucially, 
the psychic acknowledgment of loss, and the concomitant experiencing of mourning. It is 
important to remember that, in Kleinian theory, loss never refers only to actual transience 
in the external world; “mourning in grown-up life is a reliving of the early depressive 
anxieties; not only is the present object in the external world felt to be lost, but also the 
early objects, the parents; and they are lost as internal objects as well as in the external 
world” (Segal, 1952, p. 390). The picture is further complicated by the fact that, in 
phantasy, the loss of the object is experienced as having also been the fault of the self, the 
result of one’s own aggressive and destructive impulses. Moreover, the attainment of the 
depressive position signifies another kind of loss – the realization of the whole object’s 
autonomy and independent existence, its radical alterity from the self:  
Where, earlier, impulses and parts of the infant’s self were projected into the 
object with the result that a false picture of it was formed, that his own impulses 
were denied, and that there was often a lack of differentiation between the self 
and the external object; in the depressive phase, a sense of inner reality is 
developed and in its wake a sense of outer reality as well. (Segal, 1952, p. 386)  
Given all these challenges, it should come as no surprise that the attainment of the 
depressive position is never complete or irreversible, and, even when effected 
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successfully, it is certainly a very taxing achievement. Depressive anxieties are often so 
unbearable that attempts are made to obviate them by means other than genuine 
mourning and reparation; or, to put this slightly differently, reparation can take different 
forms, some of them more genuine than others: for instance, it can become mechanistic 
and obsessional, or, alternatively, assume a manic character, which carries a note of 
omnipotent triumph over the object (Klein, 1940). Segal enriches the conception of art as 
reparation by associating different ways of attempting to make reparation with 
qualitatively different aesthetic outcomes. Thus, in the event that reparation is not 
genuine but rather masks a manic denial of loss, it can give rise to “a constant make-
believe that all was well with the world” (Segal, 1952, p. 391); translated into art, this can 
produce an “effect of superficiality and prettiness” (Segal, 1952, p. 391).   
Implied in the above quotation is a contrast between mere “prettiness” and true 
beauty. However, Segal does not equate aesthetic value solely with beauty either. She 
writes: “[I]f beautiful is used as synonymous with aesthetically satisfying, then its 
contradictory is not ‘ugly’, but unaesthetic, or indifferent, or dull. … [M]y contention is 
that ‘ugly’ is a most important and necessary component of a satisfying aesthetic 
experience” (1952, p. 401). She suggests that, in terms of form, the main elements of the 
beautiful are “the whole, the complete, and the rhythmical” (1952, p. 401); but if so, 
“these elements of ‘beauty’ are in themselves insufficient. If they were enough then we 
would find it most satisfactory to contemplate a circle” (1952, p. 402). And again: 
“[S]oulless imitations of beauty, ‘pretty’ creations are also whole and rhythmical; yet 
they fail to stir and rouse nothing but boredom” (1952, p. 403). Segal goes on to suggest, 
taking her cue from tragedy, that perhaps the element of ugliness is contributed by the 
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content, “the complete ruin and destruction” (1952, p. 402), while the beautiful is given 
by the tragedy’s form, “the formal modes of speech, the unities of time, place and action, 
the strictness and rigidity of the rules” (1952, p. 400). But then her example of the circle 
above would seem to belie, or rather to complicate and qualify, this scheme. Because, 
presumably, even in the case of a purely abstract work of visual art, a more complicated 
form than just a simple, albeit perfect, circle, is more aesthetically satisfying. In that case, 
then, it would seem that it is not the content of the work that may be contributing the 
necessary element of ugliness, but some of its formal characteristics as opposed to others.  
 An additional dimension to this interplay between ugliness and beauty in the work 
of art is provided by Segal’s suggestion that, on one level, it is commensurate with the 
interplay between Eros and the death instinct. “Re-stated in terms of the instincts, 
ugliness – destruction – is the expression of the death instinct; beauty – the desire to unite 
into rhythms and wholes – is that of the life instinct. The achievement of the artist is in 
giving the fullest expression to the conflict and the union between those two” (1952, p. 
404).  I will be returning to this point, and to that of the postulated interplay between 
ugliness and beauty in terms of form alone, regardless of content, when I discuss the 
work of Adrian Stokes. 
 Two more aspects of Segal’s theory are of paramount importance. First, she 
explicitly addresses and questions the notion that the artist is somehow maladjusted or 
neurotic, or rather, she qualifies this notion in a very significant way: “[The artist] is 
often neurotic and in many situations may show a complete lack of objectivity, but in two 
respects, at least, he shows an extremely high reality sense. One is in relation to his own 
internal reality, and the other in relation to the material of his art” (1952, p. 397). As far 
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as the awareness of internal reality is concerned, we already saw how, in this conception, 
successful art is predicated on the unflinching embracing of the depressive position, with 
the heightened awareness of phantasy and of one’s own instinctual impulses that this 
entails. In contrast to that, the neurotic “splits off, represses, denies, or acts out his 
phantasy” (Segal, 1952, p. 397); and, we may add, so does the pseudo-artist who 
produces just glib or ‘pretty’ art. Moreover, in terms of the use of his medium, the 
manipulation of material in the external world, the true artist in a way surrenders to the 
possibilities and limitations of his medium, and allows it to direct and channel his efforts; 
he accepts and embraces the alterity of his material, as he does that of his objects. This 
respect for the medium presupposes but then also fosters an acute reality assessment of its 
nature and qualities. The neurotic and the pseudo-artist “uses his material in a magic 
way” (Segal, 1952, p. 397), that is, in a manic and omnipotent way – we might say that 
he works against his medium, and not with it.  
 Finally, to conclude my brief summary of Segal’s aesthetics, a word on the 
aesthetic encounter, the audience’s experience of the work of art. Assuming that the artist 
“does work similar to the work of mourning in that he internally re-creates a harmonious 
world which is projected into his work of art” (Segal, 1952, p. 400), what is it that makes 
the public derive satisfaction from the contemplation or experiencing of that work? Segal 
suggests that the satisfaction of the aesthetic encounter stems from a double 
identification: “with the work of art as a whole and with the whole internal world of the 
artist as represented by his work” (1952, p. 399). Through its formal properties, the work 
of art proves to the audience that the attainment of the depressive position, of the 
achievement of harmony our of chaos, is psychically possible; and thereby, the audience 
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also unconsciously identifies not just with the finished work, but with the process of its 
creation: “this kind of unconscious reliving of the creator’s state of mind is the 
foundation of all aesthetic pleasure” (1952, p. 399). Segal makes a point of distinguishing 
aesthetic pleasure as such, from other “incidental” (1952, p. 398) pleasures derived from 
works of art, for instance, on the basis of idiosyncratic identifications with particular 
characters or situations (reminiscent of the identifications described by Freud in ‘Creative 
Writers and Day-Dreaming’), or from “sentimental interests originating in memories and 
associations” (Segal, 1952, p. 399). This last point will be seen to be very relevant to the 
distinction between the emotional charge and impact of photographs as mementos or 
memorial objects, and their value as aesthetic objects in their own right (although, as 
mentioned earlier, these two aspects are not necessarily mutually exclusive). 
 We already briefly touched upon the importance that symbol-formation is 
endowed with in Kleinian theory, where it becomes commensurable with all sublimatory 
processes and all intellectual development. Segal reaffirms this, and specifically links 
symbol-formation to the depressive position: “[S]ymbol formation is the outcome of a 
loss, it is a creative act involving the pain and the whole work of mourning. If psychic 
reality is experienced and differentiated from external reality, the symbol is differentiated 
from the object; it is felt to be created by the self and can be freely used by the self. … 
[T]he creation of symbols, the symbolic elaboration of a theme, are the very essence of 
art” (1952, p. 397). However, this is an optimal state of affairs; symbol formation can 
also go awry, and never achieve this level of differentiation. When that happens, we are 
no longer in the realm of symbolic representation, but rather in the psychotic domain of 
symbolic equation (Segal, 1957, 1978, 1991). While true symbolism denotes an 
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acceptance of the separateness of the object, that is, the symbol is recognized as 
representing the object, symbolic equation denies separateness: the symbol and its object 
or source are confused, the symbol becomes psychically identical to the original object 
rather than standing for it. Segal considers this state of affairs problematic, indeed 
counter to the ability to sublimate and symbolize in an aesthetically meaningful way.  
Marion Milner, even though also working within the Kleinian tradition, 
introduced a very different view of symbolization as it relates to artistic creation and the 
aesthetic experience. Milner does not deny the role of artistic creation in processes of 
reparation, but suggests that it takes too much for granted, as it were; thus, she directs her 
attention “on the earlier problem of establishing object relationships at all, rather than on 
the restoration of the injured object once it is established” (Milner, 1952, p. 97). As 
opposed to Segal’s negative valuation of symbolic equation, Milner suggests that the 
ability “to discover identity in difference” (1952, p. 83) is developmentally fundamental 
as an organizational principle of experience, and is the basis of the ability to generalize, 
without which sophisticated cognition and scientific progress would be impossible; it can 
thus be viewed as “a regression in order to take a step forward” (1952, p. 84). More 
pertinently to our purposes, she calls attention to how the ability to discover identity in 
difference echoes Wordsworth’s statement to the effect that “to find the familiar in the 
unfamiliar … is the whole of the poet’s business” (Milner, 1952, p. 85). 
Thus, Milner, herself a painter, tries to reframe the concept of aesthetic 
experience in such a way as to find a positive place for the role of illusion and fusion in 
it. She remarks on the importance of the frame in creating a space for illusion, both in 
visual art and in psychoanalysis, in terms of the analytic frame. She writes: “And in 
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psycho-analysis it is the existence of this frame that makes possible the full development 
of that creative illusion that analysts call the transference. Also the central idea 
underlying psycho-analytic technique is that it is by means of this illusion that a better 
adaptation to the world outside is ultimately developed” (1952, p. 86; my italics). 
Milner’s work very often echoes, or indeed anticipates, Winnicott, in an almost uncanny 
way. In fact, in her seminal 1952 paper, she takes her cue for many of the ideas she 
proposes regarding art from the play sessions in the analysis of a quite disturbed young 
boy. She describes a situation “in which he could have a different kind of relation to 
external reality, by means of the toys; he could do what he liked with them, and yet they 
were outside him. … [They were] a pliable medium, external to himself, but not insisting 
on their own separate objective existence” (1952, p. 91; my italics). The applicability of 
this to the various artistic media should be obvious. Like toys, they also have an existence 
in objective external reality and yet are also sufficiently pliable (both materially and 
psychologically) to be able to “be made to take the shape of one’s phantasies” (Milner, 
1952, p. 99).  
Why is this of any use, though? Once more reminiscent of Winnicott, Milner 
suggests that experiences of fusion and illusion are a precondition for the development of 
object relationships, and that immersion in a self-created reality prepares the ground for 
the acceptance of the external, objective one; indeed, if this space of illusion is too 
prematurely interfered with, external reality and its exigencies may be ostensibly 
recognized and accepted, but “necessity becomes a cage rather than something to be co-
operated with for the freeing of further powers” (1952, p. 101). Art, then, both for creator 
and audience, provides access to these early experiences of benign fusion throughout life; 
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it “provides a method, in adult life, for reproducing states that are part of everyday 
experience in healthy infancy” (1952, p. 97; my italics); incidentally, so does 
psychoanalysis. Milner reminds us of an evocative term for the “temporary loss of sense 
of self, a temporary giving up of the discriminating ego” (Milner, 1952, p. 97) that 
characterizes aesthetic experience: it can be described as ecstasy (literally, stepping 
outside of oneself, in the original Greek). She also suggests that, even though symbol-
formation has been viewed in the psychoanalytic literature as an attempt to either find 
substitutes for the child’s original objects or part-objects, or for parts of the child’s own 
body and organs, these two views may be combined into the idea that “the primary 
‘object’ that the infant seeks to find again is a fusion of self and object, it is mouth and 
breast felt as fused into one” (1952, p. 87). We will further explore the implications of 
this notion in the aesthetics of Adrian Stokes.  
In a subsequent important paper, Milner (1956) expanded her aesthetic theory 
further. Analyzing the work of William Blake for self-reflective metaphors about the 
creative process itself, she comes to the conclusion that creativity “depends on giving 
equal validity to a state of mind which is attentive and receptive to what is happening 
(symbolized by the female), equally with the state that tries to force what happens into a 
preconceived idea or pattern” (1956, p. 206). Put differently, creativity depends on a 
dynamic equilibrium and interplay between, essentially, the primary and secondary 
processes, or, in different terms, the conscious, logical mode of thought that differentiates 
between opposites, and that mode of thinking that “involves an undoing of that split into 
subject and object which is the basis of our logical thinking” (1956, p. 196); in Segal’s 
terms, this would be described as a creative dialectic between symbolic equation and 
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symbolic representation. The creative process also involves a dialectical interplay 
between the content of unconscious thought processes and their form. Milner adds the 
very important point that the engagement with the artistic medium, as a part of external 
reality, is crucial for achieving a creative equilibrium between these elements: “it is by 
this struggle with the material that the conscious mind disciplines the chaotic forces in the 
creative depths” (1956, p. 206); but, paradoxically, it can only achieve this discipline in 
art only if it is able to accept, channel, and utilize the mode of thought of the 
unconscious, that is, the primary process. Such a controlled, “deliberate reversion” to the 
primary process gives rise to anxiety, “not only because of getting nearer to forbidden 
wishes, but just because the depth mind’s way of working seems like chaos to the surface 
mind” (Milner, 1956, p. 211). It is part of the artist’s task to face and withstand this 
anxiety.  
Milner, following Ehrenzweig (1953), suggests that “the two phases of the mind’s 
oscillation” (1956, p. 209) correspond to the Apollonian and Dionysian elements that 
Nietzsche (1872/1994) introduced in his analysis of tragedy. Further, she links these 
elements to the Freudian duality between Eros and Thanatos. However, she gives this 
notion an interesting twist by proposing that “Freudians, at least some of them, say that 
the so-called death instinct aims at self-destruction; but they do not, as a rule, go on to 
say that this self-destruction is perhaps a distorted, because frustrated, form of that self-
surrender which is inherent in the creative process” (1956, p. 209; my italics). 
Very much like Gombrich (cf. the previous section), Milner gives its due not only 
to the primary process, but to the artistic medium as well. “[T]he measure of genius in the 
arts is linked up with the extent to which the artist does succeed in co-operating with his 
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unconscious mind by means of his medium” (1956, p. 215). Moreover, it is important to 
note that she stresses both poles of the dialectic between symbolic equation and symbolic 
representation, fusion and separateness: as much as the first poles of these pairs are 
crucial in order for creativity to get off the ground, it is equally important that, out of this 
process, a new, shared reality emerges. “[W]hat is most important about this thing we call 
a work of art, that is admittedly a symbol, is not the original primary unconscious wish or 
wishes that it symbolizes but the fact that a new thing has been created. A new bit of the 
outside world, which is not the original primary object of the wish, has been made 
interesting and significant” (1956, p. 214).  
 We saw how Hanna Segal emphasizes the reparative aspect of art, and thus the 
whole-object relationship that the work of art symbolizes, while Marion Milner makes a 
case for the positive aspects of illusion and fusion, which are characteristic dimensions of 
part-object relationships. Segal would consider the sense of fusion with the work of art, 
the ‘oceanic’ feeling of being immersed and lost in it, as more of a sign of an attempt to 
manically evade a genuine and wholehearted experiencing of the depressive position. The 
critic Adrian Stokes, who was no psychoanalyst but was closely associated with the 
Kleinian school, integrates these differing conceptions in an ingenious way in his own 
complicated and subtle aesthetic theory (Stokes, 1952, 1961, 1963, 1965). Stokes was 
primarily interested in form in art, not content, but attempted to demonstrate how form 
itself has a latent content, in that it evokes specific types and constellations of object-
relationship.  
 Instead of choosing one position in the debate between the conception of art as 
reparation and art as illusion and fusion, Stokes acknowledges that the aesthetic 
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encounter is in its essence characterized by both of these dimensions and gives rise to 
both of these experiences in the spectator (and the artist himself, insofar as “the dividing 
line between spectator and artist” should not be construed as “separating persons [but] 
rather … roles” (Wollheim, 1965, p. xvii)). The work of art strikes us as a supremely self-
sufficient and self-contained object, and yet, at the same time, it envelops us – we can get 
‘lost’ into it in contemplation; it is “self-subsistent yet communicative” (Stokes, 1965, p. 
7).  Recall Segal’s emphasis on how the artist creates a world of his own: this implies the 
radical self-sufficiency of this alternate universe, but also the fact that we can enter this 
new world and become immersed in it. Stokes, in his very characteristic idiosyncratic and 
lyrical style, describes it thus: “Thus, a good poem has the closed air of an entity, of 
something compact that makes a dent, but its poetry is a contagion that spreads and 
spreads. We can always discover from aesthetic experience that sense of homogeneity or 
fusion combined, in differing proportions, with the sense of object-otherness” (1952, p. 
407). Elsewhere he writes: “The great work of art is surrounded by silence. It remains 
palpably ‘out there’, yet none the less enwraps us; we do not so much absorb as become 
ourselves absorbed” (1961, p. 20). He adds that thanks to this combination of “the sense 
of fusion with the sense of object-otherness … we might say that art is an emblem of the 
state of being in love” (1952, p. 407), in that the latter state is characterized by both 
“infantile introjections and reparative attitudes” (1952, p. 407). And, like the state of 
being in love and encountering the beloved, art facilitates the experience, in the artist 
when he encounters his medium as well as in the spectator when he encounters the 
finished work of art, of “some freshness of vision, some ability to meet, as if for the first 
time, the phenomenal world and the emotion it carries” (1952, p. 407).  
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 Similarly to the other theorists we discussed, Stokes emphasizes the importance of 
the medium and of the artist’s intense attachment to it, the extent to which he cathects it 
and is engrossed by it. “In a sense the work of art is not a new enactment but re-
affirmation of a pre-existing entity. This entity is allowed once more a full and separate 
life: it is restored” (1952, p. 408). We will later see how this idea is connected to the way 
Stokes conceptualizes the distinction between carving and modelling as ways of molding 
the artist’s material.  
 Stokes, referencing Thomas Mann, suggests that the categories of ‘goodness’ and 
‘badness’ are more pertinent to the evaluation of a work of art than the categories of 
‘beauty’ or ‘ugliness’ (recall Segal’s conception of the necessity of an element of 
ugliness for a successful work of art). He then points out that the concept of ‘good’ has 
“two shades of meaning … the excellent or loved and the beneficent” (1952, p. 409). 
Ingeniously, he then goes on to link these two aspects of goodness to two different 
imagos or schemas of object-relating, “in virtue of which Form embraces the artist’s 
subject matter” (1952, p. 410): these two overarching organizing imagos are “the 
sensation of one-ness with the satisfying breast no less than the acceptance of the whole 
mother as a separate person” (1952, p. 411). These two imagos constitute the primitive, 
latent content of form, and, according to Stokes, constitute the frame that enables form to 
contain even the most “dire … subject-matter” (1952, p. 409); in other words, it is these 
integrative imagos that enable art to become such an effective vehicle for the drive to 
reparation. Moreover, the contrast between form and content could also be couched in 
terms of a contrast between the more intellectual and the more sensuous qualities of the 
artwork: “While communicating an intellectual content, art revivifies the impact of 
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sensuous impressions under the aegis as well of the all-embracing sensations of early 
infanthood” (1952, p. 412).  
 However, does such an “amalgam” (Stokes, 1952, p. 415) make conceptual and 
psychological sense? “How can it be that the homogeneity associated with idealization 
(the inexhaustible breast), is harnessed by the work of art to an acute sense of otherness 
and of actuality?” (1952, p. 414). Even more starkly, and plainly trying to reconcile his 
position with that of Hanna Segal by addressing an implicit criticism he can foresee, 
Stokes asks: “What, then, is to be made of oceanic feeling or merging with the breast as a 
constant initiator of the Form in art? It testifies, surely, to a manic element?” (1952, p. 
414). Stokes posits what is, to my mind, an ingenious dialectical solution to this 
conundrum, suggesting, in effect, that the combination of these two apparently 
contradictory imagos or “prototypical experiences” (1952, p. 414) in the work of art leads 
to a higher synthesis and a transcendence, to a product that is qualitatively different from 
the sum of its parts:  
The second basic imago of Form, the emphasis it brings upon full object-
relationship, possesses a temperate power over the first unity, the blissful merging 
with the breast: it provides aesthetic experience with a definition that would be 
disturbing to mere ecstasy, brings to art a second principle of unification; so that 
the one is wide, the other crisp. It seems to me, then, that in relation to depressive 
states, the aesthetic position perhaps deserves a category of its own, between the 
predominant manic defence and a normal outcome; a position, however, not 
without relevance to an analysis of integration, since it uncovers a more creative 
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role than usual for the manic defence mechanism: one that is potentially non-
stultifying. (1952, p. 416; my italics)  
Implicit in this conception of the work of art is an explanation of the strong 
fascination art exerts on us, both as spectators and, as the case may be, creators. By 
embodying and epitomizing this complicated constellation of object-relations, the work 
of art mirrors, as it were, those processes, and such mirroring furnishes us with 
satisfaction and the containment of anxieties on the basis of identificatory mechanisms. 
In embodying the prototypical good object in both its part-object and whole-object 
aspects, the work of art not just represents but in fact fosters the transition from reliance 
on the idealized breast to a relationship with a good whole independent object. And such 
a relationship is the basis for the integration of the ego itself – a whole ego is the other 
side of the attainment of the depressive position and of relating to whole objects (Klein, 
1935); or, as Stokes puts it more poetically, “[o]ur own stability walks hand in hand with 
the stability of objects” (1961, p. 43).  
Similarly, if, in a work of art, one of the objects re-defined, renewed, and found 
by the artist is, at root, himself, nevertheless the model for self-subsistence has 
been the other person or thing: or, at least, the one cannot be distinguished 
without its reflections from the other. We may suspect that the work of art 
constantly symbolizes such percipience, just as it symbolizes the restoration of 
truly self-sufficient objects to which have accrued, all the same, propensities of 
the inexhaustible breast. (Stokes, 1952, p. 419)  
In terms of the language of symbolism, we could say that the successful work of art 
offers symbolic equation and symbolic representation at one and the same time. Recall 
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Milner’s idea of the ecstasy afforded by the aesthetic experience: ecstasy is in fact a term 
derived from mysticism, or visionary experience (Stokes, 1961). In what way then does 
aesthetic experience differ from the latter? Precisely in the fact that it achieves a fine and 
subtle equilibrium between the experiences of fusion and separateness, unlike mystical 
experiences which are ones of pure fusion and loss of self: 
All masterpieces are transfiguring if we mean by this last word that we are taken 
up into them. They differ in their effect from visionary objects in that they also 
symbolize an unchanging object-outwardness or sufficiency and an adult 
integration of the ego. If such are the terms used, art will be defined as a symbolic 
reduction of experience whereby primitive ego mechanisms, that appear also in 
visionary experience, reinforce adult perceptions and the adult need to 
reconstruct a whole and self-sufficient object; an activity, then, whereby an 
element of symbolic equivalence reinforces true symbolism. (Stokes, 1961, p. 43; 
my italics)  
Stokes also suggests that, even when we view works of art “predominantly in the light of 
their self-sufficiency as restored, whole objects” (1965, p. 19), their standing for a part-
object relationship with the breast gives rise to “a sense of nurture” (1965, p. 19) that we 
derive from their contemplation, regardless of their more manifest content. Gombrich, 
too, called attention to “oral gratification as a genetic model for aesthetic pleasure” 
(1963, p. 39), even though his frame of orientation was solidly Freudian, not Kleinian. 
What is most interesting about his discussion is the analogy he makes between art and 
cookery, and especially his suggestion that, as in cookery, so in art “too much of a good 
thing is repellent” (1963, p. 39). Drawing examples from academic painting, pictures that 
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are somehow too perfect, too pretty, too idealized, he notes how “we tend to find such 
things syrupy, saccharined, cloying. … They describe by synaesthetic metaphor our 
reaction to a surfeit of oral gratifications” (1963, pp. 38-9). As in Stokes, too much 
regression by itself, with no counterbalancing force, makes for art that fails as art; it will 
be recalled that Segal made a similar point, speaking of art that is too glib and pretty 
because it evades, rather than honestly acknowledging and contemplating, the full 
implications of destructiveness and loss in the depressive position.  
 Regarding the aspect of art as reparation, Stokes raises the important point of the 
significance of aggression as it relates to the creative process itself, over and above the 
phantasied aggressions that artistic creativity may be attempting to address. That is, he 
suggests that artistic reparation is  
dependent, it seems to me, upon initial attack. I believe that in the creation of art 
there exists a preliminary element of acting out of aggression, an acting out that 
accompanies reparative transformation, by which inequalities, tension and 
distortions, for instance, are integrated, are made to ‘work’. … A painter, then, to 
be so, must be capable of perpetrating defacement; though it be defacement in 
order to add, create, transform, restore, the attack is defacement none the less. 
(1965, p. 23-4)  
Pertinent to this is the distinction between the carving and modelling modes of 
molding the artistic material, which Stokes had first discussed in his early work (Stokes, 
1932, 1934). Very schematically, these terms denote very different attitudes of the artist 
toward his material; even though the terms originally refer to sculpture, Stokes extended 
their application to artistic creation in general. The carving relation to the material 
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denotes an attitude of greater respect for the material’s self-subsistence, its inherent 
characteristics, its physiognomy, so to speak. The carver follows the material’s lead in 
trying to mold it so as to bring out what is already contained in it in embryonic form. The 
modelling attitude, on the other hand, denotes a much more active, possessive attitude 
toward the material, which the modeler omnipotently shapes at will. In a sense, then, 
carving is linked to a mode of relating to whole objects, while modelling to part-object 
relationships. In his later work, Stokes emphasized the co-existence of both of these 
modes in most works of art, in varying proportions; both of them are deemed necessary 
for truly successful artistic creation. For there is a loose correspondence between these 
two modes of dealing with the material, and the processes of attack and reparation 
involved in artistic creation. Thus,  
if attack be reduced below a certain minimum, art, creativeness, ceases; equally, if 
sensibility over the fact of attack is entirely lulled, denied. … [An artist] cannot be 
a good artist unless at one time he reckoned painfully with the conflicting 
emotions that underlie his transformations of material, the aggression, the power, 
the control, as well as the belief in his own goodness and reparative aim. The 
exercise of power alone never makes art. (Stokes, 1965, p. 25; italics in the 
original)  
 Finally, I would like to mention that, over and above the two overarching imagos 
that every successful art object incorporates, according to Stokes, the specific formal 
qualities and organization of every work of art may also be seen as depicting specific 
constellations of object relationship between the ego and its objects, or between various 
inner objects: “the deployment of formal attributes becomes a vivid language, that is to 
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say, symbols of objects, of relationships to objects and of processes enwrapping objects, 
inner as well as outer” (Stokes, 1965, p. 26). And elsewhere:  
[P]ictorial composition induces images of inner processes as we follow delineated 
rhythms, movements, directions with their counter-directions, contrasts or 
affinities of shape with their attendant voids, as well as the often precarious 
balancing of masses. Predominant accents do not achieve settlement without the 
help of other, and perhaps contrary, references: hence the immanent vitality, and a 
variety of possible approaches in analyzing a composition. (Stokes, 1965, p. 20)  
 In the next section, I will begin applying some of the concepts and ideas summarized 
here to photography as an artistic process, as well as to the analysis of several specific 
individual photographs.  
 
III. Photography as an art 
 
 I will conclude this chapter with a brief attempt to apply some of the foregoing 
concepts specifically to photography, with the aim of beginning to address the question of 
what some of the factors may be that endow a photograph with aesthetic value and 
significance. In so far as I happen to be a practicing photographer myself, I will utilize 
some of my own photographs to illustrate some of the points I will be making. I realize 
that it could be argued that, as the creator of these photos, I may be lacking the emotional 
distance and objectivity required in order to assess and discuss them fruitfully; 
nevertheless, the opposite could also be argued, namely, that my unusual position as both 
a photographer and someone who is theorizing about photography in fact gives me a 
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privileged vantage point from which to attempt to analyze my own photographs. And, in 
fact, there is a very illustrious precedent for such utilization of one’s own productions for 
purposes of psychoanalytic exploration; this is precisely what Freud did with his own 
dreams and parapraxes. I will begin with some general points, and then proceed to the 
discussion of a few specific photographs. My discussion in this section will at times be 
meditative in character: I will hazard ideas that may not be easy to empirically 
corroborate in a strict sense; but this may be inevitable in any discussion in the domain of 
aesthetics.   
 The exceptional pertinence of the idea of creativity as reparation (Segal, 1952) to 
photography hardly needs further elucidation. Nevertheless, we may need to further 
unpack and refine our understanding of photographic reparation if it is to become a 
criterion of photographic aesthetics. As already discussed in previous chapters, 
photography by definition, by the very nature of its operation, always preserves 
something of the past. So, on an initial reading, it might appear that a reparative aim is 
always present when a photograph is taken. Indeed, capturing and preserving their 
memories and the visage of their loved ones and of themselves is, self-evidently, the 
explicit, avowed purpose of people who take everyday snapshots. However, it is equally 
evident that this aim does not automatically endow the snapshots in question with 
aesthetic value. So what is to be made of this apparent paradox?  
Certainly, the parameter of talent may be a factor playing a role here, and may 
indeed be an irreducible factor (although I will presently suggest that even talent may be 
partly reducible, or at least dependent for its unhindered operation, on some other 
psychological parameter(s)). Leaving that issue aside for a moment, though, another 
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factor that may be operative here may be the exact nature of the reparative aim. It will be 
recalled from Chapter 2 that a seemingly reparative attitude is often tinged with a manic 
element, so that, albeit apparently aimed at atoning for and repairing loss, in fact it 
covertly and subtly denies the very reality of loss (and the subject’s phantasied and/or 
real implication in it). We encountered a parallel to this in Segal’s suggestion (1952) that 
the pseudo-artist, who just produces glib, prettified art, similarly evades a real 
engagement with the depressive position. I think Stokes’ distinction between the carving 
and modelling modes of approaching and molding the artistic medium is pertinent here. 
Thus, a more manically-tinged pseudo-reparative attitude would be more likely to give 
rise to a modelling approach, that is, to a more omnipotent handling and manipulation of 
the material. This may be more obvious in the case of photography that is produced with 
artistic intent and is technically immaculate, but is somehow empty and leaves one cold, 
or at least does not engage the viewer on a deep emotional level. Certain types of garden-
variety studio photography come to mind, as well as the work of renowned photographers 
such as (other names could easily be substituted for these) Helmut Newton, Robert 
Mapplethorpe, Annie Leibovitz, and even someone as revered as Ansel Adams. 
However, I would claim that a similar mechanism is at work in the production of most 
everyday snapshots, but is harder to detect because of the confounding factor of lack of 
technical expertise. In other words, the fact that a photographer lacks the expertise to 
enable him to omnipotently manipulate his material in terms of photographic technique 
(for instance, in terms of lighting, composition, staging, etc.) should not blind us to the 
realization that omnipotent manic manipulation may take many forms, and does not 
presuppose technical expertise (even though it may be fostered and even disguised by the 
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latter). Thus, the amateur photographer who insists that his subject(s) pose in a rigid static 
way and ‘say cheese’ in order to be photographed is in fact engaging in as extreme a form 
of omnipotent modelling as the studio photographer who produces glittery, impressive 
yet soulless studio portraits.  
Implicit in the above statement is a distinction that is worth spelling out more 
explicitly: the photographer’s medium is not the camera (and other equipment), but rather 
the external world in its visual aspect. The camera is just the photographer’s tool, much 
as the chisel is the sculptor’s. Thus, when I am speaking of the omnipotent manipulation 
of the material, I am referring to what the photographer does with his subject(s), the 
people and/or objects in the external world that he photographs. Technical expertise may 
facilitate such manipulation, but in no way does it necessarily imply it; and, to repeat the 
point, neither does omnipotent manipulation of the photographic material presuppose 
expertise in the use of the photographic tool. Thus, to return to the issue of talent: on a 
superficial level, talent may refer to a facility with the use of the photographic tool. In 
that sense, an insufficient working-through of the depressive position, in other words, a 
reliance on omnipotent and manic defenses, in fact interferes with the employment of 
such talent, or, more accurately, may usurp and thus spoil or pervert it. On a secondary 
level, then, it may be more fruitful to understand talent as the conjunction of a keen visual 
sense, facility with the use of the artistic tool, and an ability to engage with the medium 
(the world) non-defensively, on a deep psychological level. Additionally, even the above-
mentioned factor of a keen visual sense may be interfered with by the operation of 
defenses, or, to put it differently, a keen visual sense may be partly dependent on the 
relative lack of defensiveness.   
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In so far as the photographer’s medium is the external world, or, more accurately, 
whatever in the world is visible, it follows that, according to the conception I have been 
arguing for, aesthetic value in photographs is correlated with an openness and 
receptiveness toward the external world as encountered, as opposed to an emphasis on 
molding and manipulating the world in order to photograph it. Schematically, a probably 
necessary albeit not sufficient condition for a snapshot’s attaining aesthetic value is that it 
be spontaneous, that the subject(s) not be asked to pose and artificially smile. This should 
not be construed to imply that I think that all posed photographs by definition lack 
aesthetic value, by dint of being posed – quite the contrary. In fact, I would like to 
suggest that in the earlier days of photography, when the mechanical and chemical nature 
of the equipment then used necessitated the sitter to not only pose but indeed to maintain 
that pose for a number of seconds or even minutes, a much greater percentage of portraits 
attained aesthetic value than nowadays. I have no way of proving this claim at present; 
nevertheless, the rationale behind it would be that, in earlier times, having one’s portrait 
taken was serious business: it was not an occasion for forcing a fake smile onto one’s 
face. An awareness of transience, of the weight of time, seems to be imprinted on the 
features and gaze of sitters in those old portraits. Such emotional depth may of course be 
present in posed photographs made at any time; I am focusing my discussion on early 
photographic portraiture precisely to emphasize the fact that, even though most of those 
portraits were taken by run-of-the-mill unknown commercial photographers, not 
recognized great artists, they nevertheless often attain a high degree of aesthetic value, 
which might be attributable to a mutual acceptance of the depressive position on the part 
of both photographer and sitter. In other words, not only did those photographers not try 
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to impose a fake cheerfulness on their sitters, but the subjects of the photographs 
themselves were also not interested in presenting such a fake façade to the world. It goes 
without saying, of course, that in earlier times as well, there was a fair share of 
photographs that were posed in a stilted, emotionally inauthentic way – even though 
people may not, as a rule, have tried to create a fake impression of cheerfulness back 
then, they may often have tried to project an overly serious or self-important persona, for 
instance. But, generally speaking, it seems that both photographers and photographed 
subjects tended to engage with the photographic process in a more emotionally authentic 
way in earlier times.    
The photographic genre that primarily epitomizes my conception of aesthetically 
meritorious photography as predicated on a controlled surrender to the medium (the 
world), however, is not portraiture but documentary photography, and, within that wider 
tradition, especially the sub-genre known as street photography. This refers to 
photography that occurs in public spaces (primarily but not necessarily outdoors), and 
that has no particular subject. It is not about newsworthy or important events or people, 
but about the quotidian, the mundane, the unnoticed fabric of everyday life. Importantly, 
this genre of photography also has no other function than an aesthetic one, unlike more 
commercial genres (such as fashion or advertising photography), but also unlike the other 
great sub-species of documentary photography, namely, photojournalism. 
Parenthetically, photojournalistic photography may face the further obstacle in 
terms of accruing aesthetic significance that, by dint of its subject matter, it may as a rule 
be less likely to achieve the golden balance between form and content described by 
Gombrich (1966). Its content may often be too intense or overwhelming to allow room 
 140 
for aesthetic form, even when significant form is there in the composition of the picture. 
In fact, the presence of aesthetically significant formal characteristics often raises 
criticisms toward photojournalism, as in the condemnation of what is sometimes referred 
to as ‘poverty porn’, for example. In other words, it often feels offensive that a 
photographer would present subject matter such as the misery of others, or natural 
disasters, or scenes from war, in a manner that is formally beautiful. Form there may be, 
but it is overwhelmed and overtaken by content. 
This obstacle is not present in the case of street photography. If anything, the 
reverse difficulty may need to be overcome, namely, transcending the subject matter in 
such a way as to make an interesting work of art out of content that is essentially 
unremarkable and commonplace. The case of found poetry, earlier alluded to, is very 
pertinent here, as is Gombrich’s great insight that puns “are discovered in the language” 
(1966, p. 35). Likewise, the street photographer’s art consists, to a large extent, in 
allowing himself to surrender and be immersed in the external world so that he achieves a 
great degree of attunement to the flow of life around him, and yet be alert and detached 
enough at the same time to not be just enwrapped and lost in an experience of merging 
with his surroundings. This kind of photography is not predicated on creation, but on 
discovery: the recognition of visual configurations and relationships in the external 
world, that, albeit accidental and encountered by chance, resonate with the 
photographer’s own “mind and conflicts” (Gombrich, 1966, p. 38), and, potentially, with 
those of his audience as well (in fact, such an expansion of meaningfulness from the self 
to other people would be the litmus test of the transformation of one’s own resonant 
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themes and conflicts into something that can be incorporated into the history and 
institution of art).   
In Stokes’ terminology, street photography is much closer to the carving mode: it 
is not about manipulating and creating a reality (as in stage-setting a studio portrait, for 
instance), but all about creating a photograph out of what happens to be there, what the 
world gives. Certainly, as Stokes himself came to realize, neither of the two modes of 
shaping one’s medium ever comes unalloyed; recall also his insight that an element of 
aggression, attack, and even “defacement” (1965, p. 24) is always involved in, and even 
presupposed by, every creative endeavor.  Thus, even a photographer primarily operating 
in the carving mode still enforces himself upon his medium (the world) to an extent; 
minimally, he slices up his visual field, and imposes a frame, four arbitrary sides, on the 
photograph.  
Suggested in this delicate balance between the carving and the modeling stance is 
also the idea of a parallel fine balance between fusion and separation, ecstasy and 
detachment. It will be recalled that this dimension of creativity and the aesthetic 
experience was emphasized both by Marion Milner and Adrian Stokes. This dialectic is 
particularly apt in the case of documentary/street photography, where it is absolutely 
essential for the photographer to be in a state of constant, very heightened awareness of 
the flow of life around him, a very heightened empathy (even to the extent of anticipating 
the next movement or gesture or position in space of the people in his environment and 
their relative configurations in space), and yet must also maintain the presence of mind 
and awareness of his own boundaries and position in space necessitated by a kind of 
photography where acting extremely fast, and good timing, are of the absolute essence; a 
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kind of photography in which a difference of a few hundredths of a second in when one 
presses the shutter, or a few centimeters this way or that in where one positions oneself in 
space or how one composes the frame, can make or break a photograph. As Stokes 
described, the work of art (and, during the unfolding of the creative process itself, the 
emergent, inchoate work, the artistic medium, which in the case of photography is the 
visible world) envelops us, we become enwrapped in it; and yet, in order for a work of art 
to emerge out of this fusion (rather than a mystical solipsistic experience), detachment, 
the awareness of the separateness and self-sufficiency of the external object, is equally 
essential. Thus, describing his experience of photographing, the great street photographer 
Garry Winogrand is quoted as saying “The way I would put it is that I get totally out of 
myself. It’s the closest I come to not existing, I think, which is the best – which is to me 
attractive” (Szarkowski, 1988, p. 34). And yet, Winogrand’s photographs are anything 
but the products of someone who does not exist, in their razor-sharp alertness and 
perceptiveness, their sensitivity and their often sarcastic humor, their exquisite timing. 
For what it’s worth, I can also vouch for experiencing a similar state when I am 
photographing, especially when it is a ‘good day’ and I have managed to enter ‘the zone’ 
(I am using this rather unfortunate yet evocative term for lack of a better one), this 
peculiar state of being and of experiencing the world and its flow, a state characterized by 
both intense immersion and, simultaneously, detachment.  
To conclude this section, I will now utilize some of my own photographs to 
illustrate some of the points touched upon above. First, a formal portrait (Figure 1):  
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Figure 1: Portrait of my grandmother, circa 1993. Photograph by the author.  
  
This is a picture of my late grandmother, and one of the first good photographs I 
took, when I was starting out in photography. She was already very old at the time, in her 
late nineties, and died a few years later. I was extremely fond of my grandmother. I took 
many photos of her, painfully aware of the fact that she was getting very old and would 
not be around forever. I have many photos of my grandmother’s face. And yet, this 
photograph is the best portrait of her I have, even though it does not really answer to the 
dictionary definition of a portrait. I have other pictures of her that are very moving, very 
touching in the way she smiles or looks straight at the camera wistfully. Perhaps those 
photographs would be experienced as touching by others as well, people who never knew 
my grandmother; perhaps even more so than this somewhat cryptic picture, because of 
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their more obvious sentimentality. But, even though those other portraits may be easy to 
like and even to be moved by, I would claim that it is their wearing their sentimentality 
on their sleeve that renders them less successful as art. I would claim that sentimentality 
is, on some level, a gloss on true depressive anxiety and real mourning. Additionally, by 
not showing my grandmother’s face, this photograph can potentially resonate more with 
any viewer, as it is more open to their projecting their own memories of similar figures 
onto it. It requires more work from the viewer, and provides a space for them to channel 
their own creativity in the process of aesthetic appreciation. By the way, one could claim, 
not inaccurately, that this rather unusual portrait is predicated on a decapitation of sorts – 
recall Stokes’ statement that reparation is dependent “upon initial attack” (1965, p. 23).  
The other element of this photograph that I find interesting is how my 
grandmother’s body and hands seem to emerge from (or recede into) the surrounding 
darkness. My guess would be that, on a primary-process level, this formal element may 
be evocative not only of the notion of transience, but also of the very dialectic between 
fusion and separation, between the loosening of boundaries and the emergence of a self-
sufficient object, which is, according to the theoreticians we have been discussing, of the 
essence of the aesthetic experience. I believe it also evokes the carving modality of 
artistic creation, the emergence of an aesthetic object out of the raw material that, 
although seemingly undifferentiated, nevertheless already contained the finished object in 
embryonic, inchoate form.  
Next, consider this photograph (Figure 2):  
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Figure 2: Prince Street, NYC, 2010. Photograph by the author.  
 
The element of someone emerging from the darkness is also present in this picture. It is 
indeed a recurrent theme in my photography. Over and above that, however, I think this 
photograph is also illustrative of Stokes’ idea that the formal and compositional elements 
of a work can also depict and evoke inner processes and constellations of object-
relationship. Thus, it might not be too far-fetched to imagine that this photograph owes its 
power, to a large extent, to the tensions (and perhaps the attainment of a dynamic 
equilibrium) evoked by the configuration of the two arrows pointing in opposite 
directions, the woman being caught exactly in the middle between these two arrows, and 
the red disembodied forbidding hand in the upper right. My claim, then, is that such a 
configuration of formal compositional elements triggers and evokes, on a deep layer of 
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the mind, a sense of inner conflict, perhaps a sense of disorientation or irresolution. The 
woman’s somewhat indecipherable, enigmatic expression would seem to add to this sense 
of confusion or hesitancy. Ultimately, however, a sense of resolution of conflict may also 
be evoked by this photograph: the arrow pointing left is more luminous, and in that sense 
mirrors the woman’s lit face; there may be a forbidding red hand in the picture, but she 
has turned her back on it and seems to be striding forward. I would claim, then, that this 
sense of a delicate balance between fixation and the eventual resolution of conflict that is 
triggered by this photograph is one of the elements that confer aesthetic value on it.  
 Incidentally, such a depiction of inner processes as I am claiming this photograph 
evokes could conceivably also be readily represented in a more staged, conceptual 
photograph. However, the essential difference would be that in such a conceptual work 
the evocation of such a state of affairs would originate in (or be primarily mediated by) 
the secondary process, not the primary one; it would be a matter of illustrating a concept 
in an intellectualized manner. It is not within the scope of the present discussion to 
address the issue of conceptual art; still, I’d like to claim in passing that the peculiar 
indifference and coldness often evoked (at least evoked in me) by conceptual art, even 
conceptual art of a high caliber, stems from this, the fact that it is art mediated primarily 
by the secondary process. Conversely, this is the great appeal of street photography for 
me: the fact that it is ideally suited for the unfolding of the kind of creative process where 
the artistic medium meets the artist’s unconscious halfway, so to speak, and, in a 
serendipitous way, occasionally provides him with “the structures that will greet him as 
meaningful in terms of his mind and conflicts” (Gombrich, 1966, p. 38).  
 Another such serendipitous photograph (Figure 3):  
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Figure 3: W 49th St, NYC, 2010. Photograph by the author.  
 
This photograph demonstrates even more clearly than the previous one the importance of 
the element of chance in street photography. We could hypothesize that part of the appeal 
of this picture stems from the Janus-like juxtaposition of the two male heads in the center 
of the photograph, which is not only formally interesting, but presumably triggers 
associations and imagos related to themes of identity, identificatory processes, the 
occasional fluidity of boundaries between people, inter-generational dynamics, etc. And 
we could also hypothesize that such themes are unconsciously poignant for most people, 
the photographer included. But, importantly, it was precisely the chance occurrence of 
this element in the visual field, this accidental discovery in the photographer’s medium 
(the visual world) that triggered the taking of this photograph. I did not go about looking 
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for an image that would illustrate or express my interest in processes of identification or 
object relations; it just happened to come along. Additionally, this would presumably 
have been a much less artistically successful photograph if the host of more minor 
characters surrounding the central ones were absent, or indeed if they were not all 
positioned in such places in the frame that give the picture balance and complexity, a 
sense of suspended animation and dynamic equilibrium. More so than in other art forms, 
the medium imposes itself on the end product in an all-important way in this kind of 
photography; street photography is a co-creation of the photographer and the world.  
 
 
Figure 4: Governor’s Island, NYC, 2013. Photograph by the author.  
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The same holds for this photograph (Figure 4). It is the serendipitous contrast between 
the general tenor of the surrounding scene (and the smiling face of the woman on the 
right), and the little boy’s scream and his tortured expression that lend this photograph 
emotional force. The photograph functions as a work of art because it manages to contain 
these conflicting emotions and integrate them in a unified whole; in Stokes’ words, it is 
“a whole and self-sufficient object” (1961, p. 43). The fact that this object can thus 
contain conflicting and perhaps intense emotions, not least the little boy’s obvious, albeit 
transitory, agony, is, I claim, soothing and containing for the viewer as well. We have all 
been that screaming child. And yet, here we are now. The agony was survived. The 
photograph is a reminder of that fact (as is all artistic creation, of course, but often in a 
less explicit way – this photograph, on the other hand, conveys that message on two 
different levels; qua art, and also in terms of its more specific manifest content).  
But formal elements also play a very significant role in suggesting or enhancing 
such an emotional contrast. Thus, the blue balloon at the center of the picture is not only 
important in terms of its content (we know that balloons denote festive occasions and, 
supposedly, evoke feelings of happiness), but also in a purely geometrical formal sense: 
notice how the lower curvature of the balloon perfectly follows the curvature in the white 
dress of a woman hidden by the balloon, and how the upper edge of the balloon is aligned 
almost perfectly with the straight line of the roof of the black vehicle in the background, 
as in a tangent. My suggestion is that these purely formal elements, in their geometrical 
elegance, evoke feeling-states: form becomes content.  
 Finally, this photograph (Figure 5):  
 150 
 
Figure 5: Lower Broadway, NYC, 2009. Photograph by the author.  
 
Again, serendipity is of paramount importance here. Notice how the little girl’s facial 
expression almost perfectly mirrors that of the woman on the right. These people are not 
connected in any way in life, and yet they are linked in the photograph, for this one 
photographed instant. They become a reflection of each other. Milner’s (1952) concept of 
‘identity in difference’ comes to mind. The woman in the poster, in between the other 
two, adds an element of triangulation to the composition (in terms of form, and thus, we 
could claim following Stokes, also on an unconscious, object-relational level).  
I usually don’t care much for written language in photographs, because I feel that 
words written in a language the viewer speaks may be unduly manipulative of his or her 
understanding of the artwork, either intentionally (as in more conceptually-driven work), 
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or inadvertently. Ideally, a photograph should be able to function on a purely visual, non-
linguistic register. Nevertheless, in the kind of photography I have been espousing, in 
which surrender to the external world (to what is given) is essential, sometimes it is just 
unavoidable that some written signage happens to be there, as is the case in this picture. 
Inevitably, each viewer will have their own associations triggered by such linguistic cues, 
especially by an emotionally charged word, as the word “TRAUMA” in this photograph. 
But the presence of this word was not important to me when I took this photograph, at 
least on a conscious level; if anything, I wished it were not there: I don’t aspire to crudely 
manhandling the understanding and reactions of viewers of my work, and, even more 
importantly, I was worried that it might divert attention from what, to me, were the more 
interesting elements in the picture. Nevertheless, after the fact, indeed after quite some 
time, I discovered an unexpected association latent in that word, which pleased me 
greatly. It occurred to me that, in German, ‘Traum’ means ‘dream’; this seemed very 
fitting, given my understanding of art in general, and photography in particular, as closely 
linked to the dreamwork.5     
 
 
 
                                                
5 Without meaning to subtract from the poetic significance of this association in the least, 
nevertheless on second thought it occurs to me that perhaps I have been protesting too 
much, so to speak, regarding the supposed lack of significance of the prominent word 
‘TRAUMA’ to me when taking this photo. Indeed, given the manner in which personal 
photographs have indeed at times functioned as quite traumatic stimuli for me, as alluded 
to in the Introduction, it may well be that the presence of this word in the frame, far from 
being an unavoidable nuisance, may have in fact played a not insignificant unconscious 
or preconscious role in my being intrigued by this scene and choosing to take this 
photograph in the first place.   
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CHAPTER 4: SCREEN MEMORIES GONE SOUR: PHOTOGRAPHY IN THE 
POETRY OF KIKI DIMOULA 
 
 
Apart from my brief comments on some specific photographs in the previous 
chapter, this discussion has been conducted on a conceptual, theoretical plane throughout. 
It is one of the aims of this dissertation to set a theoretical framework that may eventually 
generate empirical research and psychoanalytic case studies tackling the hypotheses that 
have been proffered here on a purely conceptual basis. Until that time comes, and in 
order to put some flesh on the theoretical bones hitherto presented, I will in this chapter 
attempt a brief literary case study of sorts. I will attempt to illustrate some of the points 
made in the previous chapters through a reading of several poems by the great 
contemporary Greek poet Kiki Dimoula (pronounced Kikí Dee-moo-láh). As many 
commentators have observed (Margellos, 2012; Lesser, 2012), and as is amply evident 
even after a cursory survey of her oeuvre, time, loss, and memory are the overarching 
motifs of Dimoula’s poetry; it should come as no surprise, then, that she often reaches out 
to photography as a theme epitomizing those preoccupations. Within the confines of this 
chapter I will of necessity limit myself to a mostly superficial analysis of her work, 
focusing only on some of the poems where she explicitly makes reference to 
photographs. In fact, in some of these poems, one’s relation to photographs is the central 
theme, even to the extent of furnishing the poem with its title. Dimoula’s work is very 
pertinent to my present purpose, not only insofar as it instantiates and illustrates some 
aspects of the uses of photographs that I have been talking about, but even more so on a 
meta level, inasmuch as Dimoula has herself deeply thought through the place of 
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photography in our lives in relation to loss, our ways of negotiating grief, and memory. In 
a 2011 interview, the poet stated: “I love photographs, because they give flesh to 
shadows. And this prevents them from disintegrating and disappearing right away” 
(quoted in Dimoula, 2012, p. xix).  
A few biographical markers may be useful before we get to the poems. Dimoula 
was born in 1931, and met her future husband, Athos Dimoulas (also a poet), in 1945, 
when she was 14; he was 10 years her senior. They were married nine years later, in 
1954, and stayed together until Athos’ death in 1985. This event proved momentous and 
devastating: “His death cut off my arms and legs, rendered me useless, made me too 
scared to go out, to meet people. I never got over this interruption of our coexistence”, 
Dimoula is quoted as saying (Dimoula, 2012, p. 316-7). And, again, nine years after her 
husband’s death: “This grief will not subside. Precisely because the loss is so great, it 
manages, little by little, to resemble existence. And I don’t mean those ghosts born out of 
memories. No. It’s something like a methodical effort, on the part of the deceased, to live 
on. For his own sake” (Dimoula, 2012, p. 317). Significantly, Dimoula has been 
dedicating all of her poetry collections following her husband’s death to him, usually 
with the self-aware and perhaps ironic turn of phrase “To Athos, again”. Nevertheless, 
her obsessive thematic preoccupation with memory, transience, and loss, predated this 
trauma in her life. We can thus assume that she was keenly attuned to these aspects of the 
human condition even before her own personal history endowed them with added and 
painful poignancy.  
At this juncture, it would be useful to note a pronounced parallel between, on the 
one hand, Dimoula’s obsession with photographs (both in her own personal life, as 
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attested by her statement quoted earlier, and, thematically, in her poetic oeuvre) and her 
apparently unresolvable grief about her husband’s death, and, on the other hand, Roland 
Barthes’ (1980) own very personal preoccupation with photography, which was, in his 
case, intimately linked to his immense grief over the death of his beloved mother. Barthes 
began writing Camera Lucida (1980), which was to be his final book published during 
his lifetime, soon after his mother’s death, and the book can readily be construed as both 
an attempt to bind and express his grief, and as a reflection on the role of photographs in 
such a process; or, more accurately, a reflection on the double-edged function of 
photographs, as poignant reminders of loss (even before the fact), but also as talismanic 
links to the lost love object, affording the bereaved a kind of “umbilical cord” (1980, p. 
81) to the object of his love, and thus making possible a kind of transcendence of 
objective reality, a “photographic ecstasy” (1980, p. 117; italics in the original).  
 Another point of connection between Dimoula and Barthes that will soon become 
more apparent has to do with Barthes’ concept of the punctum: “A photograph’s punctum 
is that accident which pricks me (but also bruises me, is poignant to me)” (1980, p. 27). 
This can be a formal element, a detail in the composition or subject matter of the 
photograph that grabs the viewer’s attention and becomes a locus of emotional 
significance; over and above that, however, Barthes suggests that there is another latent 
punctum inherent in every photograph, having to do with the very nature of the medium, 
the ontology of the photographic process (cf. Chapter 1, section III): every photograph, in 
its essence, is an evocation of what-has-been, an assertion that ‘that has been’ (but is no 
longer, either due to physical death, or the metaphorical death that is the passage of time). 
“This new punctum, which is no longer of form but of intensity, is Time, the lacerating 
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emphasis of the noeme (“that-has-been”), its pure representation. … I shudder, like 
Winnicott’s psychotic patient, over a catastrophe which has already occurred. Whether 
or not the subject is already dead, every photograph is this catastrophe” (1980, p. 96; 
italics in the original).   
Coming back to Dimoula: even though memory was almost from the very 
beginning the main thread running through her poetry, there are just a few scattered 
specific references to photographs in her first three published collections. A 1963 poem6 
poignantly titled Career, from her third collection, concludes with the following lines:  
 
Now  
From the far edge of a nostalgia 
I receive word of you:  
You’ve ended up frequenting  
Some old photograph of yours 
Excelling in its papery intensity.  
 
Already in this early poem we can detect the beginnings of what will later become a main 
trope of Dimoula’s treatment of photographs as objects almost acquiring a life of their 
own, and endowing the people depicted in them with a kind of second life, furnishing 
them with a new lease of life of sorts, in an uncanny parallel photographic universe. The 
                                                
6 All translations of the poems are mine. Dimoula’s work, although translated in many 
languages, was until recently largely unavailable in English translation. A volume of her 
selected poetry was published by Yale last year (Dimoula, 2012), but, sadly, in my 
estimation the translations provided there are largely unsatisfactory and often 
misunderstanding of the nuances of the originals.  
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narrator’s ambivalence is obvious: she seems to be experiencing some kind of almost 
masochistic bittersweet enjoyment in prolonging the connection with the lost loved one 
via his photographic image, and yet there is also a barely covert accusation, in her 
sarcastically describing him as having “ended up” frequenting the photograph, and 
“excelling” in his residence there. The photographic prolongation of memory comes with 
a sting. In another poem titled Counterpassage, from 1971, we encounter the following 
image, epitomizing the idea that photographs come to life through the rememberer’s care 
for the past – an essentially reparative act:  
 
It seems you often water the walls with reverie  
So that photographs bloom here and there.  
 
Less charitably, though, we could also read these lines as rather signifying an inability to 
mourn, an unwillingness to let go of the past, leading to what I previously described as a 
sort of fetishization of photographs, a talismanic use of them in the service of a retreat 
from reality (the reality of loss and the passage of time), what the poet describes as a 
“reverie”. This could be a kind of pathological psychic retreat. According to Steiner 
(1993), a psychic retreat is a very entrenched defensive structure that is geared toward 
enabling the subject to avoid the anxieties and pain associated with the paranoid-schizoid 
and depressive positions, by retreating into an imaginary space of illusory self-sufficiency 
predicated on the disavowal of reality. The paramount function of the psychic retreat is to 
evade the awareness of separateness. However, “[t]he relief provided by the retreat is 
achieved at the cost of isolation, stagnation, and withdrawal” (Steiner, 1993, p. 2). The 
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danger with getting lost in such photographic reverie, then (compare this with Barthes’ 
‘photographic ecstasy’), is that one may become stuck in it and unable to move on: as 
Barthes remarks, “when [a photograph] is painful, nothing in it can transform grief into 
mourning” (1980, p. 90). The lost love object just won’t let go (meaning, of course, that 
one won’t let go of the love object; but such blurring of boundaries and merging of 
subject and object is of the essence of the internalized pathological object relationships at 
the core of a psychic retreat). And, in fact, in Light by heart, a later poem from 1988, a 
very similar image of photographs has taken on a much more patently sinister aspect: 
 
Peeping Toms your photographs all around  
Top executives in the thriving corporation of walls  
  
The persecutory quality is here unmistakable – the tables are turned and the photographs 
are taking on a life of their own, almost turning into bizarre objects (Bion, 1956, 1957). 
These are material objects that have become suffused, in phantasy, with split-off aspects 
of the subject’s mind and personality. Moreover, bizarre objects are steeped in 
aggression, both in the sense that the parts of the personality that the subject attempts to 
disavow and get rid of tend to be uncomfortably aggressive ones, and, additionally, 
because the very process of projectively identifying with and taking over an external 
object as a vehicle for parts of oneself is felt to be a very aggressive act as such, and thus 
evokes feelings of persecutory guilt and the fear of retaliation. Such a reversal and 
merging of roles finds a perfect illustration here. Even though it is, by definition, the 
bereaved who cannot stop looking at the photographs of the loved one, here it is the lost 
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person’s photographs who have turned into intrusive “Peeping Toms”. Additionally, 
through this poetic, evocative image Dimoula illustrates the autonomization of 
photographs from both their subjects and viewers in a very poignant way. Crucially, 
photographs are material objects that can go on being independently of human intentions, 
as discussed in Chapter 2. They thus readily lend themselves to potentially occupying this 
psychological no-man’s-land between subject and depicted object.  
The earlier poem (Counterpassage) comes from Dimoula’s 1971 collection The 
Little of the World. It was at this juncture that photography really turned into a major 
theme of her poetry, to the extent that several poems in that collection (even down to 
their titles) are in their entirety devoted to the place of photography in connection with 
one’s relation to the past and one’s retrospective conception of oneself and the course of 
one’s life. Thus, the following poem, titled Photograph 1948:  
 
It looks as if I’m holding a flower.  
That’s odd.  
It seems a garden  
Once crossed my life. 
  
In my other hand  
I’m holding a stone.  
Gracefully and defiantly.  
No inkling  
That I’m being forewarned of changes,  
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That I’m afforded a foretaste of defenses.  
It seems ignorance  
Once crossed my life.  
 
I’m smiling.  
The arc of the smile, 
The concavity of that mood,  
Resembles a well-flexed bow,  
All set.  
It seems a target 
Once crossed my life.  
And a presumption of victory.  
 
The gaze steeped  
In original sin:  
Tasting  
The forbidden fruit of expectation. 
It seems faith  
Once crossed my life.  
 
My shadow, a mere play of the sun.  
It’s wearing a costume of hesitation.  
It hasn’t yet had the time to become 
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A comrade or informer.  
It seems sufficiency  
Once crossed my life.  
 
You are nowhere to be seen.  
Yet, since there’s a precipice in the landscape,  
Since I’m standing on its edge  
Holding a flower 
And smiling,  
you can’t be too far off. 
It seems life 
Once crossed my life.  
 
Here, an old photograph retroactively (i.e., with the hindsight afforded by the knowledge 
of later life events) acquires new meanings, and is imbued with an almost prophetic aura, 
the knowingness of afterwardness (cf. Chapter 2). In one fell swoop, Dimoula seems to 
be both acknowledging the defensive uses photographs can be put to, our need to use 
them as screens to foster illusion and disavowal, while also deconstructing that 
temptation in an almost clinical manner. What seems to me most striking is the reversal 
through which the photograph, from being a vehicle of illusion, is itself made to become 
the vantage point from which a life can be surveyed in its wide scope and thus imbued 
with new layers of meaning; in afterwardness, the photograph becomes the vehicle for the 
return of the real. The photograph becomes a window through which one can travel 
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through time, telescoping the sequence of one’s life’s events and linking them in such a 
way as to construct a meaningful, albeit bitter, narrative. Intriguingly, Dimoula chooses a 
posed portrait as her photographic example in this poem. The narrator’s younger self is 
standing somewhere in nature, holding a flower and a stone, and smiling. It is not clear if 
her gaze is directed at the camera or elsewhere, but it is expectant, optimistic. Indeed, as 
we saw in chapter 1, posed portraits are especially transparent examples of the defensive 
use of photographs as narcissistic props and screen memories. Nevertheless, with 
hindsight such a photograph can also afford a very poignant foil for the knowledge 
acquired subsequent to the staging and taking of the photograph. This lends an air of 
almost bittersweet irony to such an image, as if the narrator is telling herself ‘ah, little did 
I know…’. The mood of the poem is consistently that of loss, the loss of certainties and 
illusions; in other words, disillusionment. And yet, the wisdom of afterwardness 
notwithstanding, in the last two lines the narrator seems to be reaffirming the importance 
of illusions, the value of naiveté: “It seems life / Once crossed my life”. As if 
disillusionment is somehow equivalent to death, or, at best, an afterlife of sorts. On an 
alternative reading, though, what these lines suggest might be that part of the essence of 
life is precisely this movement from illusion to disillusionment, by definition always 
occurring when it’s too late.       
 This difficulty in unequivocally deciphering or deciding the meaning of a life, and 
of a photograph, is beautifully conveyed in the last stanza of a poem poignantly entitled 
Montage (with the straightforward subtitle Photograph):  
 
But you’re at the rudder.  
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Is it a boat’s implement 
Or your life’s?  
Is the boat yours,  
Or stolen?  
Is the courage yours,  
Or the photograph’s?  
Are you steering or being steered?  
Was there a rudder to begin with,  
Or did the photographer engage in some montage 
And the unsteerable 
Acquired a rudder,  
Just like our peasant grandfathers found themselves  
In framed pictures  
Wearing ties?   
 
The choice of the image of the boat and rudder is an especially apt one, given the 
entrenched and almost universal metaphor of life as a journey (Lakoff & Johnson, 1980). 
In suspecting some photomontage that might have resulted in the surreptitious imposition 
of just this particular image in the original photograph, the narrator here is suggesting that 
what lies at the core of the defensive, white-washing use of photographs is the temptation 
to retroactively superimpose an illusory sense of teleology, purpose, and meaning to our 
lives, which are nevertheless essentially “unsteerable”, their courses beyond our control, 
and, at best, only knowable after the fact. Again, it is formal posed photographic portraits 
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that provide Dimoula with a perfect analogy for the process of illusion-making here. 
Interestingly, she is juxtaposing a specific photograph (of a person supposedly steering a 
boat) with other pictures, those of peasants, decades back, who had their picture taken in 
clothing that had nothing to do with the realities of their everyday existence. The lesson is 
that photographic representations can be tendentious and misleading; in any case, they 
are not innocent.  In some cases they wear their tendentiousness on their sleeve, so to 
speak, but Dimoula seems to be suggesting that photographic legerdemain may be much 
more pernicious the less obvious it is; in fact, that every photograph, even a seemingly 
‘candid’, un-staged one, is ripe with ambiguity and potential deception.  
 And here’s the poem giving Dimoula’s 1971 book its title:  
 
The little of the world  
(photograph of a hand)  
 
Here, you’ve avoided the hassle  
Of existing again 
And your hand is alone  
In the photograph’s rectangular night.  
Like a resurrection it’s tearing the paper universe 
Alone and ascending,  
Like a suddenly  
Annulling the Little of the world.  
Where does it think it’s going, in a four by four sky?  
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But suffocating dimensions contain  
The seed of miracles.  
 
I turn the photograph,  
Because the prolonged use of miracles  
Can prove addictive.  
Here it looks like a hand 
Torn from a dancer’s body  
As he was crying Hey!,  
Because the soul was intent on turning one way 
While the body only managed to carry out a different turn.  
A counterpoised rhythm, breaking  
The melody  
As well as the limbs.  
 
I turn the photograph.  
A hand walking down  
The quiet, narrow September  
Of many mute truths.  
 
Here, the hand that engraved  
An Au revoir 
On mankind’s first stone.  
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A wish that only comes true if planted  
On photographic soil.  
 
With a tiny motion 
The hand changes yet again 
Its promises of hovering.  
Now, it’s indistinguishable from an upward caress 
Stroking a memory’s distant hair.  
 
Ah, what use does it have for all these likenesses  
In just this one world?  
 
I let the photograph fall.  
And your hand remains  
An upturned palm 
Toward some palm-reader cloud 
Deciphering it:  
It doesn’t see any link between me and your hand 
No partnership when it comes to heavy loads.   
We’ll never share the burden of lifting  
A casket 
Or a flower. 
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Here, the photographed hand of the lost loved one has attained a further level of 
autonomy; not only is it going-on-being in the parallel universe of the photograph, but it 
has also achieved independence from the rest of the body, it exists “alone in the 
photograph’s rectangular night”, while the hand’s owner has avoided “the hassle / Of 
existing again”. The photographed hand, a Barthesian punctum, thus becomes even more 
conducive to the narrator’s flights of fancy, the rewriting of history in fantasy; it truly 
seems to exist in a potential space (“suffocating dimensions contain / The seed of 
miracles”). (In this connection, cf. also the discussion in Chapter 3 of objects emerging 
from the darkness in a photograph, as exemplified by the photograph of my 
grandmother). This illusion of the transcendence of non-being can be exhilarating and 
redemptive; it temporarily annuls “the Little of the world”. But Dimoula is not one to 
readily give in to easy and false consolations; the need to engage in this imaginative 
annulment of death and transience goes hand in hand with a bittersweet awareness of the 
limitations of such an escape, in a kind of dialectical back-and-forth, a pained dance 
running through the poem. Thus, she cautions (herself as much as the reader) that “the 
prolonged use of miracles / Can prove addictive”; recall the earlier discussion of the 
perils of taking refuge in a psychic retreat. And she knows that an Au revoir “only comes 
true if planted / On photographic soil” (the metaphor of photographs as plants recurs 
again and again in her work). Indeed, quite literally, it is only through photographs that 
we can see again what-has-been, exactly the way it was; Barthes describes the 
photograph as “a temporal hallucination” (1980, p. 115). And then, eventually, the 
photograph is allowed to fall to earth, along with the narrator from her brief imaginative 
flight. A crash landing is inevitable: a photographed hand is no good for carrying any real 
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weight; the only sharing of burdens possible can only occur in reality, and such an 
outcome was not meant to be for the narrator and the owner of the photographed hand. 
But again, such a realization is only possible in afterwardness, with the help of the 
knowledge and experience gained in the interim.  
 A dialogue between past and present, photographed time and real time, as well as 
the process of the post hoc impregnation of a photograph with meaning that can only 
have an extra-photographic source is also evident in the following stanza from a poem 
titled Unexpectations:  
 
I’ve received no news of you. 
Your photograph stationary. 
You stare as if you’re on your way 
you smile as if you’re not. 
Dried flowers on the side 
incessantly repeating for you 
their intemperate name sempervivum 
sempervivum – everlasting, everlasting 
lest you forget what you’re not. 
 
Here, the narrator is, seemingly illogically, complaining to the obviously deceased 
photographic subject that she has received no news from them; the objective fact of death 
is hard to reconcile with the evidential, hallucinatory force of the photographic 
representation’s continued existence. Barthes writes that a photograph is “like the 
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ectoplasm of ‘what-had-been’: neither image nor reality, a new being, really: a reality one 
can no longer touch” (1980, p. 87). This gives rise to an uncanny state of affairs, an 
astonishing, irresolvable aporia: the photograph is “stationary”, “everlasting”, and yet the 
depicted person, although right there in front of the narrator’s eyes, is not. The subject of 
the photograph seems himself caught in this paradox, not quite knowing what to do: 
“You stare as if you’re on your way / You smile as if you’re not”. The ironic 
juxtaposition of the everlastingness of the photograph and the ephemerality of what is 
depicted in it is doubled in the contrast between that person and the sempervivum 
flowers, in a twist characteristic of Dimoula’s mordant humor. Yet even the flowers, 
despite their name, have only survived in the photograph.    
 This theme is further elaborated in a relatively long poem ingeniously entitled 
Passe-Partout (a passe-partout, of course, is not just the cardboard border used for 
mounting a photograph, but also a kind of master key that opens all doors):  
 
I open the photograph’s windows 
to air it. It’s been shut up for a while now 
like many summer-house pasts. 
 
You’re on the balcony. In your old favorite 
position; erect; you’re wearing the earthly colored 
tight-fitting costume of flat surfaces: a tiled 
roof the pine’s puffy jacket, 
patched up in-between with sea 
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in the spots where the branches got torn 
while playing with strong winds. 
The orchards are at high tide 
they’re up to the telegraph poles 
and lemons dangle from the wires 
unripe festive bulbs. 
 
You’re lowering the sun-flag. 
You’re rolling up the awning, crushing 
canvas flowers. Impatiently you rotate 
the motion as if there’s a scarcity of shadow. 
 
So far the photograph is behaving rationally. 
 
Until I appear, a crazy newcomer 
to the picture; as if by plastic removal. 
 
Though I was beside you all along 
co-owner of tide and orchards 
seated just behind you 
in my very cosy pliant smile 
it now looks 
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as if I’ve just been added to the photo. 
With my present face, gaze dark, 
long, its tail dragging on the balcony 
as if it’s me that the official darkness had invited. 
Breathless I stretch as if wanting 
to move you away from the awning 
so you won’t have even more of this shadow quarry 
fall on you. 
You’re sunless enough already. 
 
How did the photograph get updated. 
How did real time enter paper time. 
With what familiarity did torment 
speak to the apathy of inanimates. 
Maybe those inanimates are something deeper. 
Could they be some previous lives of animates 
that at the first painful opportunity 
suffer a relapse?  
 
 In the first stanza, a photograph is ingeniously compared to a place of habitation, 
but one visited only periodically: a summer house. It takes on new life with every new 
visit. Then, the figure of the beloved one depicted in the photograph is described as 
conflated with his surroundings, the physical and natural world. There is a sense of 
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almost dizzying confusion and disorientation, on both the visual and the emotional plane: 
architectural elements, tree branches, the sea and the sky merge with and clothe the man 
on the balcony, while even among themselves physical objects merge in bizarre ways: 
“The orchards are at high tide / … / and lemons dangle from the wires”. And yet the 
narrator, surprisingly, states that up to this point “the photograph is behaving rationally”; 
because the worst is yet to come: a much more radical confusion and disorientation, not 
just of a spatial but of a temporal order. The narrator, as if going through the looking 
glass, comes to inhabit the photographic space in her present incarnation, and, crucially, 
equipped with her present knowledge, the knowledge of events subsequent to this 
photograph. Frantically, she is trying to shelter the man in the picture from the awning’s 
shadow, knowing, as he does not, that he has now joined a different realm of shadows 
(“You’re sunless enough already”). The poem closes with another mordant, ingenious 
remark about temporality, the transience of animates which is made all the more poignant 
by the senseless endurance of the inanimate world (including photographs).  
 I will conclude this chapter with two poems that seem to me to be taking 
Dimoula’s philosophical engagement with photography to exquisite heights. The first of 
these, from 1988, is entitled Substitute:  
 
They are scattering,  
The great rallies of tears.  
Memory and the present are running for cover  
To escape their lucidity.  
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Every now and then a gunshot 
Sorrow is firing now from that conspicuous trench 
Now from a more obscure one.  
It’s a stratagem, to give the impression 
Reinforcements are on the way.  
            Let it surrender.  
 
Your photograph has almost prevailed.  
It has spread out wherever it found a civilian area  
A decimated sense eager for calm.  
It flutters on the mountaintops of gazes  
Not like some sluggish melancholy custom 
But as a brave slanderer of your loss.  
Day by day it convinces that nothing has changed 
That you were always like this, made of paper 
A photograph from birth when I met you  
That thus I loved you always, a vagrant  
Being content to roam 
From picture to likeness 
And back from your likeness to your picture.  
 
Memory and the present must take cover  
From their lucidity.  
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Every now and then a gunshot faintly 
Sorrow is testifying on your behalf 
               let it surrender.  
The only reliable witness to our having lived 
Is our absence.  
 
Here Dimoula is depicting the inner conflict between memory and oblivion (under a 
different description, between memory and screen-memory) as a battlefield of trenches. 
The pull of the temptation to disavow the present (which includes a real memory of the 
past, i.e. of loss) is too strong. (“Memory and the present are running for cover / To 
escape their lucidity”). Sorrow, which is coextensive with lucidity, seems too much to 
bear. The photographic universe expands voraciously, displacing reality and painful 
emotions such as sorrow and the acceptance of loss. (“Your photograph has almost 
prevailed … as a brave slanderer of your loss”). The oblivion of illusion is too sweet, too 
alluring. In this, the photograph, the hallucinatory, fetishistic substitute for real presence, 
can be a powerful ally. Gradually and imperceptibly, the narrator almost comes to believe 
that the lost loved one was always nothing but a photographic representation: “made of 
paper / A photograph from birth when I met you”. And yet, again at the last minute 
Dimoula exposes this for a charade, and asserts that the presence of the photographic 
specter is just the flip side of a very real and irrevocable absence.  
 Finally, another poem from 1988 that seems to me to beautifully illustrate both 
the idea of photographs as screen memories, and the notion of photographs as living 
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things, undergoing developments and transformations in parallel with the course of our 
lives:  
 
Zero star cognac 
 
The prattle of tears is all to no avail.  
When disorder speaks order must remain silent 
- loss is very experienced indeed.  
Now we must stand by the side of  
What’s futile.  
So that memory can little by little recover its eloquence  
So it may offer fine advice on longevity 
To whatever’s dead.  
 
Let’s stand by the side of this little  
Photograph 
still in the prime of its future: 
young people embracing somewhat unavailingly 
before an anonymously merry beach.  
Is this Nafplio Euboea Skopelos?  
But then again 
Wasn’t everywhere by the sea back then?  
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Here Dimoula dismisses “the prattle of tears” as pointless, perhaps suggesting that getting 
lost in sorrow is not a sufficient reaction to loss (cf. how she juxtaposes loss, describing it 
as “very experienced”, to the “prattle” of tears, a characterization with unmistakable 
connotations of immaturity and foolishness). She firmly proposes to “stand by the side of 
/ What’s futile”, not out of naiveté, but in fact in full knowledge of the futility of the 
endeavor, of the photographic resurrection of the dead and reclaiming of the past. The 
equation of photographic presence with such inevitable, necessary futility, is further 
made clear by the repetition of the phrase “stand by the side of”, applied to both the 
notion of “what’s futile” and to “this little photograph”. The pliable and multi-layered 
temporality of photographs is ingeniously expressed by describing an old photograph as 
being “still in the prime of its future”: a lot of life has happened since the photograph was 
taken, all of it imbuing the photograph with layer upon layer of nachträglich meaning, 
like a palimpsest. The photograph is naïve, blandly idyllic: it does not matter where it 
was taken – it’s a moot point, because, after all, back then all was sea and shore, beautiful 
and carefree (and even if it did matter, it seems that the narrator is unable to remember 
the location: once again, a photographic memory, the memory of a photograph, has 
displaced and replaced the memory of the real time and place from which the photograph 
in fact emanated). But then this pronouncement is made tongue-in-cheek; Dimoula is, as 
always, ready to call the photographic screen memory’s bluff, to painfully remind herself, 
and her audience, that this is a futile exercise: life (and death) finally have the last word.   
 This seems to me to be the genius of Dimoula when it comes to her treatment of 
photography: her ability to engage in this seemingly effortless and almost imperceptible 
elision between the use of photographs as props for illusion, and their potential to become 
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true memorials, vehicles (albeit often inadvertent ones) for memory, mourning, and 
pulling the threads of a life together.  
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